• Critical notice of Aaron James,Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy
    with Mathias Risse
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3): 382-401. 2013.
  • Three Images of Trade: On the Place of Trade in a Theory of Global Justice
    with Mathias Risse
    Moral Philosophy and Politics 1 (2): 201-225. 2014.
    Economic theory teaches that it is in every country’s interest to trade. Trade is a voluntary activity among consenting parties. On this view, considerations of justice have little bearing on trade, and political philosophers concerned with global justice should stay largely silent on trade. According to a very different view that has recently gained prominence, international trade can only occur before the background of an international market reliance practice shaped by states. Trade is a shar…Read more
  • On the claims of unjust institutions: Reciprocity, justice and noncompliance
    Politics, Philosophy and Economics. forthcoming.
    Just institutions have claims on us. There are two reasons for thinking that such claims are warranted. First, one may believe that we are under a natural duty of justice to support and further just institutions. If one believes that it matters whether institutions are just, one also has a reason, almost as a matter of consistency, to support and further just institutions. Second, one may believe that by enjoying the benefits brought about by cooperation through just institutions, one incurs an …Read more
  • The Third Wave of Theorizing Global Justice. A Review Essay
    Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 6 21-39. 2013.
  • Critical notice of Aaron James, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy
    with Risse Matthias
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (3): 382-401. 2013.
    (2013). Critical notice of Aaron James, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract for a Global Economy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 382-401
  • Framing, reciprocity and the grounds of egalitarian justice
    Res Publica 16 (3): 281-298. 2010.
    John Rawls famously claims that ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions’. On one of its readings, this remark seems to suggest that social institutions are essential for obligations of justice to arise. The spirit of this interpretation has recently sparked a new debate about the grounds of justice. What are the conditions that generate principles of distributive justice? I am interested in a specific version of this question. What conditions generate egalitarian principles of distri…Read more
  • Egalitarianism, numbers and the dreaded conclusion
    Ethical Perspectives 19 (3): 399-416. 2012.
    Some contractualist egalitarians try to accommodate a concern for numbers by embracing a pluralist strategy. They incorporate the belief that the number of people affected matters for what distribution one ought to bring about by arguing that their primary contractualist concern for justifiability to each may be outweighed by aggregative considerations. The present contribution offers two arguments against such a pluralist strategy. First, I argue that advo- cates of the pluralist strategy are f…Read more
  • Justice, Democracy and Reasonable Agreement (review)
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2): 294-296. 2010.
  • Justice in Finance: The Normative Case for an International Financial Transaction Tax
    Journal of Political Philosophy 22 (4): 458-485. 2014.
    There has recently been much debate about the idea of levying a tax on particular transactions on international financial markets. Economists have argued about how much revenue such an international financial transaction tax would raise and they disagree about what effects it would have on trade volumes, financial stability, and overall growth. Politicians have argued about the feasibility of introducing such a tax internationally and they disagree on its adequacy as a policy response to the cur…Read more
  • Equality and the Significance of Coercion
    Journal of Social Philosophy 42 (4): 363-381. 2011.
    Some political philosophers believe that equality emerges as a moral concern where and because people coerce each other. I shall argue that they are wrong. The idea of coercion as a trigger of equality is neither as plausible nor as powerful as it may initially appear. Those who rely on the idea that coercion is among the conditions that give rise to equality as a moral demand face a threefold challenge. They will have to succeed in jointly (a) offering a convincing account of the wrongness of c…Read more