Gabriele De Anna

Il saggio analizza la critica di Elizabeth Anscombe al concetto di dovere morale, mostrando come essa non conduca necessariamente al soggettivismo o al relativismo spesso attribuiti all’etica della virtù. Dopo aver ricostruito la posizione di Anscombe nel saggio Modern Moral Philosophy, l’articolo chiarisce il legame tra l’abbandono del linguaggio del dovere morale e l’appello a una rinnovata filosofia della psicologia di ispirazione aristotelica. Attraverso un’analisi della teoria dell’azione sviluppata in Intention, si sostiene che la psicologia proposta da Anscombe non sia riducibile a una descrizione empirica dei fatti psichici, ma contenga elementi normativi centrali. In particolare, emerge una concezione della virtù in cui il concetto di dovere conserva un ruolo decisivo, sebbene distinto dal dovere morale inteso in senso moderno. Il saggio mostra inoltre l’influenza di Aristotele e di Tommaso d’Aquino su questa impostazione e conclude che la critica anscombiana al dovere morale non implica, in senso intrinseco, esiti relativisti ma è stata spesso fraintesa a causa di ambiguità nel suo concetto di legge.

The occasion for this dialogue on Elisabeth Anscombe’s legacy for twenty-first-century ethics came with the publication in Italian of the collection of her ethical writings (G. E. M. Anscombe, Scritti di etica con un saggio di Peter Geach, a cura di S. Cremaschi, Morcelliana, Brescia 2022). In addition to making Anscombe’s ethical writings accessible to the Italian public, the book brings together her contribution to practical philosophy to its full extent for the first time. Vaccarezza's essay discusses Anscombe’s critique of the modern law-based view of ethics. Magri’s contribution focuses on Anscombe’s anti-anti-naturalism, aiming to unearth the twofold agenda in her project of meta-critique of modern moral philosophy. De Anna's paper sets out to examine the role of Wittgensteinian ways of thinking in Anscombe’s proposed restructuring of modern ethics.

The essays in this volume clarify the notion of political identity by focusing on the metaphysics of polities. By analysing the notion of political identity, they provide the conceptual resources for a deeper understanding of the theoretical and practical debates on populism, on the crisis of sovereignty, on the feasibility of a world government, and on ethical, religious, and cultural pluralism. What is a political community? Any answer to this question lies at the intersection between three fields: metaphysics, philosophy of action, and political philosophy. The question concerns how and why a plurality of individuals becomes a political unity, what principles or forces keep that unity together, and what threats that unity can encounter. In this volume, the contributors investigate how different metanormative views affect the possible answers to this metaphysical question. They explore the role that the individual identities of agents play in grounding common practices that underpin political life. They investigate the individual identities of agents as the result of the interplay between natural and cultural factors. Finally, they observe the ways in which a political community, as a collection of individuals who hang together in the attempt to reach common purposes, demonstrate a certain metaphysical solidity. Political Identity and the Metaphysics of Polities will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in metaphysics, political philosophy, political theory, and philosophy of action.

This book explores the metaphysics of political communities. It discusses how and why a plurality of individuals becomes a political unity, what principles or forces keep that unity together, and what threats that unity can be faced with. In Part I, the author justifies the need for the notion of substance in metaphysics in general and in the metaphysics of politics in particular. He spells out a moderately realist theory of substances and of their principles of unity, which supports substantial gradualism. Part II concerns action theory and the nature of practical reason. The author claims that the acknowledgement of reasons by agents is constitutive of action and that normativity depends on the role of the good in the formation of reasons. Finally, in Part III the author addresses the notion of political community. He claims that the principle of unity of a political community is its authority to give members of the community moral reasons for action. This suggests a middle way between liberal individualism and organicism, and the author demonstrates the significance of this view by discussing current political issues such as the role of religion in the public sphere and the political significance of cultural identity. Authority and the Metaphysics of Political Communities will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working in social metaphysics, political philosophy, philosophy of action, and philosophy of the social sciences.

Realism has been a central object of attention among analytical philosophers for some decades. Starting from analytical philosophy, the return of realism has spread into other contemporary philosophical traditions and given birth to new trends in current discussions, as for example in the debates about “new realism.” Discussions about realism focused on linguistic meaning, epistemology, metaphysics, theory of action and ethics. The implications for politics of discussion about realism in action theory and in ethics, however, are not much discussed. This collection includes essay which address from different and complementary points of view the issue of the social and political relevance of philosophical debates on realism.

Contemporary neo-Aristotelianism attempts to ground normative constraints on action on the notion of human nature and this opens it to two main objections: Firstly, human nature seems to be too indeterminate to set constraints on action; secondly, it is unclear why knowledge of human nature should motivate agents. This essay considers the contribution that Wittgenstein’s notion of form of life can give in answering these challenges. It suggests that forms of life are not objects of analysis, but rather a new philosophical method, which allows us also to investigate human volitional capacities and their normative significance for practical rationality.

This brief introduction expounds the reasons behind the collection of essays entitled ‘Nature, Value and Normativity’. Political and social philosophers have usually a hard time finding a role for considerations about nature (and human nature in particular) in their accounts of normativity, due to the risk of committing the naturalistic fallacy and/or running against people’s autonomy. Scepticism about appeals to nature in normative accounts of politics and society, however, seems bound to clash with the fact that nature constrains human action. The essays of the collection tackle some specific questions about the role of nature in accounts of value and normativity: the fact–value distinction, the relevance of emotions for normativity and values, the role of intersubjectivity in normative theory, as well as free will and action.

Current naturalistic accounts of value face the problem of explaining the normative constraints that value impose on agents. Attempts to solve this problem have progressively relaxed the strictness of naturalistic requirements, up to the point of seeking theistic solutions. However, appeals to God are also problematic, since it is questionable that a relevant notion of God is conceivable at all: if God is wholly other He cannot matter for our choices and if He is a being among natural beings He cannot explain our normative constraints. Engaging a discussion with Fiona Ellis’ treatment of the problem, this essay sketches an account of transcendence, which vindicates the conceivability of a notion of God suitable for the explanation of value. The proposal rests on the possibility of transcendental arguments based on analogy.

In the past years, the relevance of Thomas Aquinas's theory of cognition for contemporary debates on epistemology has been widely discussed. That theory claims that mind and world are formally identical and that this relationship overcomes various problems associated with scepticism concerning mental representation. The proposal, however, is grounded on the idea that the world can act on the mind through a relation of formal causation. This thesis attempts to develop a Thomistic theory of formal causation which may be suitable for a realist account of mental representation and which may meet the requirements prompted by current discussions. The suggested view is grounded on Aquinas's metaphysics, according to which the world is constituted of substances. The claim that change is possible since substances are hylomorphically constituted is defended. Aquinas's claim that some substances have forms which may act independently of matter is also supported. The paradigmatic examples are human souls, i.e. the forms of human beings, whose higher cognitive capacity, i.e. thinking, can be in principle carried on without the need of any material organ. A Thomistic theory of causation is subsequently proposed. It is argued that hylomorphism explains the distinction among four species of causes. Aquinas's attempt to explain causal relations conditionally is developed along the lines suggested by John Mackie's INUS conditional analysis. Jaegwon Kim's implementation of Mackie's proposal through an object-based metaphysics of events is then adapted to the hylomorphical account of substances. On these grounds, a theory of formal causation can be proposed and applied to Aquinas's theory of mental representation. The ensuing proposal is offered not in the spirit of historical exegesis but as a substantive philosophical account and it is Thomistic only in the broad sense that it is built on Aquinas's metaphysics and is consistent with his claims on causation.

Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler have been arguing for what they named libertarian paternalism (henceforth LP). Their proposal generated extensive debate as to how and whether LP might lead down a full-blown paternalistic slippery slope. LP has the indubitable merit of having hardwired the best of the empirical psychological and sociological evidence into public and private policy making. It is unclear, though, to what extent the implementation of policies so constructed could enhance the capability for the exercise of an autonomous citizenship. Sunstein and Thaler submit it that in most of the cases in which one is confronted with a set of choices, some default option must be picked out. In those cases whoever devises the features of the set of options ought to rank them according to the moral principle of non-maleficence and possibly to that of beneficence. In this paper we argue that LP can be better implemented if there is a preliminary deliberative debate among the stakeholders that elicits their preferences, and makes it possible to rationally defend them

Resumo Recentemente o Hilemorfismo – a visão tradicional, segundo a qual, as substâncias são constituídas pela combinação de forma e matéria – tem sido alvo de renovado interesse. Este artigo centra-se na substância material e sugere que, neste caso, a constituição hilemórfica exige uma noção de forma que deve ser alargada ao conceito de energia, ou ao exercício de uma força. Neste artigo também se defende o gradualismo substancial: se a forma for assim entendida, a substancialidade possui graus, ou seja, as coisas podem ser substâncias em maior ou menor grau. O gradualismo substancial pode iluminar os actuais debates relativos à identificação das partes das substâncias e à compatibilidade entre o hilemorfismo e o categorialismo. Palavras-chave : forma, gradualismo substancial, hilemorfismo, matéria, substânciaHylomorphism, the old traditional view according to which substances are constituted by the combination of form and matter, has recently undergone a renaissance. This essay focuses on material substance, and suggests that in this case the hylomorphic constitution calls for a notion of form which should be understood also as energy, or the exercise of a force. It further argues for substantial gradualism: when form is thus understood, substantiality comes in degrees, i.e. things can be substances to a greater or lesser degree. Substantial gradualism sheds new light on current discussions concerning the identification of the parts of substances and the compatibility between hylomorphism and sortalism. Keywords : form, hylomorphism, matter, substance, substantial gradualism.

Science increasingly deals with human behavior: biology, neuroscience, genetics, psychology, evolutionary theory, and ethology all bring new insights into our actions and uncover new facts about our agency. However, what is the philosophical significance of their findings? The answer to this question varies according to one's background philosophical views. On the one hand, the dominant empiricist view contends that the sciences can in principle tell us everything there is to know about human agency. On the other hand, there are other non-empiricist views - such as Kantian or Aristotelian perspectives - which hold that although science can contribute to our understanding of agency, agency itself cannot be reduced to mere scientific facts. This collection of original essays brings together a number of experts from different philosophical fields (history of philosophy, philosophy of action, ethics, and philosophy of science) to discuss how recent scientific developments about human behavior may be interpreted by, and may be relevant for, non-empiricist conceptions of agency. Contributors share the project of reconciling the scientific and the manifest images of the world in order to reach a stereoscopic vision of reality, with the conviction that philosophy is an attempt to establish coherence among our beliefs, while taking, at least prima facie, all the aspects of our experience at face value.