Gary Neels

Epistemic Contrastivism is the thesis that, for any proposition A, one does not simply know that A. Rather, one knows A rather than some set of alternatives. Typically, arguments for Epistemic Contrastivism have relied on intuitions regarding knowledge ascriptions in ordinary language. In this article, I offer a novel argument for Epistemic Contrastivism (at least with respect to lottery propositions) from considerations of the Lottery Paradox. Recent treatments of the Lottery Paradox demonstrate that Doxastic Contrastivism, the thesis that rational belief is contrastive, provides powerful resources to resolve this paradox. Insofar as Doxastic Contrastivism entails Epistemic Contrastivism (assuming some contrastive beliefs constitute knowledge), these resources are only available if we accept Epistemic Contrastivism as well. The article has three sections. In the first, I give a brief overview of contrastivism in general, beforeexplaining Epistemic Contrastivism and Doxastic Contrastivism. In the second, I turn to the Lottery Paradox, and explain how recent work in formal epistemology supportsEpistemic Contrastivism. In the third, I show how these formal theories have resources to answer objections that have been raised against Epistemic Contrastivism and Doxastic Contrastivism.

While much has been written about the probabilities referenced in Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, insufficient attention has been paid to the question of how these probabilities are to be interpreted. In this paper, I demonstrate that objective interpretations entail the denial of traditional theism, making them unsuitable for Plantinga’s purpose here. With respect to epistemic interpretations, I note that standard Bayesianism is too permissive for Plantinga’s purposes. I then argue that Plantinga’s use of the Principle of Indifference is at odds with his Reformed Epistemology. I conclude with some suggestions for how defenders of the argument might proceed.