Frieder Vogelmann

Evidence, science, politics. On the Dangers of Generalizations. Common sense supports the demand for evidence-based politics. Yet problems crop up once the concepts „evidence“, „science“ and „politics“ are scrutinised. Building on results from three prominent debates in philosophy of science - about the demarcation problem, about values in scientific practices and about the concept of evidence -, the argument presented in this contribution shows why pluralism and the disunity of science have become the standard assumptions today. Furthermore, the concept of politics must be pluralised, too, in order to avoid questionable idealisations by which conflicts in politics are all too often ignored in political philosophy. The contribution closes with a few considerations what it means, from this perspective, to fight for policies and political decisions that take scientific evidence seriously in all its plurality and messiness.

Genealogy is no longer the name of a singular method. True to its descent in Nietzsche’s writings, it means a plethora of distinct philosophical methods, even if they are all concerned with concepts and their history. In Foucault’s creative incorporation of Nietzsche’s method, genealogy’s distinction from other modes of writing conceptual histories lies in the destruction of the origin as a sacred, singular place of truth, in its meticulous attention to violently embodied practices and in tracing the emergence of ideas and ideals to the contingent victories of conflicts within those practices. Genealogy in this radical sense is still rare as a philosophical method; applying it to the history of philosophy is rarer still. For it poses a difficult challenge: It requires writing a history neither of the mighty dead nor of their eternal philosophical problems, glorious ideas, or magisterial works but of conflict-ridden, embodied philosophical practices. This contribution spells out, and argues for, these two claims to draw a risky conclusion: Writing the history of philosophy as a genealogy of philosophical practices is possible by focusing on the mechanisms of exclusion that shape these practices. For the exclusions of topics and concepts, of groups and individuals, crisscross texts, institutions, and individual habits—they pertain to philosophical practices as a whole. Genealogy as a method for philosophy and its history that takes up Nietzsche’s and Foucault’s challenge must attend to philosophical practices in all their— often overlooked—institutional, bodily, and intellectual details to describe how mechanisms of exclusion have slowly formed what we know today as philosophy.

Truth is a contested concept, yet the current contest takes place within an idealistic picture that accords all conceptions of truth three features: truth is singular, atemporal and independent. Because of these features, conceptions of truth within the idealist picture are ‘sovereign’ conceptions of truth that lead to serious obstacles in different parts of philosophy, e.g. regarding the concept of normativity or the relationship between truth and politics. The article makes a case for changing the underlying philosophical picture in which truth is conceptualised. To that end, it sketches a materialist picture that can account for the contextuality, historicity and plurality of truth, leading to ‘non-sovereign’ conceptions of truth. Thinking of truth as a force that emerges from social practices but is not reducible to them, that is weak in comparison to other forces (like affects or social power), that exclusively targets subjectivities and that has a ‘ratchet effect’ on these subjectivities provides enough details of the materialist picture to overcome the obstacles mentioned.

Political epistemology has become a popular field of research in recent years. It sets itself the ambitious task to intertwine epistemology with social and political theory in order to do justice to the relationships between truth and politics, or reason and power. Yet many contributions either expand arguments and concepts from traditional epistemology to political phenomena or use existing theories and frameworks from social and political theory to address the politics of epistemological questions. The former approach (prominent, e.g., in the epistemic injustice debate) leads to an epistemisation of political phenomena and concepts coupled with their de-politicization, the latter approach (prominent, e.g., in Frankfurt School critical theory) leads to a politicization of epistemic phenomena and concepts coupled with their de-epistemisation. Instead, it is argued that political epistemology requires reworking even basic concepts, due to its three foundational commitments: It is committed to the claim that socio-material conditions of existence matter epistemically (minimal materialism), to the self-reflection of the socio-material conditions of political epistemology's own arguments and theories (radical self-reflexivity), and to a specific form of epistemic humility (epistemic non-sovereignty). Using the notion of normativity as an exemplary problem, the article closes by highlighting the difficulty of maintaining these three commitments.

ABSTRACT: What might a contemporary philosophical practice after and following Foucault look like? After briefly analyzing Foucault’s rather ambiguous stance towards academic philosophy in his posthumously published Le discours philosophique, we argue for continuing his historico-philosophical practice of diagnosing the present. This means taking up his analytic heuristic (with its three dimensions of power, knowledge and subjectivity) rather than his more concrete diagnostic concepts and the specific historical results they yield. We argue that the common methodological operation on each of the three axis is to shift the perspective from the given legitimacies, norms, identities and selves to their historical, conflict-ridden emergence. Practicing philosophy in this way allows developing Foucauldian contributions in two contemporary philosophical debates: critical ontology and political epistemology. While ontology and epistemology might seem surprising fields to work in for philosophers inspired by and critically loyal to Foucault, we attempt to dispel these reservations and illustrate the stakes in both debates, pointing to the urgent issues of ecological questions and of the problematization of untruths in politics respectively.

Michel Foucault’s thoughts on truth have been controversial from the start, and not just for those who routinely charge him with relativism without reading him—once again a prominent exercise in contemporary public and philosophical debates, especially when taking up the diagnosis of a “post-truth era”. While Daniele Lorenzini confronts these “interpretations” several times in his book, he has wisely decided not to let them frame his attempt to clarify Foucault’s actual philosophical conception of truth. Instead, he elucidates Foucault’s lifelong project of a history of truth, situates Foucault’s late analysis of parrhesia within that project, and demonstrates how this yields a different understanding of Foucault’s genealogical critique. Along the way, he argues vehemently against readings of Foucault that turn him into a relativist and against Nancy Fraser’s and Jürgen Habermas’ criticism that Foucault’s critique lacks normative foundations.

Begriffe herrschen, so können wir im Anschluss an Wittgenstein und Nietzsche sagen, wenn sie unsere Denk-, Handlungs-, und Seinsweisen bestimmen und uns zugleich vergessen machen, dass sie Ergebnisse einer langen Geschichte von Konflikten um jene sozialen Praktiken sind, in denen sie gebraucht werden. Denn ihre heutige Bedeutung ergibt sich aus dem Sieg eines bestimmten Gebrauchs – mit jeder unreflektierten Verwendung bekräftigen wir daher unhinterfragt die Sieger der Begriffsgeschichte. Die Responsibilisierung unseres Denkens ist die in diesem Sinne verstandene Herrschaft eines bestimmten Gebrauchs von „Verantwortung“. Die heute selbstverständliche Verwendung von „Verantwortung“ resultiert aus der Entwicklung des Begriffs in Recht, Politik und Philosophie, in der „Verantwortung“ an ein spezifisches Selbstverständnis des verantwortlichen Subjekts gebunden wird. Darin verbirgt sich eine Objektivierung von Machtbeziehungen im Inneren des Subjekts, damit dieses sich allen Einschränkungen zum Trotz souverän fühlen kann. Insofern haben wir gute Gründe, die Responsibilisierung des Denkens zu kritisieren.

Über die Wissenschaften wird derzeit gestritten: über ihre Ergebnisse, ihre Methoden und ihre Praktiken. Das ist ihrer gesellschaftlichen Bedeutung angemessen. Doch so, wie der Streit derzeit geführt wird, zementiert er ein gefährlich verkürztes Verständnis, als gäbe es nur die eine Wissenschaft. Gegen die Leugnung »der Wissenschaft« errichten ihre Verteidigerinnen ihrerseits ein Ideal, das Wissenschaft gegen Kritik immunisiert, ihre Vielfalt verdeckt und Wissenschaftsleugnerinnen in die Hände spielt, da ihm keine Forschungspraxis entspricht. Gegen dieses schädliche Ideal plädiert Frieder Vogelmann für ein realistisches Verständnis wissenschaftlicher Praktiken. Sciences are contested: their results, their methods and their practices. Such disputes are appropriate to the social significance of the sciences. Yet in its current form, these disputes lead to a dangerously truncated understanding of the sciences, as if there were only one unified science. Against the denial of “science”, its defenders erect an ideal that immunises science against criticism, obscures its diversity and plays into the hands of science deniers, since no acutal research practice could ever correspond to it. Against this harmful ideal, Frieder Vogelmann argues for a realistic understanding of scientific practices.

How is philosophical knowledge related to the world in which it is produced – and how should it be related? In the article, “world” refers to the whole of historically established, politically contested and materially constituted practices. Three ideal-type relationships are distinguished: affirmatively in the world, negatively against the world, and with the world. The article argues for the latter because it combines the two decisive insights of the first two relationships: the insight into philosophy’s facticity, i. e., it being bound to the world, and the insight into philosophy’s freedom, i. e., that it can, nevertheless, turn against that world. Political epistemology is needed to explicate any philosophy with the world because it holds together, in a productive tension, minimal materialism as the core of the insight into philosophy’s facticity and the irreducibility of thought as the core of the insight into philosophy’s freedom.

Political epistemology is the name of an ambitious task. In order to aptly conceptualise the internal relationship between truth and knowledge on one side, and politics and society on the other side, political epistemology must reformulate the concepts of epistemology and social and political theory. For the concept of knowledge, this task implies to consider the truth and the force of knowledge equally. Frieder Vogelmann shows in his book the far-reaching consequences of this endeavour: for the contemporary debate about untruth in politics, for the possible forms of social critique, and for the reflection upon philosophy and its history.

Contemporary concerns about the increase in untruths in politics have renewed interest in the relationship between truth and politics. Is democracy losing its foundations in a ‘post-truth era’ because it is becoming disconnected from reality? Or are facts, to which a technocratic mindset cannot tolerate alternatives, threatening to suppress political debate? In twelve contributions, political theorists investigate the relationship between truth and politics against the background of the current discussion. With contributions by Floris Biskamp, Oliver Flügel-Martinsen, Eva Marlene Hausteiner, Oliver Hidalgo, Anna Hollendung, Dominik Klein, Gundula Ludwig, Franziska Martinsen, Johannes Marx, Martin Nonhoff, Frank Nullmeier, Samuel Salzborn, Hagen Schölzel, Frieder Vogelmann and Lucas von Ramin.

In this article, three theses are proposed. The first is that ›force‹ and ›normativity‹ are not just two fundamental concepts in philosophy today but two paradigms: Each claims to structure how we view the world, to name what is specifically human and to determine the task of philosophy. Their confrontation repeats, according to the second thesis, the dispute between neo-Kantian normativism and life-philosophy in the 19th century, best captured by the concepts of ›life‹ and ›validity.‹ Third, the differences within this repetition concern the position, status and nature of subjectivity: Whereas theories of validity in the 19th century are at least partially anti-subjectivist, and thus accused of being abstract, scholastic and hostile to ›life‹ by life-philosophy, today it is the paradigm of ›force‹ which regards the subject as a contingent result of forces. In contrast, contemporary normativism argues for the autonomy of a sovereign subject whose activity is the source of non-indifference in his or her world.

This review of Bernard Harcourt’s "Critique & Praxis" focuses on the book’s two guiding ideas that (a) critical theory has been on an “epistemological detour” which has separated it from critical praxis, and that (b) the lesson critical theory should learn from its “epistemological detour” is a heightened reflexivity in its action imperative, that Harcourt reformulates as “What more am I to do?” The review suggests that this historical account of critical theory is not quite right and that the reformulated action imperative runs into well-known objections from the feminist debate about representation or the abolishment thereof.

Although Amy Allen’s critique of contemporary Frankfurt School critical theory has been widely discussed, her concern for an adequate conceptualization of reason’s intertwinement with power has not received the attention it deserves. The article shows that the diagnosis of a too idealistic account of reason forms the backbone of Allen’s charges against Habermas, Honneth and Forst, before it discusses her criteria for an adequate conceptualization of the intertwinement of reason and power. It demonstrates that Allen’s attempt to formulate such a conceptualization falls short of two of her own criteria, namely the basic commitments of essentially impure reason and radical self-reflexivity. Taking seriously Allen’s proposal for a radical self-reflexive genealogical critique would force her to question the very terms in which she formulates her critique of critical theory, namely the search for “normative foundations,” and the article sketches a way for doing so.

Starting with the observation that transparency has become a concept so familiar that one hardly ever stops to consider the presuppositions and consequences of its usage, the chapter analyses transparency demands as a specific way of exercising power. By doing so, the author shows that the intrinsic logic of transparency leads to paradoxical effects. Any attempts to realize complete transparency undermine its own preconditions. As Vogelmann argues, instead of providing more visibility and clarity, transparency makes its objects “invisible” and the intensification of transparency demands produces self-censorship. The chapter concludes that transparency claims undermine the distinction between the private and the public and threaten the individual autonomy.

Although seldom examined and not explained by Robert Brandom himself, the concept of responsibility is as important as the concept of inference for Brandom’s account of discursivity. Whereas ‘inference’ makes explicit the propositional content of concepts as the inferentially structured totality of their relations of material incompatibility, ‘responsibility’ makes explicit the normative force of these relations. ‘Responsibility’ thus becomes the paradigm of understanding normativity’s binding force – and my critical reading demonstrates that it fosters a moralizing, juridifying and economizing understanding of normativity’s binding force. Furthermore, a diagnostic interpretation of Nietzsche’s genealogy of ‘responsibility’ reveals that Brandom’s concept of ‘responsibility’ is not an exception but exemplary for how ‘responsibility’ is used in philosophy.

‘Post-truth’ is a failed concept, both epistemically and politically because its simplification of the relationship between truth and politics cripples our understanding and encourages authoritarianism. This makes the diagnosis of our ‘post-truth era’ as dangerous to democratic politics as relativism with its premature disregard for truth. In order to take the step beyond relativism and ‘post-truth’, we must conceptualise the relationship between truth and politics differently by starting from a ‘non-sovereign’ understanding of truth.

Foucault’s concept of ‘biopolitics’ has sparked a lively debate within critical theory, although Foucault himself rarely used it after The History of Sexuality, Volume 1. In this chapter I argue that the reasons both for the way ‘biopolitics’ stirred Foucault’s readers and for his subsequent abandonment are to be found in the relation between Foucault’s model of critique and the role ‘biopolitics’ plays in it: it names the counter-truths derived from Foucault’s critical diagnosis of the dispositif of sexuality. Since ‘biopolitics’ was introduced as a notion with a specific critical function closely tied to Foucault’s model of critique, I first explicate this model of critique as a diagnostic practice of prefigurative emancipation before re-reading Le Volonté de Savoir from this methodological perspective. After Le Volonté Savoir, Foucault tried turning ‘biopolitics’ into a descriptive term, no longer naming the critical diagnosis but the object to be criticised. Yet within Foucault’s model of critique, this required him to produce a new critical diagnosis which he never did. The implication for contemporary usages of ‘biopolitics’ in critical theory is that it either needs to develop its own counter-truths from a critical analysis of biopolitics or use a different model of critique.

Although the various interpretations of Foucault’s model of critique often seem to differ only in minor details, they seriously diverge by situating critique on different levels of abstraction in Foucault’s work. Mapping interpretations of Foucault’s critique according to this criterion shows that none of them pays full attention to all three of Foucault’s methodological imperatives which he calls nihilism, nominalism and historicism. The article offers such a reading of Foucault’s critique, interpreting it as a diagnostic practice of prefigurative emancipation. The task of diagnosing the present explains how Foucault’s critique functions as a philosophical practice, and by making explicit in which ways it emancipates us, it gives us reasons why we might be interested in doing critique like that.

"Foucault lesen" [Reading Foucault] proposes a systematic and philosophical readig of Foucaut’s work: Systematically, I emphasize Foucault’s methodological perspective as a nihilistic, nominalistic and historicistic analysis of practices and the realities produced by them. This analysis proceeds along the three axes of knowledge, power and self-relations. I explore the consequences of this interpretation regarding the debates about Foucault’s concept of critique, his attack on the science humaines and his stance vis-à-vis neoliberalism. My interpretation amounts to a philosophical reading because it demonstrates that the ‘history of truth’ is at the core of Foucault’s philosophy.

This introduction diagnoses two tendencies among Foucaultian scholars with regard to Michel Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: While the book was initially enthusiastically embraced and its central concepts – above all “discipline” and “panopticism” – were used almost too frequently, these very concepts were often thought to be superseded by Foucault’s own development in the governmentality lectures and beyond. The articles in the special issue, however, demonstrate that Discipline and Punish, read carefully with neither uncritical enthusiasm nor progressivist dismissal, has still a lot to offer for today’s critical theory and cultural analysis.

Most people would agree that we should behave and act in a responsible way. Yet only 200 years ago, ‘responsibility’ was only of marginal importance in discussions of law and legal practice, and it had little ethical significance. What is the significance of the fact that ‘responsibility’ now plays such a central role in, for example, work, the welfare state, or the criminal justice system? What happens when individuals are generally expected to think of themselves as ‘responsible’ agents? And what are the consequences of the fact that the philosophical analysis of ‘responsibility’ focuses almost exclusively on conditions of agency that are mostly absent from real life? In this book, Frieder Vogelmann demonstrates how large parts of philosophy have fallen under responsibility’s spell, and he uses a Foucauldian approach in an attempt to break it. The three axes of power, knowledge, and self are used in a detailed analysis of the practical regimes of labour (including the welfare state), criminality (including policing, punishment practices, and criminal proceedings), and philosophy, and of the two subject positions required by ‘responsibility’ – those of the attributors and bearers of responsibility – within them. The power relations between these positions, which Vogelmann carefully excavates from the grounds of our practices, reveal that the deck is stacked unevenly from the start.

Most conceptual analyses of responsibility fail to sufficiently account for the historicity of the concept – both within philosophical reflections and within non-philosophical practices. Three frequently encountered problems are: First, “responsibility” is often read retrospectively in texts where the concept is not present; second, the necessary and sufficient conditions that account for responsibility’s meaning are often derived from contemporary usage alone; and third, the non-philosophical usage of “responsibility” is often dismissed as “defective” too quickly. To avoid all three problems, I argue for a Foucauldian analysis of practices in which “responsibility” is used.

Does truth have a history? Whereas Bernard William denies it and only allows a history of truthfulness, I defend the possibility of a critical history or genealogy of truth. Because a trifling relativistic historicization of truth leads to a paradoxically a-historic and pacifistic conception of truth, one must first establish the methodological concepts with which a genealogy of truth can avoid both problems. Three first steps towards such concepts can be found in some of Michel Foucault’s lectures, which lead the genealogy of truth to focus on the origins of truth’s force.

Die Behauptung, dass Verantwortung eine Subjektform sowie die Technik zu ihrer Herstellung bezeichnet, wird kaum Erstaunen auslösen. Wozu wären all die auf Verantwortung sich stützenden ethisch-moralischen Normen auch gut, wenn sie nicht unsere Subjektivität formen könnten? Dieses Selbstverständnis als verantwortliche Subjekte ist Nietzsches zentralen Angriffspunkt in der zweiten Abhandlung von "Zur Genealogie der Moral". Doch sein Verständnis von Verantwortung als Subjektivierungstechnik und Subjektform war im Kontext des philosophischen Diskurses, in dem er sich selbst verortet, alles andere als eine Selbstverständlichkeit. Der junge Begriff »Verantwortung« war noch zu eng am Recht orientiert, um ein Selbstverhältnis zu besitzen, und wurde von der Philosophie nur in der metaphysischen Schlacht um die Willensfreiheit gebraucht.