Gabriel Monette

Cooperatives, despite their commitments to democratic member control and concern for community, often struggle to prioritize the interests of their members and non-member stakeholders. Research on cooperatives has identified many remedies, though these remedies are fragmented. We adopt the lens of republican political philosophy to advance a framework for an integrated analysis of these challenges centered on the principle of non-domination. After defining domination in the context of cooperatives and elaborating how it can affect both members and non-member stakeholders, we develop a comprehensive framework of republican cooperative governance anchored in Hirschman’s ( 1970 ) model of exit, voice, and loyalty. In doing so, our paper makes two main contributions to research at the nexus of research on cooperatives, business ethics, and political philosophy. First, our conception of domination in cooperatives advances the limited but growing republican research on cooperatives and the challenges they face by spotlighting the importance of attending to non-member stakeholder domination and distilling distinctive types of member domination. Second, overcoming insufficient attention to loyalty to date, our comprehensive framework builds on exit, voice, and critical loyalty to elaborate how organizational and societal remedies can be integrated towards a comprehensive republican approach to cooperatives and cooperative economies.

Kingmaking occurs when a board game participant who can no longer win attempts to change the winner without improving their own position. This phenomenon often elicits strong negative reactions and is widely regarded as a breach of two normative expectations in gameplay: the Meritocratic Norm, which holds that the most skilled or deserving player ought to win, and the Striving Norm, which demands that all players continue to try to win even when victory is unattainable. While both norms are prominent in player discourse, we argue that they fail to capture what is morally significant about kingmaking. We contend that kingmaking is morally objectionable only when it constitutes a failure to abide by the Lusory Impartiality principle, according to which players must bracket extra-game allegiances and treat each other as equals qua individuals. This norm speaks in favor of a form of Moderate Moralism about games: while many in-game actions are not apt targets of moral evaluation, some—like kingmaking—can have genuine moral import when they express interpersonal disrespect. One upshot is that kingmaking that doesn’t express such disrespect isn’t wrong—and that its salience can even be valuable in some contexts. When motivated by in-game reciprocity, strategic deterrence, or aesthetic storytelling, kingmaking can be justified and may enhance the strategic and narrative value of play.

Cet article se veut une exploration du concept de propriété dans la pensée républicaine. Il sera question d’aborder notre réflexion avec la définition de la propriété de John Christmann, ce qui nous permettra de faire ressortir des nuances importantes dans le concept d’autonomie, notamment la nécessité, pour son existence, d’un certain contrôle. Nous verrons que le républicanisme, en insistant sur l’importance du contrôle comme élément fondamental à la liberté, offre un outil important pour le design des institutions économiques.

L’objectif de cet article est de montrer que le républicanisme d’entreprise développé par Hsieh ne protège pas les travailleurs contre l’ensemble des interférences arbitraires. Comme ils sont fondés uniquement sur la contestation des décisions, les arrangements institutionnels que Hsieh propose n’arrivent pas à saisir l’ensemble des formes que peut prendre la domination. Pour ce faire, nous utiliserons la critique développée par McCormick des institutions républicaines. Pour exploiter cette critique et l’appliquer au contexte d’entreprise, nous aurons besoin de présenter les arguments en faveur du parallèle État-entreprise. Nous verrons ensuite que la critique de McCormick appliquée à l’entreprise nous permet de défendre l’idée selon laquelle il est nécessaire d’aller plus loin que le républicanisme d’entreprise pour réaliser la liberté républicaine.