Gabriel de Andrade Pagnozzi Maruchi

Paraconsistent deontic logics have been proposed to deal with deontic paradoxes. We argue that these systems have been misdirected when used to solve deontic paradoxes not grounded on deontic inconsistency. Although the solutions are a formally satisfactory way out of the paradoxes, philosophically they are unsatisfactory. As an example, we discuss how some paraconsistent deontic logics have dealt with Chisholm’s Paradox. A paraconsistent deontic logic should be used to solve paradoxes directly related to deontic inconsistency, as in the case of moral dilemmas. We show how some of these logics can model moral dilemmas while avoiding trivialization. We then consider the philosophical viability of their treatment of moral dilemmas. We argue that _DPI_ is a system that models moral dilemmas in a philosophically satisfactory way. We offer an interpretation for this system, which reads the operator \boxminus as formalizing non-dilemmatic situations. We discuss its philosophical consequences.

Nesta monografia, discutirei o Argumento Direto pelo incompatibilismo. Incompatibilismo ´e a tese de que responsabilidade moral ´e incompat´ıvel com o determinismo nomol´ogico. De ma- neira simplificada, o argumento ´e o seguinte: N´os n˜ao somos respons´aveis pelo passado e pelas leis da natureza. Se o determinismo for verdadeiro, nossas ac¸ ˜oes s˜ao consequˆencia do passado e das leis da natureza. Portanto, se o determinismo for verdadeiro, n˜ao somos respons´aveis por nossas ac¸ ˜oes. Defendo ao longo da monografia que o Argumento Direto ´e nem prima facie uma ameac¸a ao compatibilismo – a posic¸ ˜ao oposta ao incompatibilismo –, j´a que os proponen- tes do argumento falham em motivar com sucesso o argumento. A monografia se divide em trˆes cap´ıtulos. No primeiro, apresento a formulac¸ ˜ao do Argumento Direto proposta por Peter van Inwagen (1983). Sua formulac¸ ˜ao se vale de um operador modal de n˜ao-responsabilidade, para o qual van Inwagen define duas regras dedutivas. Nos dois cap´ıtulos subsequentes, discuto algumas das cr´ıticas encontradas na literatura contra essas regras e apresento minhas pr´oprias cr´ıticas. Na conclus˜ao, considero alguns modos pelo qual o debate pode avanc¸ar.

The Direct Argument argues for the claim that determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. The most controversial assumption of the argument is the thought that "not being responsible for" transfers across conditionals: if no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p is true, and no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that p? q is true, then no one is (even partially) morally responsible for the fact that q is true. Here we argue that the principle is true if one accepts a truth-maker account of the relationship between non-responsibility and propositions. While non-responsibility transfers across conditionals, one upshot of the truth-maker account is that it allows one to be responsible for necessary truths.