Garrett DeWeese

The past six decades have seen rising interest in the philosophy of time, driven in large measure by the metaphysical implications of the physical theories of relativity and quantum mechanics. Philosophical theology has only recently begun serious interaction with contemporary metaphysics of time. In particular, the issue of God's temporal mode of being has come under investigation In Part 1, I begin with the metaphysics of time, explicating and defending a causal account of dynamic time. I then consider objections that can be brought against this account from the standpoint of the Special and General Theories of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics, and conclude that one of the objections are compelling. In Part II, I consider the evidence from Scripture relative to God's temporal mode of being, and find that it is neutral between a temporal and an atemporal conception. The arguments upholding the medieval consensus in philosophical theology of divine timelessness are evaluated, along with contemporary arguments for atemporality. Openness to divine temporality is discernible in some medieval philosophers; their arguments, along with contemporary arguments for temporality, are investigated. I then offer an analysis of the concept of omnitemporality which I take to be the form of temporality most appropriate to expressing God's temporal mode of being. Finally I argue that objections to omnitemporality are not forceful, and that the concept has in its favor greater explanatory power for a range of issues in philosophical theology.

In the literature of philosophical theology, several different terms are used to elucidate the metaphysics of “eternity” as God's temporal mode of being. This chapter offers definitions of four crucial terms: temporal, atemporal, sempiternal, and omnitemporal. Certain metaphysical implications which flow from the definitions offer philosophical theologians clear alternatives from which to choose in explicating God's eternity. First, it is suggested that the definition of atemporality has clearly detrimental implications for traditional conceptions of God's being. Next, it is argued that if God's eternity is conceived as sempiternal, then it follows that God is logically contingent, a rather unwelcome result. Finally, the chapter contends that omnitemporality, while not without some difficulties, may offer the best conceptual framework for understanding God's relation to the temporal universe and to us.