Fumitake Yoshizawa

David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for anti-natalism has been a subject of long-standing scrutiny. I shall focus on a crucial yet surprisingly overlooked structural flaw in his use of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) arguments. Benatar’s argument begins with the procreation asymmetry, which implies that some procreative cases are morally wrong, whereas others are not. He then concludes with anti-natalism, which asserts that all procreative cases in the real world are morally wrong. This leads to a problematic overlap between the cases in the premises and those in the conclusion, resulting in conflicting moral judgments. I shall argue that this conflicting overlap renders the argument untenable as an IBE. This flaw in the inferential structure has complicated the debate, particularly by making it difficult for critics to effectively refute his argument. Although anti-natalist arguments could, in principle, utilize IBE, Benatar’s original attempt to develop contemporary anti-natalism fails to adhere to the fundamental rules of IBE arguments. This paper aims to clarify the issues with Benatar’s foundational approach and to suggest directions for future exploration of anti-natalism.

The anti‐natalist philosopher David Benatar defends a position asserting that all life is harmful, and that it is, therefore, wrong to have children. In this paper, I critique Benatar's less‐discussed claim that his anti‐natalism provides solutions to population ethics problems, such as the Non‐Identity Problem, the Repugnant Conclusion, and the Mere Addition Problem, all of which are presented in Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons. Since the publication of his Better Never to Have Been, Benatar has continued to claim that its provision of such solutions strengthens his defense of anti‐natalism. Although Benatar's view has received much criticism, this argument has not been discussed at length. I undertake a thorough examination of the argument and identify reasons to reject it. The central point of my critique is that the implications of Benatar's views in determining ranges of wrong and not‐wrong cases of procreation are extensionally inadequate when applied to the problems of population ethics.

In this paper, I show that David Benatar’s asymmetry argument for anti-natalism leads to a dilemma. In Chapter 2 of his book Better Never to Have Been, Benatar claims that there is an axiological asymmetry between harms and benefits that explains four prevalent asymmetries. Based on the axiological asymmetry, he defends the anti-natalist conclusion that we should not have children. The four prevalent asymmetries to be explained are moral duties, reasons, attitudes, or feelings concerning life as a whole. However, Benatar explains them by applying the axiological asymmetry to parts of life, such as pains and pleasures. I find a serious gap here. While two ways are available to bridge this gap, a dilemma arises from Benatar’s asymmetry argument. The axiological asymmetry is not supported because it cannot explain the four prevalent asymmetries, or else it cannot lead to the anti-natalist conclusion. A number of philosophers have already criticized Benatar’s asymmetry argument, mainly questioning its assumptions. In this paper, I contend that there is no good reason to agree with his argument even if all its explicit assumptions are accepted.

In Meaning in Life: An Analytic Study, Thaddeus Metz advocates a kind of naturalistic objective theory of meaning in life, through a rejection of supernaturalism. In this paper, I examine Metz’s argument on supernaturalism, in particular, soul-centered theory and immortality. I will argue that his objection to supernaturalism is inadequate because he does not treat properly a familiar idea about the relationship between death and meaning, namely, the idea that a person’s death itself makes her life meaningless. Metz interprets immortality as a condition for obtaining meaning, but in view of the idea that I present, immortality means the negation of the death of a person whose life already has meaning. As I see it, this idea about death and meaning is also one of the motivations to accept a soul-centered theory and therefore key to a fuller rejection of supernaturalism.