Frieder Bögner

The alignment of science, technology, and innovation with societal values and concerns is a key objective of governance approaches that include technology assessment, responsible (research and) innovation, and anticipatory governance. Such alignment is supposed to take place, inter alia, in anticipatory practices involving technoscientific experts, stakeholders, and publics, whose views are then integrated into research and development. However, we lack knowledge on how alignment is accomplished in practice, and the conditions under which it perpetuates or chal- lenges the anticipation of technocratic and market-oriented futures, especially in commercially competitive environments. This article aims to fill this gap by introducing the concept of antici- patory alignment work. Through a case study on an innovation ecosystem emerging around neu- romorphic computing technology, the article demonstrates the analytical potential of the concept. In analyzing different modes of anticipatory alignment work, the study reveals how politics shapes alignment and keeps anticipation locked in dominant constructions of the past and pre- sent. The article casts doubt on the optimism typically implicit in science, technology, and innovation governance approaches that promise the advancement of societal alignment, while also discussing opportunities for these approaches to foster novel forms of anticipation.

Some challenges humans are facing do not apply to individuals alone and may not be solved individually. Sometimes, technology seems to provide relevant and promising strategies of problem solving for societal challenges. Choosing technological means and strategies to address encompassing challenges while alternative approaches would also be optional is sometimes criticised as an attitude of technosolutionism. Especially with emergent technologies like AI, this is an attitude common in technologically advanced societies that refers to AI technologies being proposed as solution strategies to societal challenges. It is often the case that instances of the critique need refinement as this would be of help to structuring debates, especially for discussions on the implementation of AI for sustainability issues. In this conceptual article, selected essential features of the attitude of technosolutionism as well as two example cases are discussed. The main goal is to distinguish existing variants of the objection of technosolutionism and to then propose a novel model of this objection, the lock-and-key model. According to this reading, it is a tendency of technology to crowd out other options in discourses on solution strategies due to its apparent seamless introduction. This will provide a new and productive understanding of the critique. Finally, the case of AI systems applied to issues of sustainability is discussed in the light of this model since in this area solutions are most urgent, the promises attached to technological solutions are wide-ranging and a novel conceptual tool is needed to promote reflected debates.

In this paper, we question the applicability of eyeball test, a device for measuring social justice, which Philip Pettit introduces in On the People’s Terms. We claim that the result of the test is what it requires. Furthermore, we doubt that the test can indicate the relevant means to establish social justice. Finally, we assert incompatibilities (i.) of two assumptions Pettit postulates when ascribing to the test the capacity to compare different societies with regards to their social justice and (ii.) between his concept of social justice and his presupposed idea of freedom.

Die folgenden Überlegungen widmen sich der Frage, welches Konzept von Autonomie für übliche moralisch bedeutsame Szenarien der Sozialen Arbeit anwendbar und philosophisch gut begründbar ist. Dazu richte ich zunächst den Fokus auf die Idee, Autonomie eng mit der Pflicht zu verbinden, informierte Einwilligung von Klienten/-innen zu Interventionsschritten einzuholen, und prüfe, inwiefern diese Verbindung für die moralische Praxis der Sozialen Arbeit angemessen sein kann. Ich zeige anhand ausgewählter Aspekte des medizinethischen Ansatzes von Beauchamp und Childress auf, dass ein Konzept von Autonomie, welches auf das Einholen informierter Einwilligung konzentriert ist, für die Soziale Arbeit nicht angemessen ist, weil es mit mehreren Merkmalen von Interventionen im Rahmen Sozialer Arbeit nicht kompatibel ist. In vielen Kontexten der Sozialen Arbeit ist vielmehr ein Modell der Autonomie adäquat, welches als Kriterium die Biographie von Klienten/-innen mit erfassen kann. Um für diese Ansicht zu argumentieren, berufe ich mich auf eine Konzeption der personalen Autonomie von John Christman. // English version // ​The following considerations are concerned with the question, what conception of autonomy for common morally relevant scenarios of social work is applicable as well as philosophically well founded. In order to answer this question I will focus on the thought to connect autonomy closely with the duty to obtain informed consent of clients to steps of the intervention. Subsequently, I will determine in how far this connection can be adequate for the moral praxis of social work. Based on selected features of Beauchamp’s and Childress’ medical ethics I will then demonstrate that a conception of autonomy, which concentrates on obtaining informed consent, is not adequate for social work contexts, since it is not compatible with several features of social work interventions. In many contexts of social work, a conception of autonomy that includes in its criteria the biography of clients is far more adequate. In order to substantiate this claim, I will refer to the conception of personal autonomy by John Christman.

In this paper, we will discuss Peter van Inwagen’s contribution to the epistemological debate about revealed peer disagreement. Roughly, this debate focuses on situations in which at least two participants disagree on a certain proposition based on the same evidence. This leads to the problem of how one should react rationally when peer disagreement is revealed. Van Inwagen, as we will show, discusses four possible reactions, all of which he rejects as unsatisfying. Our proposal will be to point to hidden assumptions in van Inwagen’s reasoning and ask whether he is willing to reject at least one of these to get rid of the problem. In short, our thesis amounts to the following: Of the two epistemological claims, which we call “Weak” and “Full-blown Fallibilism”, van Inwagen cannot simultaneously accept the first and reject the latter, while this is what he seems to suggest. Revealing this potential dilemma for van Inwagen’s position will lead to a more detailed discussion of how “rationality”, “truth”, “evidence” and “justification” interrelate and how a closer look at their relation might help solving the puzzle of revealed peer disagreement.

Issues of global justice are ethical concerns for decision-making procedures in wealthy countries of the globe. Many arrangements and technological developments can influence just relations with other regions that are less prosperous. The paper points towards resource exploitation as a common cause for global injustices. Many of the resources extracted in less industrialised and wealthy regions are pertinent for a social transformation for sustainability, e.g. rare earths mined in order to provide electric mobility for a sustainable transition. The paper highlights that sometimes technological strategies in decision-making settings that are relevant to a social transformation for sustainability in wealthy regions have serious discursive effects which have not gained enough attention in the debate. In particular, it is argued that the objection of technosolutionism has not been sufficiently addressed in this regard. This is a critique against societal solution strategies for demanding challenges which would also allow less technologically advanced options. A novel reading of this objection is introduced that allows for a more concrete connection between technological options and global justice issues. Overall, the paper argues for a specific connection between (1) the objection of technosolutionism, (2) social transformation for environmental sustainability, and (3) the practice of resource exploitation. If technological options have a tendency to crowd out other non- or low-technological options in decision-making processes and if global justice problems are more connected to technological options, then there are ethical reasons to object to technosolutionism in this regard.

In this paper, we illustrate how a philosophical focus on interactive and dialogical processes within technology research and development can play a crucial role in discerning moral progress in this area. We underline how dialogical and learning practices with changes in moral motivation in research and development can lead to more morally progressive technology. We first contrast views that attempt to discern moral progress through the identification of benchmarks that enable a comparison between states of affairs (“comparative” accounts) with approaches that focus on moral change in its unfolding, as a continuous development (“developmental” views). After briefly discussing two selected philosophical approaches on the role of technology in moral change to argue that, in these cases, philosophical research does not sufficiently focus on how psychological attitudes of technology researchers can contribute to moral progress, we then illustrate how changes in moral motivation in particular align with “developmental” views of moral progress. Finally, we exemplify how “developmental” views of moral progress can lead to such an understanding by analyzing the example of the Personalized Parkinson’s Project. As a project in medical research, it concerns a sensitive area which includes opportunities for harming the vulnerable and hence moral progress in this area is particularly important. Ultimately, we discuss the role of motivational change and dialogical practices within this research project and thereby illustrate the advantages of taking into account the moral motivation of technology researchers in a developmental view of moral progress.

Während es in der Praktischen Philosophie und Angewandten Ethik ausführliche Debatten und Konzepte etwa zu den Fragen gibt, wie mit Problemen globaler Armut und Ungerechtigkeit umzugehen ist, welche Rechte und Pflichten Nationalstaaten angesichts zunehmender Flüchtlings- und Migrationsströme haben und welche Umweltschäden wir zukünftigen Generationen zumuten dürfen, bleiben einige andere innerstaatliche und naheliegende moralische Fragestellungen oftmals auf der Strecke: Welche moralischen Ansprüche haben sozial ausgegrenzte, ökonomisch benachteiligte und in Notlagen lebende Personen, die zu unserer Gesellschaft dazugehören? Mit den Problemen in der Lebensgestaltung von Personengruppen wie Drogenabhängigen, Obdachlosen, Menschen mit Behinderungen und Arbeitslosen beauftragt der Sozialstaat – oftmals über subsidiär übertragene Kompetenzen – soziale Einrichtungen und ihre Sozialarbeiterinnen und Sozialarbeiter. Mit Blick auf diese „Dreieckskonstellation“ stellen sich zwei grundlegende ethische Fragen: Welche moralisch relevanten Gesichtspunkte bestimmen das Verhältnis von Sozialstaaten und gesellschaftlich ausgeschlossenen und benachteiligten Bürgerinnen und Bürgern bzw. – weiter gefasst – Bewohnerinnen und Bewohnern? Welche moralisch relevanten Gesichtspunkte sollten die Interaktion von Sozialarbeiterinnen und Sozialarbeitern mit ihren Klientinnen und Klienten in Beratungs- und Hilfskontexten bestimmen? Diesen basalen Fragen einer Ethik der Sozialen Arbeit wird, so unsere zentrale These, bisher von Seiten der Praktischen Philosophie noch zu wenig Aufmerksamkeit entgegengebracht. Diesem Zustand soll der vorliegende Themenschwerpunkt der Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie entgegenwirken, indem die darin enthaltenen Beiträge besonders auf die zweite Frage reagieren. Diese befassen sich insbesondere mit theoretischen und methodologischen Fragen einer Ethik der Sozialen Arbeit, etwa der Arbeitsteilung zwischen empirischen und normativen Ansätzen, der Funktion eines Rawls’schen weiten Überlegungsgleichgewichts und der Rolle und angemessenen Verständnisweise des Prinzips des Respekts vor Autonomie in der Praxis der Sozialen Arbeit. Wir verstehen unseren Themenschwerpunkt zugleich als ein Plädoyer und einen Aufruf zu weiterer Auseinandersetzung auch von Philosophinnen und Philosophen mit Fragen der Ethik der Sozialen Arbeit.