| Survey Prompt |
Response |
| A priori knowledge |
Accept:
yes
|
| Abortion |
Lean towards:
permissible
|
| Abstract objects |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Reject
nominalism
-
Lean against
Platonism
-
Accept
abstract objects may be said to exist, but this existence is a dependent one
|
| Aesthetic experience |
Accept:
sui generis
|
| Aesthetic value |
Lean towards:
objective
|
| Aim of philosophy |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
understanding
-
Neutral towards
happiness
-
Neutral towards
wisdom
-
Lean towards
goodness/justice
-
Lean towards
truth/knowledge
-
Lean towards
screening, investigating and determining position and role of intelligent being as part of the universe
|
| Analytic-synthetic distinction |
The question is too unclear to answer
|
| Arguments for theism |
Skipped
|
| Belief or credence |
Skipped
|
| Capital punishment |
Skipped
|
| Causation |
Skipped
|
| Chinese room |
There is no fact of the matter
|
| Concepts |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Reject
empiricism
-
Reject
nativism
-
Accept
will be answered step by step by cognitive sciences & at each new stage should be re-evaluated philosophically
|
| Consciousness |
The question is too unclear to answer
|
| Continuum hypothesis |
Accept an alternative view:
suggest, the question asks for truth value in models of ZF ; consistency result (Gödel 1938) and independence result (Cohen 1963) then settle the question
|
| Cosmological fine-tuning |
Skipped
|
| Eating animals and animal products |
Skipped
|
| Environmental ethics |
Skipped
|
| Epistemic justification |
Other
|
| Experience machine |
Accept:
no
|
| Extended mind |
Accept:
yes
|
| External world |
Other
|
| Footbridge |
Other
|
| Foundations of mathematics |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Accept
set-theoretic
-
Lean towards
logicism
-
Lean towards
constructivism/intuitionism
-
Neutral towards
structuralism
-
Neutral towards
formalism
|
| Free will |
Lean towards:
compatibilism
|
| Gender |
Skipped
|
| Gender categories |
Skipped
|
| God |
Other
|
| Grounds of intentionality |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean against
inferential
-
Lean towards
primitive
-
Lean against
interpretational
-
Neutral towards
causal/teleological
-
Lean against
phenomenal
|
| Hard problem of consciousness |
Accept:
yes
|
| Human genetic engineering |
Accept an alternative view:
as a common practice extremely dangerous; might be acceptable in health emergencies, if ethically controlled
|
| Hume |
Skipped
|
| Immortality |
Skipped
|
| Interlevel metaphysics |
Skipped
|
| Justification |
Skipped
|
| Kant |
Accept:
one world
|
| Knowledge |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
rationalism
-
Lean towards
empiricism
-
Lean towards
transcendental idealism
|
| Knowledge claims |
Skipped
|
| Law |
Skipped
|
| Laws of nature |
Accept an alternative view:
instrumentalism, operationalism augmented with constructivism, conventionalism
|
| Logic |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Neutral towards
non-classical
-
Lean towards
classical
-
Lean towards
intuitionistic logic for discussing foundational issues, n-aletheism to discuss some of Hegel's argumentation patterns
|
| Material composition |
Skipped
|
| Meaning of life |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Neutral towards
subjective
-
Lean against
nonexistent
-
Lean towards
objective
|
| Mental content |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
|
| Meta-ethics |
Skipped
|
| Metaontology |
Skipped
|
| Metaphilosophy |
There is no fact of the matter
|
| Method in history of philosophy |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
contextual/historicist
-
Lean towards
analytic/rational reconstruction
-
Lean towards
systematic (contextual/rational reconstruction)
|
| Method in political philosophy |
Skipped
|
| Mind |
Accept an alternative view:
hybrid of both [philosophical question that will be answered (only) partially by progress in science (informatics, neuro-sciences, ...) & at each new stage should be re-evaluated philosophically]
|
| Mind uploading |
Skipped
|
| Moral judgment |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
cognitivism
-
Lean against
non-cognitivism
|
| Moral motivation |
Skipped
|
| Moral principles |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
moral particularism
-
Neutral towards
moral generalism
|
| Morality |
Skipped
|
| Newcomb's problem |
Accept an alternative view:
dependent, on whether smaller sum (in box 1) matters
|
| Normative concepts |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
ought
-
Lean towards
value
-
Neutral towards
fit
-
Lean towards
reasons
|
| Normative ethics |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
virtue ethics
-
Neutral towards
consequentialism
-
Lean towards
deontology
|
| Other minds |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Accept
adult humans
-
Accept
cats
-
Lean towards
fish
-
Neutral towards
flies
-
Neutral towards
worms
-
Neutral towards
plants
-
Lean against
particles
-
Accept
newborn babies
-
Neutral towards
current AI systems
-
Lean towards
future AI systems
-
Lean towards
ETs, if they were found
|
| Ought implies can |
Accept:
yes
|
| Perceptual experience |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
disjunctivism
-
Lean towards
representationalism
|
| Personal identity |
Other
|
| Philosophical knowledge |
Accept:
a lot
|
| Philosophical methods |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
conceptual engineering
-
Lean towards
intuition-based philosophy
-
Lean against
experimental philosophy
-
Lean towards
formal philosophy
-
Lean towards
conceptual analysis
-
Lean against
empirical philosophy
-
Lean against
linguistic philosophy
|
| Philosophical progress |
Accept:
a little
|
| Plato |
Lean towards:
knowledge only of forms
|
| Political philosophy |
Skipped
|
| Politics |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
capitalism
-
Lean towards
socialism
-
Lean towards
take as political pattern whatever works towards implementing/sustaining the four freedoms and human rights in general
|
| Possible worlds |
Accept an alternative view:
as used for modal logic semantics, an innocuous extension of classical model theory, without additional existential commitment
|
| Practical reason |
Lean towards:
Kantian
|
| Principle of sufficient reason |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Reject
false
-
Reject
true
-
Lean towards
PSR nowadays a mainly heuristic (not mainly explanatory) principle, beneath others, e.g. abduction, or Occam's razor
|
| Proper names |
Other
|
| Properties |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Reject
transcendent universals
-
Lean against
immanent universals
-
Lean towards
nonexistent
-
Neutral towards
tropes
-
Lean against
classes
-
Lean towards
Freges way of putting things: concepts as truth functions
|
| Propositional attitudes |
The question is too unclear to answer
|
| Propositions |
Accept an alternative view:
invariance classes of sentences (e.g. wrt translation)
|
| Quantum mechanics |
Skipped
|
| Race |
Skipped
|
| Race categories |
Skipped
|
| Rational disagreement |
Skipped
|
| Response to external-world skepticism |
Skipped
|
| Science |
Lean towards:
scientific anti-realism
|
| Semantic content |
Skipped
|
| Sleeping beauty |
Insufficiently familiar with the issue
|
| Spacetime |
Agnostic/undecided
|
| Statue and lump |
Other
|
| Teletransporter |
Skipped
|
| Temporal ontology |
Skipped
|
| Theory of reference |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
descriptive
-
Neutral towards
causal
-
Lean against
deflationary
|
| Time |
The question is too unclear to answer
|
| Time travel |
Skipped
|
| Trolley problem |
Skipped
|
| True contradictions |
Accept an alternative view:
Obviously dependent on the logic system you select or design, not a question of fact.
|
| Truth |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Accept
epistemic
-
Lean against
deflationary
-
Lean towards
correspondence
-
Lean towards
coherence
|
| Units of selection |
Skipped
|
| Vagueness |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Accept
epistemic
-
Lean against
metaphysical
-
Neutral towards
semantic
|
| Values in science |
Accept:
can be either
|
| Well-being |
Skipped
|
| Wittgenstein |
Accept a combination of answers:
-
Lean towards
early
-
Lean against
late
|
| Zombies |
Skipped
|
