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Existence and predicationIn Milton Karl Munitz (ed.), Logic and ontology, New York University Press. pp. 159--174. 1973.
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16An Invitation to Formal Reasoning: The Logic of TermsRoutledge. 2017.An Invitation to Formal Reasoning introduces the discipline of formal logic by means of a powerful new system formulated by Fred Sommers. This system, term logic, is different in a number of ways from the standard system employed in modern logic; most striking is its greater simplicity and naturalness. Based on a radically different theory of logical syntax than the one Frege used when initiating modern mathematical logic in the 19th Century, term logic borrows insights from Aristotle's syllogis…Read more
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14Das "Physikalische Modell" und die "Metaphysiche Wirklichkeit"; Versuch Einer Metaphänomenologie (review)Journal of Philosophy 50 (11): 332-334. 1953.
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The Logic of Natural LanguageRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (3): 367-368. 1983.
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15Leibniz's program for the development of logicIn R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Reidel. pp. 589--615. 1976.
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32Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life (edited book)Wadsworth. 2010.VICE AND VIRTUE IN EVERYDAY LIFE has been a popular choice in college ethics course study for more than two decades because it is well-liked by both college instructors and students. Course instructors appreciate it for its philosophical breadth and seriousness while college students and other readers welcome the engaging topics and readings. VICE AND VIRTUE IN EVERYDAY LIFE provides students with a lively selection of classical and contemporary readings on pressing matters of personal and socia…Read more
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42An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. By G. E. M. Anscombe. (London: Hutchinson University Library. 1959. Pp. 179.) (review)Philosophy 36 (138): 374-. 1961.
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145Dissonant beliefsAnalysis 69 (2): 267-274. 2009.1. Philosophers tend to talk of belief as a ‘propositional attitude.’ As Fodor says:" The standard story about believing is that it's a two place relation, viz., a relation between a person and a proposition. My story is that believing is never an unmediated relation between a person and a proposition. In particular nobody grasps a proposition except insofar as he is appropriately related to some vehicle that expresses the proposition. " Fodor's story – that belief is a three-place relation betw…Read more
Waltham, Massachusetts, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |