Friso Timmenga

This article emphasizes the value of śūnyatā, through the lens of Japanese philosopher Nishitani Keiji, in fostering global philosophical dialogue. First, we highlight how Nishitani interprets śūnyatā, or "emptiness," as a fundamental relationality, distinct from substantiality. The second section situates Nishitani's thought within the rising paradigm of relational thinking, now influential in philosophy, feminism, social sciences, and interdisciplinary studies. We note that these discourses have been largely shaped by Anglo-European thinkers, overlooking contributions from philosophers like Nishitani. In the final section of this article, we illustrate how Nishitani's concept of "emptiness" could form the foundation for an intercultural philosophical method that allows for a global dialogue moving beyond the critique of existing discourses. This ultimately implies an understanding of philosophy as pedagogical practice.

Background: Debates on diversifying the philosophy curriculum often emphasize what is taught rather than how it is taught. Yet, curriculum content and pedagogy are deeply interconnected. Little is known about how philosophy teachers conceptualize and evaluate their teaching approaches, or how these conceptions shape curricular decisions. Aims: This study examines how university philosophy teachers understand and assess their pedagogical approaches, focusing on how they balance intellectual development, transformative education, and engagement with philosophical diversity. Sample: Eighteen philosophy teachers from diverse institutional and cultural contexts participated in the study. Methods: A qualitative research design using semi-structured interviews was used. Thematic analysis identified shared patterns and tensions in teachers’ accounts of their pedagogical aims and practices. Results: Participants prioritized fostering students' intellectual growth over transmitting content. Exposing students to diverse perspectives was viewed as key to developing critical reflection. While many regarded their pedagogies as potentially transformative, others expressed ambivalence toward the concept of ‘transformative education,’ associating it with political or religious indoctrination. Teachers also cautioned that encounters with difference can be disorienting if not carefully facilitated, emphasizing the need for balance. Diversification was seen less as curriculum expansion than as the deliberate design of experiences that help students engage responsibly with difference. Conclusions: The study highlights both the potential and the challenges of intercultural and transformative approaches in philosophy education, suggesting that diversification is best understood as a reflective pedagogical practice rather than simple content inclusion. The study also suggests exploring aesthetic approaches to evaluating transformative education.

This article critically examines the increasing advocacy for diversifying the philosophical curriculum over recent decades. By analyzing the discourse on the cultural diversification of philosophy, we observe that the debate revolves around a dual premise: (1) philosophy exists within a specific cultural context, and (2) it can transcend this context. We relate two strategies for diversifying philosophy to this premise, which emphasize either the first or the second part: contextualizing and universalizing, respectively. The strategy of universalizing is prevalent in comparative and intercultural philosophical discourse and focuses on philosophy’s ability to convey context-independent meaning. Recently, however, critical social epistemology and decolonial discourses have highlighted the risks of prematurely adopting a universal perspective and have advocated for greater contextualization instead. After outlining the arguments and potential downsides of both strategies, we argue that both approaches converge on a critical insight: (intercultural) philosophy should be viewed primarily as a transformative practice. We therefore propose an understanding of universality as a continual process of becoming, rather than a static, abstract category. In line with this view, we argue that diversifying philosophy should aim to cultivate a new type of philosopher, rather than merely develop another theory.

This paper analyses the tension between the double focus on critique and alterity within decolonial discourses. We argue that an excess of critical thinking could lead to scepticism, whereas an overemphasis on alterity could result in dogmatism. Consequently, since both approaches end up obstructing epistemic decolonization, we argue that it is necessary to strike a balance between critique and alterity; a balance that does not resolve the tension, but seeks to reveal its underlying relation. The first section locates decolonial theory within the framework of critical theory. We highlight how Quijano, Dussel and Mignolo invoke the critical tradition, whilst simultaneously claiming that a radical departure from it is necessary. Turning more explicitly to Dussel in Section 2, we explain Dussel’s analectics as a method to localize discourses, in which globally excluded perspectives are foregrounded. In the third section, we defend Dussel’s universalism and rationalism against criticisms from Castro-Gómez and Vallega by interpreting him as a relational thinker. Ultimately, the paper concludes that the success of epistemic decolonization hinges on its ability to reconcile classic notions of universality and rationality in a manner that avoids dogmatism and scepticism, namely by a continual grounding of philosophical discourse in material life.

This paper emphasizes the value of śūnyatā, through the lens of Japanese philosopher Nishitani Keiji, in fostering global philosophical dialogue. First, we highlight how Nishitani interprets śūnyatā, or ‘emptiness’, as a fundamental relationality, distinct from substantiality. The second section situates Nishitani’s thought within the rising paradigm of relational thinking, now influential in philosophy, feminism, social sciences, and interdisciplinary studies. We note that these discourses have been largely shaped by Anglo-European thinkers, overlooking contributions from philosophers like Nishitani. In the final section of this paper, we illustrate how Nishitani’s concept of ‘emptiness’ could form the foundation for an intercultural philosophical method that allows for a global dialogue moving beyond the critique of existing discourses. This ultimately implies an understanding of philosophy as pedagogical practice.

This essay critically discusses the rising interest in process philosophy in recent years. I argue that the appeal of process philosophy lies in its ability to circumnavigate the binary dichotomies pervasive in European philosophy and defend an interpretation of process philosophy in terms of relationality, difference, and change. After outlining the central tenets of process philosophy, Graham Harman’s critique of a relational account of process philosophy is examined, particularly his assertion that this type of philosophy cannot fully explain genuine change. Despite the merits of Harman’s critique, I will show that his object-oriented ontology faces similar limitations. Turning to Graham Priest’s dialethism I suggest that philosophy, instead of striving for a consistent representation of fundamental metaphysics, must embrace paradox to some extent. This leads the philosophical discipline to understand itself as a transformative process.

This paper evaluates Pierre Hadot’s concept of ‘philosophy as a way of life’ (PWL) as a tool to critique academic philosophy. Firstly, I will provide a concise overview of Hadot’s critique through a discussion of two lesser-known texts. I will go on to submit that PWL, contrary to what its name might imply, does not primarily distinguish between philosophical theory and practice. Instead, through an exploration of relevant secondary sources, I will emphasize PWL’s focus on the spiritual dimension of philosophy, or rather the lack thereof in the modern research university. A return to philosophy as a way of life, then, does not imply emancipation from the university as such, but rather from contemporary academia’s research practices and standards. Only then can philosophy rekindle its true essence, namely transforming the lives and worlds of many.

This paper analyses the reemerging concept of evil in political science and international relations. Evil is approached as the link between the metaphorical and the metaphysical that is used to sacralize politics. After introducing the concepts of metaphor, metaphysics and the sacred, we expand on the definition of evil by drawing on existing philosophical and theological literature. We proceed to analyze its effects in politics by applying our findings to examples from the United States, Russia, India, Myanmar, Israel, ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The paper addresses the political potential of the common evil for building international communities in the third section. We conclude that the concept of evil achieves the sacralization of politics by effacing itself, that is, by becoming metaphysical. The metaphor of evil, then, is most successful precisely when it is no longer a metaphor at all but deemed a metaphysical reality.