•  15
    Bodily spatial content
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1). 2009.
    The classic notion of an egocentric frame of reference cannot be easily applied to bodily space, given the difficulties in providing a centre of such frame as well as axes on which one could compute distances and directions . Yet, Smith tries to rehabilitate the egocentric account of bodily frame by switching from an anatomical definition of egocentricity to a more functional definition . Here I will review some empirical evidence that shows that one cannot ground bodily experiences in action. T…Read more
  • Cédric Lemogne, Pascale Piolino, Stéphanie Friszer, Astrid Claret, Nathalie Girault, Roland Jouvent, Jean-François
    with Philippe Fossati Allilaire, Tiziana Zalla, Andrés Posada, Anne Louvegnez, Olivier Koenig, Nicolas Georgieff, Nicolas Franck, Arnaud DÕArgembeau, and Martial Van der Linden
    Consciousness and Cognition 15 232-233. 2006.
  •  21
    Interview with Frederique de Vignemont.
  •  7
    According to a motor theory of empathy, empathy results from the automatic activation of emotion triggered by the observation of someone else's emotion. It has been found that the subjective experience of emotions and the observation of someone else experiencing the same emotion activate overlapping brain areas. These shared representations of emotions could be the key for the understanding of empathy. However, if the automatic activation of SRE suffi ces to induce empathy, we would be in a perm…Read more
  •  19
    What are the epistemic bases of the knowledge of the reality of our own body? Proprioception plays a primordial role in body representation and more particularly at the level of body schema. Without proprioception people can feel amputated and the mislocalization of proprioceptive information through the remapping of the Penfield Homonculus induces illusions of phantom limbs, illusions that contradictory visual feedback cannot erase. However, it turns out that it is not as simple as that and tha…Read more
  •  25
    The golden rule of most religions assumes that the cognitive abilities of perspective-taking and empathy are the basis of morality. One would therefore predict that people that display difficulties in those abilities, such as people with psychopathy and autism, are impaired in morality. But then why do autistics have a sense of morality while psychopaths do not, given that they both display a deficit of empathy? We would like here to refine some of the views on autism and morality. In order to d…Read more
  •  11
    Hysteria has been the subject of controversy for many years, with theorists arguing about whether it is best explained by a hidden organic cause or by malingering and deception. However, it has been shown that hysterical paralysis cannot be explained in any of these terms. With the recent development of cognitive psychiatry, one may understand psychiatric and organic delusions within the same conceptual framework. Here I contrast hysterical conversion with anosognosia. They are indeed remarkably…Read more
  •  46
    Are bodily self-ascriptions immune to error through misidentification? According to the Inside mode view, one cannot be mistaken about whose body part it is when experiencing them from the inside. Here I shall consider two possible objections to bodily immunity. On the one hand, I shall briefly envisage two cases of misidentification: somatoparaphrenia and the Rubber Hand illusion. I shall show that none of them challenges the immunity principle. On the other hand, I shall highlight a more serio…Read more
  • Brainreading of perceptual experiences: a challenge for first-person authority?
    Anthropology and Philosophy 7 (1-2): 151-162. 2006.
    According to a traditional Cartesian view of the mind, you have a privileged access to your own conscious experiences that nobody else can have. Therefore, you have more authority than anybody else on your own experiences. Perceptual experiences are selfintimating: you are aware of what you are consciously perceiving. If you report seeing a pink elephant, nobody is entitled to deny it. There may be no pink elephant, but you do have the conscious experience of such elephant. However, the progress…Read more
  •  101
    A Review of Shaun Gallagher: How the Body Shapes the Mind (review)
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12 1-7. 2006.
    With 'How the body shapes the mind', Shaun Gallagher provides a general panoptic of the importance of the body in cognition, based on significant experimental results. His main goals here are (1) to describe body awareness in detail and (2) to investigate the influence of the body on self-consciousness, perception, language and social cognition. Here, I focus on two points: the distinction between the body schema and the body image and the structuring role of the body
  •  31
    In many circumstances we tend to assume that other people believe or desire what we ourselves believe or desire. This has been labeled 'egocentric bias.' This is not to say that we systematically fail to understand other people and forget that they can have a different perspective. If it were the case, then it would be highly difficult, if not impossible, to communicate, cooperate or compete with them. In those situations, we need to take the other person's perspective and to inhibit our own. Bu…Read more
  •  245
    "'Unless I put my hand into his side, I will not believe'. The Epistemic Privilege of Touch
    In Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception, Oxford University Press. pp. 165-188. 2020.
    Touch seems to enjoy some epistemic advantage over the other senses when it comes to attest to the reality of external objects. The question is not whether only what appears in tactile experiences is real. It is that only whether appears in tactile experiences feels real to the subject. In this chapter we first clarify how exactly the rather vague idea of an epistemic advantage of touch over the other senses should be interpreted. We then defend a “muscular thesis”, to the effect that only the e…Read more
  •  20
    Fear beyond danger
    Mind and Language. forthcoming.
    Many agree that the more we feel that we can handle a given situation, the less afraid we are. But why? Is the situation no longer dangerous or is fear a response to more than danger? Here I analyze situations in which one reacts in cold blood to danger and argue that the formal object of fear is not the dangerous, but the unsafe. The unsafe indicates not only how the world is, but also how it can be handled. Safety, and its negative counterpart, are characterized by their duality, both evaluati…Read more
  •  15
    Our own body seems to be the object that we know the best for we constantly receive a flow of internal information about it. Yet bodily awareness has attracted little attention in the literature, possibly because it seems reducible to William James’s description of a “feeling of the same old body always there” (1890, p. 242). But it is not true that our body always feels so familiar. In particular, puzzling neurological disorders and new bodily illusions raise a wide range of questions about the…Read more
  •  45
    Expecting pain
    Synthese 202 (5): 1-18. 2023.
    There is a large amount of evidence of placebo and nocebo effects showing that one’s expectation of a forthcoming pain can influence the subsequent experience of pain. Here I shall not discuss the implications of these findings for the nature of pain, but focus instead on the nature of pain anticipation itself. This notion indeed remains poorly analysed and it is unclear what type of anticipatory state it involves. I shall argue that there is more to pain anticipation than a mere combination of …Read more
  •  19
    Research into peripersonal space has yielded exciting discoveries across many fields, from anthropology to cognitive neuroscience. Bringing these perspectives together for the first time, The World at Our Fingertips presents a fresh, accessible dialogue, challenging entrenched ideas about the way people see and understand the world around them.
  • European Review of Philosophy, 6: The Structure of Nonconceptual Content (edited book)
    with Christine van Geen
    CSLI Publications. 2006.
    Can concepts represent subtleties in emotions, bodily sensations, and perceptions? What is the nature of mental representations in nonlinguistic and prelinguistic creatures? _The European Review of Philosophy, Volume 6_ tackles issues such as these by asking how far the analogy between conceptual and nonconceptual content can be carried. By bringing together contributions from both conceptualists and nonconceptualists, this volume sheds new light on an issue sure to interest cognitive scientists…Read more
  •  11
    Under Influence
    In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and his Critics, Blackwell. 2016.
    One of the assets of the simulation theory, as defended by Alvin Goldman in many papers and in his book Simulating Minds, is its ability to explain egocentric bias, and more generally the priority of first‐person mindreading over third‐person mindreading (ascription of mental states to other people). This chapter argues, on the contrary, that the simulationist framework enables confusions between self and others that go both ways: taking one's beliefs for the other's beliefs (egocentric bias) an…Read more
  •  44
    Pain and Touch
    The Monist 100 (4): 465-477. 2017.
    When one contrasts pain with the classic five senses, discussions generally focus on vision, which is taken as the paradigmatic example of perception. An intentionalist might argue that if the phenomenal difference between feeling and seeing bodily disturbances cannot be explained at the level of the content, it can be so at the level of the mode of presentation, and more particularly at the level of the structure of the spatial phenomenology of pain. Here I will argue that the spatial phenomeno…Read more
  •  18
    Drawing the boundary between low-level and high-level mindreading
    Philosophical Studies 144 (3): 457-466. 2009.
    The philosophical world is indebted to Alvin Goldman for a number of reasons, and among them, his defense of the relevance of cognitive science for philosophy of mind. In Simulating minds, Goldman discusses with great care and subtlety a wide variety of experimental results related to mindreading from cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, social psychology and developmental psychology. No philosopher has done more to display the resourcefulness of mental simulation. I am sympathetic with…Read more
  •  1911
    The distinction between the body schema and the body image has become the stock in trade of much recent work in cognitive neuroscience and philosophy. Yet little is known about the interactions between these two types of body representations. We need to account not only for their dissociations in rare cases, but also for their convergence most of the time. Indeed in our everyday life the body we perceive does not conflict with the body we act with. Are the body image and the body schema then som…Read more
  •  107
    Egocentrism, allocentrism, and Asperger syndrome
    with Uta Frith
    Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4): 719-738. 2005.
    In this paper, we attempt to make a distinction between egocentrism and allocentrism in social cognition, based on the distinction that is made in visuo-spatial perception. We propose that it makes a difference to mentalizing whether the other person can be understood using an egocentric (‘‘you'') or an allocentric (‘‘he/ she/they'') stance. Within an egocentric stance, the other person is represented in relation to the self. By contrast, within an allocentric stance, the existence or mental sta…Read more
  •  79
    Peripersonal perception in action
    Synthese 198 (Suppl 17): 4027-4044. 2018.
    Philosophy of perception is guilty of focusing on the perception of far space, neglecting the possibility that the perception of the space immediately surrounding the body, which is known as peripersonal space, displays different properties. Peripersonal space is the space in which the world is literally at hand for interaction. It is also the space in which the world can become threatening and dangerous, requiring protective behaviours. Recent research in cognitive neuroscience has yielded a va…Read more
  •  47
    Beyond Empathy for Pain
    Philosophy of Science 83 (3): 434-445. 2016.
    Here we address four objections raised by Julien Deonna, John Michael, and Francesca Fardo against a recent account of empathy for pain. First, to what extent must the empathizer share her target’s affective state? Second, how can one interpret neuroscientific findings on vicarious pain in light of recent results challenging the notion of a pain matrix? Third, can one offer a simpler account of how empathy makes one aware of another’s emotion? Finally, to what extent can this account of empathy …Read more
  •  73
    A Minimal Sense of Here-ness
    Journal of Philosophy 118 (4): 169-187. 2021.
    In this paper, I give an account of a hitherto neglected kind of ‘here’, which does not work as an intentional indexical. Instead, it automatically refers to the immediate perceptual environment of the subject’s body, which is known as peripersonal space. In between the self and the external world, there is something like a buffer zone, a place in which objects and events have a unique immediate significance for the subject because they may soon be in contact with her. I argue that seeing object…Read more
  •  70
    What Phenomenal Contrast for Bodily Ownership?
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1): 117-137. 2020.
    In a 1962 article, ‘On Sensations of Position’, G. E. M. Anscombe claimed that we do not feel our legs crossed; we simply know that they are that way. What about the sense of bodily ownership? Do we directly know that this body is our own, or do we know it because we feel this body that way? One may claim, for instance, that we are we aware that this is our own body thanks to our bodily experiences that ascribe the property of myness to the body that they represent. Here I approach this issue fr…Read more
  •  257
    The mark of bodily ownership
    Analysis 73 (4): 643-651. 2013.
    I am aware that this hand is my own. But is the sense of ownership of my hand manifested to me in a more primitive form than judgements? On the deflationary view recently defended by Martin and Bermúdez in their works, the sense of bodily ownership has no counterpart at the experiential level. Here I present a series of cases that the deflationary account cannot easily accommodate, including belief-independent illusions of ownership and experiences of disownership despite the presence of bodily …Read more
  •  139
    In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
    Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. One of the few unchallenged intuition about touch, however, is that tactile awareness entertains some especially close relationship with bodily awareness. This article considers the relation between touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives: the body template theory and the body map theory. According to the former, touch is defined by the fact that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We raise some objec…Read more