Frederik Bakker

Cette introduction présente et contextualise les articles publiés dans la section spéciale dont le but est d’analyser l’interprétation de la pensée hellénistique chez les philosophes continentaux très influents tels que : Agamben, Arendt, Blumenberg, Foucault, Heidegger et Stiegler. Les articles prêtent une attention particulière à trois directions de recherche. Ils examinent tout d’abord l’influence de la pensée hellénistique sur ces auteurs et la façon dont ils ont interprété, utilisé et mésinterprété l’héritage des philosophies hellé-nistiques. Deuxièmement, les articles analysent les hypothèses in-terprétatives et les préjugés qui ont caractérisé ces interprétations. Enfin, ils nous permettent de comprendre plus clairement pourquoi plusieurs philosophes continentaux se sont intéressés à la philosophie ancienne. Les rédacteurs invités résument les conclusions pro-visoires de cette section spéciale en soulignant que les interprétations continentales de la pensée hellénistique représentent un thème particulièrement intéressant dans le cadre de la recherche historico-philosophique actuelle.

In contrast to other ancient philosophers, Epicurus and his followers famously maintained the infinity of matter, and consequently of worlds. This was inferred from the infinity of space, because they believed that a limited amount of matter would inevitably be scattered through infinite space, and hence be unable to meet and form stable compounds. By contrast, the Stoics claimed that there was only a finite amount of matter in infinite space, which stayed together because of a general centripetal tendency. The Roman Epicurean poet Lucretius tried to defend the Epicurean conception of infinity against this Stoic alternative view, but not very convincingly. One might suspect, therefore, that the Epicureans’ adherence to the infinity of matter was not so much dictated by physical arguments as it was motivated by other, mostly theological and ethical, concerns. More specifically, the infinity of atoms and worlds was used as a premise in several arguments against divine intervention in the universe. The infinity of worlds was claimed to rule out divine intervention directly, while the infinity of atoms lent plausibility to the chance formation of worlds. Moreover, the infinity of atoms and worlds was used to ensure the truth of multiple explanations, which was presented by Epicurus as the only way to ward off divine intervention in the realm of celestial phenomena. However, it will be argued that in all of these arguments the infinity of matter is either unnecessary or insufficient for reaching the desired conclusion.

Fragment 21 (= NF 40/YF 097) of the Epicurean inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda continues the argument of the so-called Theological Physics-Sequence (= NF 167 + NF 126 + NF 127 + fr. 20 + NF 182, henceforth: Theol.). In Theol. XIV, Diogenes sets out to investigate whether god designed everything for the sake of human beings. The discussion is divided into two parts: the design of the world and the design of human beings themselves. The part dealing with the world starts in Theol. XIV and continues in fr. 21. Only at the end of column III, the discussion moves on to the human condition, which is continued in column IV. Unfortunately, the text of this argument is only partially perserved, because the block which contained the right-hand half of column IV has not been found. The reconstruction of this column by Martin Ferguson Smith (Diogenes of Oinoanda. The Epicurean Inscription, Naples 1993, 182-184 and 377) permits us to understand the general argument. Diogenes seems to have pointed out the inconsistency of the Stoics, who claim, on the one hand, that human beings are privileged above all other animals, but, on the other hand, that almost all people are miserable on account of their foolishness. Although Smith’s reconstruction is generally on the right track, many of its details are open to discussion. This paper offers a discussion and an alternative reconstruction of the column, that makes better use of the available spaces and is more regular in terms of grammar and idiom. It suggests, moreover, that Diogenes, in criticizing the Stoics, mimicked the Stoics’ own diction.

Cette introduction présente et contextualise les articles publiés dans la section spéciale dont le but est d’analyser l’interprétation de la pensée hellénistique chez les philosophes continentaux très influents tels que : Agamben, Arendt, Blumenberg, Foucault, Heidegger et Stiegler. Les articles prêtent une attention particulière à trois directions de recherche. Ils examinent tout d’abord l’influence de la pensée hellénistique sur ces auteurs et la façon dont ils ont interprété, utilisé et mésinterprété l’héritage des philosophies hellé-nistiques. Deuxièmement, les articles analysent les hypothèses in-terprétatives et les préjugés qui ont caractérisé ces interprétations. Enfin, ils nous permettent de comprendre plus clairement pourquoi plusieurs philosophes continentaux se sont intéressés à la philosophie ancienne. Les rédacteurs invités résument les conclusions pro-visoires de cette section spéciale en soulignant que les interprétations continentales de la pensée hellénistique représentent un thème particulièrement intéressant dans le cadre de la recherche historico-philosophique actuelle.

Both in antiquity and today Virgil is sometimes accused of ignorance in astronomy. This paper argues that, on the contrary, Virgil’s treatment of astronomical topics in Georgics 1.231-258 shows that he was quite familiar with the subject, and was able (when he wished to) to combine information from different sources (Aratus, Eratosthenes and other, unidentified ones) into a sensible and harmonious whole. On the other hand, the omission of essential steps between the various parts of his account, and the deliberate confusion of science and myth show us that his ultimate aim was not to inform the ignorant but to amuse and surprise readers who were just as familiar with astronomy as Virgil himself.

While it is well known that Plutarch’s De facie in orbe lunae was a major source of inspiration for Galileo’s Sidereus nuncius, its influence on his Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo, and especially on his views on gravity, has not been sufficiently explored. This essay offers the first systematic comparison of Plutarch’s and Galileo’s accounts of gravity by focusing on four themes: the thought experiment of a stone falling in a tunnel passing through the center of the Earth; the account of gravity as a tendency to unite with the whole; the view that the Moon is a separate center of attraction; and the impossibility of attraction by an incorporeal point. The essay analyzes the role that these themes play in De facie and in the Dialogo, trying to understand how Galileo appropriated, reworked, and expanded on Plutarch’s views.

In this introduction, we explain our choice to approach the topic of space from a cosmological perspective, that is, by studying the conceptions of space that were implicitly or explicitly entailed by ancient, medieval and early modern representations of the cosmos, and the role that imagination played in those conceptions. We compare our approach with those of Alexandre Koyré and Edward Grant, and we present the two important issues this book intends to shed light on, namely the continuity and discontinuity between ancient, medieval, and early modern conceptions of space and the cosmos; and the role that metaphysical, cosmological, and theological considerations played in the elaboration of new theories of space in the course of history. This chapter also presents the main, recurring themes of this book: the relation between place and space; the notion of imaginary spaces; the role played by thought experiments in discussions concerning the nature of space and the structure of the cosmos; the impact of the condemnation of 1277 on subsequent theories of space; and the relation between God’s immensity and the infinity of space.

This volume provides a much needed, historically accurate narrative of the development of theories of space up to the beginning of the eighteenth century. It studies conceptions of space that were implicitly or explicitly entailed by ancient, medieval and early modern representations of the cosmos. The authors reassess Alexandre Koyré’s groundbreaking work From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe and they trace the permanence of arguments to be found throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. By adopting a long timescale, this book sheds new light on the continuity between various cosmological representations and their impact on the ontology and epistemology of space. Readers may explore the work of a variety of authors including Aristotle, Epicurus, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, John Wyclif, Peter Auriol, Nicholas Bonet, Francisco Suárez, Francesco Patrizi, Giordano Bruno, Libert Froidmont, Marin Mersenne, Pierre Gassendi, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Samuel Clarke. We see how reflections on space, imagination and the cosmos were the product of a plurality of philosophical traditions that found themselves confronted with, and enriched by, various scientific and theological challenges which induced multiple conceptual adaptations and innovations. This volume is a useful resource for historians of philosophy, those with an interest in the history of science, and particularly those seeking to understand the historical background of the philosophy of space.

The three studies that make up this work each deal with another facet or subdiscipline of Epicurean cosmology. The first study is devoted to Epicurus’ method of multiple explanations, the second study compares the meteorological sections of Epicurus' Letter to Pythocles and Lucretius' De rerum natura with other ancient meteorological accounts as regards the range and order of subjects, and the third study investigates what shape the Epicureans assigned to the earth. [For an updated version of this thesis, see Frederik A. Bakker, Epicurean Meteorology: Sources, Method, Scope and Organization, Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2016]