Gabriele Ferretti

What is the nature of our perception of pictures? Philosophers intrigued by this question, and adopting a naturalistic perspective, have turned to findings from visual neuroscience to answer it. This perspective seeks to address the question within the framework of the Two Visual Systems Model, which provides a specific anatomo‐functional description of how our visual system operates. According to this model, the visual cortex hosts a specific hodological division between a ventral stream, responsible for visual recognition, and a dorsal stream, responsible for the visual guidance of action. A philosophical account of picture perception based on this model is therefore referred to as the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception. Since its inception, this account has evolved in parallel with the advancements in the Two Visual Systems Model itself. This paper surveys the various interpretations under the different formulations of this account and traces their development within the literature of empirically informed philosophy of cognitive science.

A crucial question in the study of picture perception asks about whether, when perceiving an object in a picture, we see only the depicted scene or, rather, we simultaneously see both the depicted scene and the surface. Two different views have fueled the debate since a long time. According to Wollheim, we see both the depicted scene and the picture’s surface simultaneously. Call this the ‘simultaneous account of picture perception’ (SA). SA is in contrast with Gombrich’s view that, during picture perception, we do not simultaneously see both the depicted scene and the surface, but we alternate between these two visual states. Call this the ‘non-simultaneous account of picture perception’ (NA). The debate between these two positions still persists in the contemporary literature on picture perception. In this paper, I first analyze the notion of vision SA and NA are committed to. Then, by discussing empirical evidence from vision science, I offer an argument that supports SA.

Can skilled action be considered intentional if the skilled agent performing the action lacks consciousness of it? Some philosophers embraced the Non-intentional view: skilled action cannot be intentional because the agent does not consciously access action performance. This is supported by the Non-access view: since skilled action is very quickly and automatically executed, it is impossible to consciously access it. Recently, the Non-access view has been explicitly attacked (Brozzo, A role for conscious accessibility in skilled action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12:683–697, 2021), through arguments supporting the notion that certain aspects of skilled action can be consciously accessed, i.e., the Access view. This would suggest, in turn, that we could save the intentionality of skilled action, i.e., the Intentional view. This paper suggests that the arguments offered for the Access View, in this form, are untenable. So, as I show, the Non-Access View remains undefeated, for several reasons related to the nature of skilled action, which I describe. The paper remains neutral on whether the Access view is necessary and/or sufficient to hold the Intentional View. However, it follows that those who want to support the Intentional View by relying on the Access View encounter serious problems.

_Embodied Cognition_ suggests that cognitive processes are deeply rooted into our bodily morphology and its sensorimotor interactions with the environment. _Evolutionary Embodied Cognition_ suggests that our cognitive abilities are inscribed within the evolutionary trajectory of our dynamic bodily architectures. This paper extends the framework of _Evolutionary Embodied Cognition_, by combining it, for the first time, with the _Endurance Running Hypothesis_, which suggests that our bodily morphology has been massively shaped by an evolutionary history in which our ancestors’ ability to run played a crucial role. We analyze several pieces of anatomical, physiological, biomechanical, neurobiological and neurochemical evidence, in line with the _Endurance Running Hypothesis_, to extend _Evolutionary Embodied Cognition_ to the case of running. We build a framework suggesting a special link between the bodily, motoric capacity of endurance running, and a particular set of our cognitive abilities, so as to show a special relation between running and the mind, via body and brain.

Philosophers and neuroscientists often suggest that we perceptually represent objects and their properties. However, they start from very different background assumptions when they use the term “perceptual representation”. On the one hand, sometimes philosophers do not need to properly take into consideration the empirical evidence concerning the neural states subserving the representational perceptual processes they are talking about. On the other hand, neuroscientists do not rely on a meticulous definition of “perceptual representation” when they talk about this empirical evidence that is supposed to show that we perceptually represent such and such properties. It seems that, on both sides, something is missed. My aim is to show that, in the light of empirical evidence from neuroscience, the case of action properties is a good candidate in order to properly talk of perceptually represented properties. My claim is that the neurophysiological states encoding action properties are perceptual processes and that these perceptual processes are representational processes. That is, in the case of those neurophysiological states involved in the detection of action properties, it is correct to speak of perceptual representational states, and hence, ipso facto, of perceptually represented properties. First, I describe a reasonable and widely agreed upon conception of perceptual representation in the philosophical literature. Then, I report evidence from vision and motor neuroscience concerning the perception of action properties, which is subserved by the ventro-dorsal stream, a portion of the dorsal visual system. Finally, I show that a strong connection can be found between the philosophical idea of perceptual representation I have reported before and the neuroscientific evidence concerning the activity of the ventro-dorsal stream, whose job is, as said, to detect action properties.

Our experience seems to be populated by mind-independent objects. These very same objects are also experienced as offering the possibility of motor interactability. Thus, one may be tempted, prima facie, to consider these two experiences as always related. In this paper, I propose that this idea is not tenable, by invoking evidence from vision science and ophthalmology about a special case of blindness, stereoblindness. Stereoblind subjects cannot rely on stereopsis. Stereopsis is the visual mechanisms responsible for the experience of motor interactability with objects. Nonetheless, as I argue, stereoblind subjects can experience objects as mind-independent (notwithstanding the diminished quality of the experience of their spatial features for action). This claim is crucial for the literature. First, it explicitly suggests that the visual experience of motor interactability and the experience of mind-independence do not always correlate, and can be disjointed, though they may be usually considered two simultaneous aspects of our experience of objects. Second, it offers a novel philosophical discussion, showing the significance, for the first time, of this visual impairment, i.e., stereoblindness, for the literature on philosophy of perception.

The present paper offers an analysis of _derealization disorder_, a disorder in which the experience of reality is altered. In this respect, usually, real objects are experienced as _mind-independent_ and as _offering motoric interaction_. These two features seem to be responsible for our experience of objects in quality of _real objects_. Then, a crucial question is the following: what aspect of the experience of reality is derealization, in quality of a disorder of reality, about? This paper suggests that, in the case of _derealization_, what is disrupted is the experience of _mind-independence_, but not the experience of _possibility for motor interaction_. By doing so, however, the paper also suggests something important on the relation between these two experiences, namely, that they can be, _contra_ any alleged, very general intuition, disjointed, as the case of derealization shows.

Great scholars in philosophy possess a keen analytical mind, excel in logical reasoning, and exhibit meticulous attention to detail. They rigorously define terms, avoiding ambiguities and errors. Originality and the willingness to challenge conventions are their hallmarks. They make significant contributions across various philosophical fields. They transparently address the exact aim of their research, and what it is not. Finally, they anticipate the impact of their theories on the current literature, and how such an impact should blossom across the future generations. In this respect, great philosophers address open problems and propose big questions for the foreseeable research efforts of those who will follow. Mario Alai embodies the qualities of a great scholar in philosophy, and the various essays in this volume are an evidence to that. It is challenging to condense a lifetime of research in one book. However, the Editors of the present volume’s aim was to face this challenge, to make a collection dedicated to Mario Alai’s work not only possible but, as metaphysicians would say, actual. The book attempts to bring together the reflections of three different generations of scholars - i.e., mentors, colleagues, and students - on Alai’s thought. Viewed from this perspective, the extensive and valuable contributions that follow, crafted in honor of Mario Alai and his scholarly endeavors, come as no surprise. All the chapters focus on a theme that was very dear to the philosophical curiosity of Mario Alai. Moreover, in engaging with these different topics, the plethora of contributions gives us a sense of the work by Alai. To make sense of the different contributions as a unified enterprise, this volume is organized into three sections, which seek to gather writings that revolve around Mario’s most substantial contributions, while elucidating their contemporary significance in the global discourse. Moreover, it endeavors to offer precious insights into the origins and development of these contributions, as observed through Mario’s writings and responses. This represents a sort of closure of the theoretical circle, clearly showing how the work by Mario Alai has been appreciated through different generations, originating from his relation to his mentors, on the one hand, while also shedding new light on his students’ research interests, on the other. Editing such a wealth of material was, again, no small feat. Still, the taxonomy we have chosen for this book will assist readers in navigating the profound depths of Alai’s philosophical research. Consequently, the book is structured into the following three parts: 1. Realism in History of Philosophy, History of Science, and Metaphysics. 2. Scientific Realism. 3. Realism in Philosophy of Language, Epistemology, and Experimental Philosophy. Each contribution actively participates in a substantial conversation with Alai’s body of work, as a deep theoretical dialogue between the author and Mario. Consequently, it appeared fitting to let Alai conclude this conversation, with direct responses to these philosophy-provoking pieces in his honor. We shall refrain from further commentary on the works within this book and allow them to express their significance independently to appreciate the river of ideas flowing through Mario’s work1. Beyond their philosophical substance, they are a vivid testament to Alai’s enduring dedication and ongoing contributions, in different moments of his research life.

It is generally said that dreams are experienced as real. But the notion of reality is often used, in the philosophical literature, along with that of presence. A big problem, in this respect, is that both these terms may assume different meanings. So understanding the nature of presence and reality in dreams depends on the way we conceive these two notions. This paper contributes to the literature on dreaming by describing the experience of presence and reality in dreams in a very specific sense. I consider the experience of presence as related to the experience of possibility of motoric interaction, and the experience of reality as related to the experience of mind-independence. Then, endorsing that dream experiences are different from perception, and similar to imagery, I suggest that the dreamer can experience reality but not presence, with three lines of argument, concerning visual determinacy, stereopsis and peripersonal localization.

Research on the concept of affordance generated different interpretations, which are due to different stories aimed at describing how this notion accounts for visually guided motor behaviors. On the one hand, _dispositional accounts of affordances_ explain how affordances emerge from the encounter of the agent’s perceptual-motor skills, with an object offering possible interactions, as _behavioral dispositional properties_. On the other hand, _cognitive neuroscience_ explains what neural mechanisms are required for agents to detect affordances, resulting from an internal _processing_. As the literature recognized, it would be beneficial to connect these two stories. We propose an important step into this connection, showing how a _dispositional notion_ of affordance can be distinguished into two versions, the _Dispositional Account of Nomological Affordance Response_ and the _Dispositional Account of Probable Affordance Response_, and how to complement different aspects of _visuomotor processing_ for affordance extraction, discussed in _neuroscience_, with them. An important benefit of our proposal is that it suggests, for the first time, that we should not prefer one _dispositional_ account at the expense of the other. Indeed, we show that different _dispositional_ accounts can capture distinct aspects of the plethora of complex manifestations, at the neurocognitive level of visuomotor-processing, that affordances can display in humans, both in healthy and pathological subjects.

This volume features new research about the philosophy of plant intelligence and plant cognition, one of the most intriguing and complex current debates at the intersection of biology, cognitive science and philosophy. The debate about plant cognition is marked by deep disagreements. Some theorists are confident that the empirical evidence supports the ascription of cognitive capacities to plants. Others hold that such claims are overblown, and defend more traditional, non-cognitive accounts of plant behavior. Still others seek to formulate intermediate positions. This volume brings together leading researchers from across this theoretical spectrum to tackle the foundational questions that are at issue in the debate about plant cognition. The contributions focus on the philosophical questions raised by recent discoveries and controversies in the empirical sciences, such as: Can plants be said to have genuine cognitive abilities? Can they be characterized as representing or perceiving their environment, as pursuing goals, or even as having some form of conscious experience? Which data could provide evidence for such characterizations? And what are possible implications of these issues for general questions about the nature of cognition, representation, perception, and consciousness? Philosophy of Plant Cognition will be of interest to scholars and students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of biology, cognitive science, and plant biology.

Habits usually come in the form of skilled action. Then, accurately explaining the nature of habitual actions requires to say something on skilled actions. Here we focus on the debate on skilled actions in the philosophical literature informed by motor neuroscience. The main question in the literature is whether practical knowledge can be reduced to propositional knowledge and, if not, how these different forms of knowledge can be related when skilled motor performance is in play. But this, ipso facto, also represents a crucial question in the case of habitual actions. In this respect, we suggest that skilled action performance at the basis of habitual actions is the result of an information processing that is shared, within the motor brain, by both epistemic and practical states (of which we specify the nature and the relation). We offer a description of how this information processing works, so as to shed new light on how to conceive habitual skilled action, while also taking into account the practical mode of access to the epistemic states about this action.

Philosophers and cognitive scientists have been debating about the nature of practical knowledge in skilled action. A big challenge is that of establishing whether and how practical knowledge (knowledge-how) is influenced by, or related to propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). This becomes even more challenging when trying to understand how propositional and motor representations may cooperate in making action performance flexible, while also remaining rational. In this paper, we offer an account that explains how practical knowledge leads to the execution of our actions in a way that accounts for its relation to propositional knowledge, and with respect to the possibility of granting flexibility and rationality.

Philosophers and cognitive scientists try to understand, from different perspectives, the nature of the experience of reality. Given this shared, interdisciplinary interest, it would be beneficial to have a coherent story about the experience of reality, in which there is reciprocal contribution from both philosophy and cognitive science. This paper wants to pave the way for this shared enterprise on the investigation of the experience of reality. I first distinguish between two indicators of reality. (1) The experience of availability to motor interaction. (2) The experience of mind-independence. I then show how invoking an analysis of the results from vision science, concerning the visual mechanisms of stereopsis, which is related to the visual impression of a solid, three-dimensional world available to motor interaction, successfully provides a coherent description of the first indicator. Furthermore, I suggest that the analysis of the evidence about the first indicator is very informative in preparing the ground for the investigation of the second indicator. This is shown by discussing experimental evidence directly related to stereopsis, as well as some perceptual phenomena that are usually described by invoking the story from vision science about stereopsis. Thus, the epistemological analysis of the results from vision science on stereopsis, offered in this paper, is beneficial in a twofold manner, for the interdisciplinary enterprise aimed at understanding the experience of reality. It is explicitly beneficial in the description of the first indicator, and implicitly beneficial to understand the second indicator. Finally, it also suggests future research about their relation.

Everyday visual experience constantly confronts us with things we can interact with in the real world. We literally feel the outside presence of physical objects in our environment via visual perceptual experience. The visual feeling of presence is a crucial feature of vision that is largely unexplored in the philosophy of perception, and poorly debated in vision neuroscience. The aim of this article is to investigate the feeling of presence. I suggest that visual feeling of presence depends on the visual representation of a very particular spatial relation with the object we interact with: the visual representation of absolute egocentric depth, which is due to stereoscopic vision.

Does action play any crucial role in our perception of pictures? The standard literature on picture perception has never explicitly tackled this question. This is for a simple reason. After all, objects in a picture seem to be static objects of perception. Thus, it might sound extremely controversial to say that action is crucial in picture perception. Contrary to this general intuitive stance, this paper defends, for the first time, the apparently very controversial claim, never addressed in the literature, that some of the specific and essential relations between vision and action make action (and its motoric basis) crucial in order for us to enter pictorial experience. I first discuss two ways in which vision and action are deeply linked, by describing the famous notions of Vision-for-Action and Sensorimotor Understanding. Then, I describe the special role they play in generating ordinary pictorial experience and suggest that, when we cannot rely on them while in front of a picture, we lose pictorial experience.

Les modèles mathématiques peuvent être utilisés avec profit pour établir si notre perception du monde extérieur est précis. Donald Hoffman et ses collaborateurs ont développé un cadre mathématique prometteur dans lequel cette question peut être abordée, et qui repose sur une taxonomie exhaustive des différentes relations possibles qui peuvent tenir entre les représentations perceptuelles et le monde extérieur. Après avoir reformulé leur cadre au moyen d’un système formel amélioré, nous discutons de leur application de la théorie des jeux évolutifs, qui semble montrer qu’une stratégie perceptuelle essentiellement anti-réaliste à long terme surpasserait biologiquement ses rivaux. Nous soutenons que leur modèle ne prend pas dûment en considération la signification biologique cruciale des changements environnementaux et proposons des modèles alternatifs qui le font. Nous concluons que, dans nos modèles, une représentation partiellement réaliste serait privilégiée.

When seeing a jaguar, we can see all the spots on its mantle without seeing a determinate number, N, of spots on the mantle. How is this visual phenomenon possible? Philosophers have tried to provide a reliable answer to this question, by recruiting evidence from vision science about the way attention works. Here we push this idea forward, by suggesting that an alternative and less complex solution, with respect to the one proposed in the literature, is possible. In particular, we argue that the puzzling visual phenomenon of 'seeing entities without seeing N-entities' strictly depends on the specific number of entities we are simultaneously attending to: a problematic scenario concerning this visual process arises only when the number of entities in the visual field exceeds a specific quantity. This depends, as we argue, on the fact that the nature of our visual content is modulated, in this perceptual scenario, by the limited way we can exercise visual attention on the properties of the objects of our perception. Differently from other accounts, our proposal allows us to properly define when and why such a problem arises, and explains why such a situation has traditionally been found to be so puzzling. Our idea is also well motivated by experimental results that so far have not been taken into account in the debate.

According to an influential view, the detection of action possibilities and the selection of a plan for action are two segregated steps throughout the processing of visual information. This classical approach is committed with the assumption that two independent types of processing underlie visual perception: the semantic one, which is at the service of the identification of visually presented objects, and the pragmatic one which serves the execution of actions directed to specific parts of the same objects. However, as our knowledge of vision has improved over the years, this established view has turned out to be only an approximation. This paper sets out the details of a non-modularist approach to visual perception of action possibilities and explains how to resist the lure of cognitive segregation.

Everyday visual experience constantly confronts us with things we can interact with in the real world. We literally feel the outside presence of physical objects in our environment via visual perceptual experience. The visual feeling of presence is a crucial feature of vision that is largely unexplored in the philosophy of perception, and poorly debated in vision neuroscience. The aim of this article is to investigate the feeling of presence. I suggest that visual feeling of presence depends on the visual representation of a very particular spatial relation with the object we interact with: the visual representation of absolute egocentric depth, which is due to stereoscopic vision.

In 1688 the Irish scientist and politician William Molyneux sent a letter to the philosopher John Locke. In it, he asked him a question: could someone who was born blind, and able to distinguish a globe and a cube by touch, be able to immediately distinguish and name these shapes by sight if given the ability to see? The philosophical puzzle offered in Molyneux’s letter fascinated not only Locke, but major thinkers such as Leibniz, Berkeley, Diderot, Reid, and numerous others including psychologists and cognitive scientists today. Does such a question represent a philosophical puzzle or a problem that can be solved by experimental tests? Can vision be fully restored after blindness? What is the relation between vision and touch? Are the senses linked through learning or bound at birth? Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy is a major collection of essays that explore the long-standing issues Molyneux’s problem presents to philosophy of mind, perception and the senses. In addition, the volume considers the question from an interdisciplinary angle, examines the pre-history of the question, and aspects of it that have been ignored, such as perspectives from religion and disability. As such, Molyneux’s Question and the History of Philosophy presents a set of philosophically rich, empirically informed, and scientifically rigorous original investigations into this famous puzzle. It will be of great interest to students and researchers in philosophy, psychology, and the cognitive sciences including neuroscience, neurobiology and ophthalmology, as well as those studying the mind, perception and the senses.

Here is a crucial question in the contemporary philosophy of perception: how can we be aware of action properties? According to the perceptual view, we consciously see them: they are present in our visual phenomenology. However, this view faces some problems. First, I review these problems. Then, I propose an alternative view, according to which we are aware of action properties because we imagine them through a special form of imagery, which I call visuomotor imagery. My account is to be preferred as it offers an explanation of our awareness of action properties without generating all the problems that the perceptual view faces.

Is there any fruitful interplay between philosophy and neuroscience? In this paper, we provide four case studies showcasing that: (i) Philosophical questions can be tackled by recruiting neuroscientific evidence; (ii) the epistemological reflections of philosophers contribute to tackle some foundational issues of (cognitive) neuroscience. (i) will be supported by the analysis of the literature on picture perception and Molyneux’s question; (ii) will be supported by the analysis of the literature on forward and reverse inferences. We conclude by providing some philosophical reflections on the interpretation of these cases.

Philosophers suggested that usual picture perception requires the simultaneous occurrence of the perception of the surface and of the depicted object. However, there are special cases of picture perception, such as trompe l'oeil perception, in which, unlike in usual picture perception, the object looks like a real, present object we can interact with, of the kind we are usually acquainted with in face‐to‐face perception. While philosophers suggested that usual picture perception and trompe l'oeil perception must differ with respect to the perception of the surface, nobody has ever proposed a final explanatory account for such a difference. Here, I propose such an account. I consider the two possible options as candidates for the explanation of the illusory power of trompe l'oeil perception. The first is that, with trompe l'oeils, we perceive the surface unconsciously. The second is that, with trompe l'oeils, we cannot perceive the surface at all, that is, we cannot perceive it either consciously or unconsciously. I show that the second option is the unique plausible option, as it is in line with vision science, and with our received view about the nature of usual picture perception.

One of the most important tasks of philosophy of mind is the investigation of the nature of our mental states. However, mental states come in different formats. In this respect, one of the most interesting problems in contemporary philosophy of mind is determining how mental states coming in different formats can interlock. Such a problem has generated two parallel debates, especially when we try to describe the nature of practical knowledge in skilled motor action: the one about Intellectualism and the one about the Interface Problem. Both of these two debates, which are at the crossroad between philosophy of mind and philosophy of action, seem to share a common problem. Action performance requires the interplay between two different representational formats, the practical and the propositional. If so, how can we account for such an interlock between these two different formats? We mention these two debates as starting point, in order to highlight the importance of providing an account capable of explaining the relation between different mental states, especially in the case of propositional and pragmatic, motor states. However, we do not want to directly tackle these two literatures here. Rather, we want to sketch a possible solution for such a problem, which can be beneficial for both the literatures. We suggest that motor and propositional states interlock through the motor mediation of action concepts. Our account is cashed out from the philosophical analysis of empirical evidence showing that the information processing that is responsible for the generation of the representations of action concepts is strictly related to the motor processing that is responsible for generating the appropriate representations recruited in the planning and execution of motor behaviors.

Does action play any crucial role in our perception of pictures? The standard literature on picture perception has never explicitly tackled this question. This is for a simple reason. After all, objects in a picture seem to be static objects of perception. Thus, it might sound extremely controversial to say that action is crucial in picture perception. Contrary to this general intuitive stance, this paper defends, for the first time, the apparently very controversial claim, never addressed in the literature, that some of the specific and essential relations between vision and action make action (and its motoric basis) crucial in order for us to enter pictorial experience. I first discuss two ways in which vision and action are deeply linked, by describing the famous notions of Vision-for-Action and Sensorimotor Understanding. Then, I describe the special role they play in generating ordinary pictorial experience and suggest that, when we cannot rely on them while in front of a picture, we lose pictorial experience.