Gabriel Donoso Umaña

The term “regulation” is often used in biology to refer to the means by which a system keeps or returns to a certain state after perturbation. Feedback mechanisms and the propagation of the perturbation through a network of constitutive components are commonly associated with this phenomenon. Intending to produce a full-fledged theoretical account of regulation in organisms, Bich and colleagues have proposed a stricter concept based on the Theory of Biological Autonomy. According to them, regulation is exerted by specialized subsystems that can change the constitutive regime of a living system while their dynamics is not specified by the latter. As such, regulatory subsystems allow faster and more specific responses, enabling the system to deal with a wider range of perturbations and providing greater robustness. In this paper, we extend this approach to ecological systems, showing how regulatory subsystems can be studied as mechanisms above the level of individual organisms belonging to the same species. Moreover, we differentiate between an ecological regulatory mechanism and an organismal regulatory mechanism with ecological consequences. We model an ecological regulatory mechanism that fits into the organizational approach to regulation. The mechanism involves responses to herbivory, in which plants produce volatile compounds to attract predatory insects from different species. We also model a case in which an organismal regulatory mechanism, related to changes in floral phenology, has important ecological consequences. In this manner, we intend to provide a proof of concept for ecological regulatory mechanisms in the strict sense proposed by Bich and colleagues, as well as for their differentiation from organism-level regulatory mechanisms that bring about ecological consequences. We hope this paper spurs further research that develops theoretical understanding of regulation in ecological systems through the investigation of other cases of ecological regulatory mechanisms.

A planta sensível Mimosa Púdica é um tipo particular de planta que possui folhas capazes de responder ao contato em questão de segundos, fazendo com que se retraiam e pareçam murchas. É uma das poucas plantas que iniciam movimentos visualmente perceptíveis ao ser humano. No que diz respeito às pesquisas incipientes sobre sensibilidade e cognição em plantas, a Mimosa parece ser um organismo modelo interessante para analisar essas possibilidades graças às suas respostas rápidas que podem ser observadas diretamente. Desta forma, a Mimosa Púdica poderá ser utilizada como modelo para o estudo do fenómeno da sensibilidade e da cognição, não só a nível eletrofisiológico, mas também a nível comportamental e funcional. Com base nas evidências científicas da biologia e da neurociência dos últimos 15 anos, argumentar-se-á que a planta sensível é um organismo modelo adequado para estudar, não apenas a nível fisiológico-mecânico, a capacidade das plantas em responder a estímulos, mas também também avaliar que tantas habilidades cognitivas, como aprendizagem e memória, são atribuíveis aos organismos vegetais a partir das respostas observáveis ​​no referido modelo. O acima exposto é postulado em relação à ideia de que todos os organismos vegetais iniciam movimentos, mas nem todos são observáveis ​​pelos humanos: a Mimosa seria então um modelo útil para análise, pois apresenta movimentos que podem ser observados pelos pesquisadores e permitiria a avaliação de diferentes capacidades relacionadas aos fenômenos de sensibilidade e cognição.

This article reviews the main criticisms made to David Lewis's Counterpart Theory (CT) intwo distinct periods: 1971-1979 and 2001-2012. A counterpart, according to Lewis, is anentity that exists materially in another possible world, and the quality of that entity is thatit is similar, almost identical, to an individual in the actual world. The early critiques, byFeldman, Plantinga and Hazen, address fundamental problems related to the debate ontransmundane identity, the counterpart relation and the role of similarity in thecounterpart relation. Later critiques, by Chihara, Sider, Divers, Mackie and Hazen, focus on mainly logical and semantic aspects of CT, the intuitive character and its limitations incapturing modal properties. The article shows that, although CT has been influential inmetaphysical debates, its reliance on comparative similarity and lack of a sound logicalframework make it vulnerable to objections. Despite these challenges, the theory remainsa significant contribution to modal metaphysics, inspiring contemporary discussions ofpossible worlds and counterpart relations. This article seeks to provide a structuredoverview of the evolution of criticisms of CT and their implications for the philosophy of modality.

Explanatory Essentialism (EE) is the view that a property is the essence of a kind because it causally explains the many properties that instances of the kind exhibit. This paper examines an application of EE to biological species, which I call Biological Explanatory Essentialism (BEE). BEE states that a particular biological origin is the essence of a species on the grounds that it causes certain organisms to display the group of properties the species is associated with. Evaluating BEE is important, as it offers a novel argument for Biological Essentialism, the contentious claim that biological species have essences. The paper critically assesses the empirical foundations of BEE, focusing on the presupposition that a single biological origin causes the many properties associated with the species in question. By discussing a case of five-toed jerboas within the Scarturus elater species complex, I challenge that presupposition, thereby showing that cryptic species present a serious obstacle to BEE. I conclude that BEE fails to support Biological Essentialism, and suggest that essentialist philosophers reconsider the relevance of causal-explanatory factors in accounting for the purported essences of biological species. These philosophers may need to explore alternatives beyond such factors, one of which I briefly outline.