Gal Katz

In recent years, the ancient concept of second nature has become the focus of a growing volume of Hegel-related work in ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of mind, and action theory. And for good reason: second nature allows us to think across, and seeks to bridge, fundamental antagonisms that have haunted modern philosophy since its inception – between the realm of law and the realm of reasons, necessity and freedom, inclination and duty. In social philosophy, in particular, second nature holds the promise of reconciling the painful modern rupture between the individual and her political community, reviving the goods and comforts of what have been called the freedoms of the ancients in the context of a modern Sittlichkeit.

Explicating a concept that Hegel coins in his early writings, this paper shows how death—which initially appears as an absolute limitation on human freedom—can be understood as its condition. Understood as ‘the power to die’, our mortality becomes the freedom to negate any determination whatsoever, much as to own and value some determinations. The last section juxtaposes this agentive understanding of mortality against Hegel’s ideal of modern Ethical Life, sketching the ways in which modern ‘second nature’ is better grounded in our mortal ‘first nature’.

Like some ‘second wave’ feminists, Rousseau believes that modern sexual practices are not a manifestation of a newfound autonomy—rather, they reflect its systemic deprivation. Drawing on his critique of libertine culture in eighteenth century Paris, I show how even consensual sex may lead to a chronic deficit of recognition, coupled with psychological misery. To avoid such discontents, sexual freedom must include a satisfying sexual recognition. I articulate the conditions for such recognition as cultivated in Emile’s erotic education. Informed by amour-propre, Emile would seek a sexual partner who could recognize him as superior, yet, because Emile is also endowed with pity, he would understand such superiority in terms of uniqueness, independence and authentic expression, rather than as winning the transient favors of public taste. I propose that Rousseau’s recognitive account of sexual desire is applicable to current-day philosophical and public debates.

The paper develops a conception of marital love as a complex recognitive relation, which I articulate by juxtaposing it against other recognitive relations that figure in Hegel's theory of modern civil society (i.e., respect and esteem). Drawing on Hegel's early writings, I argue that, if love is to provide its unique sort of recognition, it must obtain between “living beings who are equal in power”—a peculiar form of equality that I name (drawing on Stanley Cavell's work) “dynamic equality.” I conclude that it is by Hegel's own lights that we should reject his notorious conception of the sexual difference. However, I also offer reasons why, from Hegel's early 19th century perspective, he could consider the following two conditions as compatible: (1) equality within marriage and (2) sexual hierarchy outside marriage, namely, in civil society.