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Gabor Brody

Brown University
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  •  Publications
    3
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 More details
  • Brown University
    Post-doctoral Fellow
Homepage
Providence, Rhode Island, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language
Meaning
Reference
Pragmatics
Innate Concepts
Developmental Psychology
Atomist Theories of Concepts
Mental Files
Concepts
Vision
5 more
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Linguistics
Meaning
Reference
Pragmatics
Vagueness and Indeterminacy
Innate Concepts
Developmental Psychology
Atomist Theories of Concepts
Mental Files
5 more
  • All publications (3)
  •  51
    Discourse referents in infancy
    with Gergely Csibra
    Psychological Review 133 (2): 382-393. 2026.
    Psychology
  •  186
    Polysemy does not exist, at least not in the relevant sense
    with Roman Feiman
    Mind and Language 39 (2): 179-200. 2024.
    Based on the existence of polysemy (e.g., lunch can refer to both food and events), it is argued that central tenets of externalist semantics and Fodorian concept atomism, an externalist theory on which words lack semantic structure, are unsound. We evaluate the premise that these arguments rely on—that polysemous words have separate, finer‐grained senses. We survey the evidence across psychology and linguistics and argue that it shows that polysemy does not exist, at least not in this “sense”. …Read more
    Based on the existence of polysemy (e.g., lunch can refer to both food and events), it is argued that central tenets of externalist semantics and Fodorian concept atomism, an externalist theory on which words lack semantic structure, are unsound. We evaluate the premise that these arguments rely on—that polysemous words have separate, finer‐grained senses. We survey the evidence across psychology and linguistics and argue that it shows that polysemy does not exist, at least not in this “sense”. The upshot is that if polysemy does not exist, it cannot pose a problem for atomism or externalism.
    Ambiguity and PolysemyPerception of MeaningPsycholinguisticsLanguage UnderstandingNature of Linguist…Read more
    Ambiguity and PolysemyPerception of MeaningPsycholinguisticsLanguage UnderstandingNature of Linguistic KnowledgeLinguistic Intuitions
  •  42
    Twelve-month-olds disambiguate new words using mutual-exclusivity inferences
    with Barbara Pomiechowska, Gergely Csibra, and Teodora Gliga
    Cognition 213 (C): 104691. 2021.
    Cognitive Sciences
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