Gabriel Kofi Akpah

The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) presents new opportunities, but at the same time, it poses significant ethical challenges. In this paper, I explore the potential for Ubuntu—a Southern African philosophy that emphasises community, interconnectedness, and mutual care—to guide AI governance. Ubuntu offers a critical lens through which one can comment on the effect of AI on society, underscoring values such as inclusivity, empathy, and collective well-being. In the future, infusing principles of Ubuntu within the governance of AI will supply a more holistic approach with prime human dignity and social justice at the forefront. I argue that the inclusion of Ubuntu in AI policy and regulation can help lower biases, increase accountability, and ensure transparency in AI systems. By a normative critical approach, I unpack the philosophical underpinnings of Ubuntu, its bearings on contemporary ethical debates in AI, and the potential to transform AI governance. Comparative analyses with existing ethical frameworks underline what is peculiar about the contribution that Ubuntu can make toward democratic engagement and inclusivity in AI development and deployment. I conclude by putting forward some concrete actions for policy decision-makers, technologists, and scholars in taking Ubuntu principles into AI governance, underscoring the fact that global collaboration plays a very integral part in shaping good ethical futures for AI. I thus call for a paradigm shift in this all-inclusive AI ecosystem where technology remains only a means to better human flourishing and social cohesion.

The underdevelopment of Africa continues to be a significant issue, with some scholars, such as Walter Rodney, attributing it to a mix of historical, political, and economic causes. The factors encompass the history of colonialism, persistent wars, and insufficient infrastructure, all of which impede growth and development throughout the continent. However, this paper attributes Africa’s underdevelopment to the environmental circumstances in which numerous African children are raised. This environment, often characterised by antiquated cultural practices, tribal and ethnic conflicts, and poverty, among others, has impeded the capacity to cultivate and express their talent. These limits have a ripple effect, resulting in adverse results such as economic stagnation, diminished global standing, and brain drain, eventually sustaining the cycle of underdevelopment throughout the continent. This paper further claims that the root cause of these factors, especially wars and poverty, which lead to Africa’s underdevelopment, is bad governance. This paper therefore suggests drawing on the principles of Ubuntu and Rawls’ Theory of Justice, that a just and collective society where fairness and equity thrive can provide the foundation for creating a healthy environment that will support the development of children’s talents for the development of Africa.

This dissertation aims to look at the moral justification for war in a critical way so that we can better understand both the justice and morality of war. In contrast to natural disasters, war has historically been viewed as an extreme manifestation of human social failure. The vast majority of theorists who address the morality of war do so within the moral framework established by Just War Theory; a normative account of war that dates all the way back to the Western Philosophical Tradition over 1500 years. Recent events in the conduct of wars around the world, however, have called into question the just war theory's relevance and applicability to contemporary wars. For instance, morality and virtue have had no place in society during recent wars. This work will examine several major theorists in the history of Western Just War Theory (St Thomas Aquinas and Augustine), demonstrating that the forefathers of Just War Theory did regard moral virtues and ethical principles as central to the morality of war. I will critically examine the concept of a just war through a discussion of various formulations of the realist and pacifist positions and argue that, while the just war tradition offers a reasonable alternative to either of these extremes, its glaring shortcomings (the theory's inability to address the rise of non-state actors such as al-Qaeda, the increasing availability of weapons of mass destruction, etc) should not be overlooked. Finally, I will argue that the theory of just war is obsolete, impractical, unrealistic, and flawed in the modern era, particularly if one wishes to maintain a moral constraint on war.