The recent wave of human rights-based climate litigation has raised the question of whether states can be held responsible for the impact of their greenhouse gas emissions on human rights outside their territory. Given the lack of legal consensus, this paper examines this question in light of philosophical theories of human rights. I argue that if the “humanist” conception of human rights holds, then states must bear extraterritorial obligations in the context of climate change. Most opponents o…
Read moreThe recent wave of human rights-based climate litigation has raised the question of whether states can be held responsible for the impact of their greenhouse gas emissions on human rights outside their territory. Given the lack of legal consensus, this paper examines this question in light of philosophical theories of human rights. I argue that if the “humanist” conception of human rights holds, then states must bear extraterritorial obligations in the context of climate change. Most opponents of these obligations rely on alternative “practical” conceptions. However, I defend that even if we follow the practice of human rights, as these conceptions insist, its internal norms require the allocation of extraterritorial climate obligations. Thus, I aim not only to give normative support to climate advocates, but also, to contribute to the development of a practice-based approach to the philosophy of human rights which goes beyond the borders of the state.
