Gaston Lenotre

Many scholars remain perplexed by Aquinas’s treatment of “mysterious” common natures. They call it “careless,” “contradictory,” or “ad hoc.” But the standard interpretation (adopted by authors such as Owens, Black, Kenny, Pasnau, Brower, and Galluzzo) mistakenly conflates the common nature with the nature absolutely considered. Starting from Boethius’s meaning of “nature” as whatever can in any way be intelligible, the author argues that the “common nature” and “nature absolutely considered” are conceptually distinct for Aquinas. Unlike the nature absolutely considered, the common nature positively has unity, existence, as well as the intention of universality. Moreover, the common nature (such as the nature of a species) is the only nature that is individuated. It exists in the individual “objectively,” as the foundation for human cognition.

Thomas Aquinas’s writings on natural law (ST 1–2.94) are well-known. Around the same period of writing, Thomas wrote his twelfth Quodlibet (1272), including one famous article about why truth is stronger than wine, women, and kings (QQ 12.13.1). The two texts are parallel in surprising ways. Although the Quodlibet passage is overly brief, similar arguments concerning whether love is stronger than hatred (Summa theologiae 1–2.29.3) and whether all things tend to the good (De veritate q. 22, a. 1) complete the Quodlibet’s argumentation. Furthermore, Thomas’s understanding of natural law in the human heart as a participation in the eternal law, especially in terms of natural inclinations, gives theoretical justification for why truth is strongest.

The science of being as being for Thomas Aquinas acquires distinct modalities based on distinct paths of reasoning, either from principles or towards principles, and based on distinct domains of discourse, either according to extrinsic causes ( secundum rem ) or according to intrinsic causes ( secundum rationem ). "Metaphysics" proceeds by resolution secundum rationem towards the universal principle of being, and "first philosophy" proceeds by way of composition secundum rationem from the universal principle of being. In another sense, "first philosophy" proceeds by resolution secundum rem to the universal cause of being as such, and theology, divine science, or "philosophical theology" proceeds by composition secundum rem from the universal cause of being, namely, God. I respond to arguments against the possibility of philosophical theology by showing how some arguments for the real distinction and for the existence of angels proceed by way of composition secundum rem. We can argue from an imperfect notion of God insofar as we assume philosophical insights already gained about God through another mode, namely, through first philosophy, by way of resolution secundum rem. Finally, I have shown how this mode assumes only a suppositional necessity in God's operation with regard to creatures.

Neoplatonic commentators found in Aristotle’s Categories a basis for participation and self-predication (or reflex predication). Although Simplicius seems to accept a certain type of self-predication (e.g., “quality is qualified”), Pseudo-Dionysius gives arguments against self-predication among caused things, making exception only for the divine nature insofar as the predicates preexist in their Cause (e.g., “God’s Beauty is beautiful”). Theologians such as Philip the Chancellor (1165/85–1236) and Thomas Aquinas adapt the Neoplatonic view of divine transcendence while also elaborating a transcendental conception of metaphysics. These theologians in effect make ontological space for created substantial goodness. One sign of this second beginning in metaphysics is the ability to make reflex predications about creatures (e.g., “goodness is good”). Philip the Chancellor argues for this reflex predication in Summa de Bono (q. 9), and Thomas defends it at length in De veritate (q. 21, a. 4 ad 4).

A premodern philosophy of race and racism in Thomas Aquinas resolves some seeming oppositions between the three most current theories of race. Thomas’s generational account of race is primary. It affirms the racial naturalist view that there are biological differences between people, and some of which stem from a characteristic genotype and geography. Thomas’s individual account of race is secondary but nevertheless a necessary clarification of the generational account. It affirms the racial skeptic view that these racial characteristic properties are individual properties, not essential or specific properties, and as such cannot lead to a definite, essential being that is a ‘race.’ Thomas’s intersubjective account of race is tertiary, insofar as it presumes the generational and individual accounts, and yet crucially explains a peculiar social reality. It affirms the racial constructionist view that the intention by which we understand the notion of race is a socially constituted object, a mind-dependent reality informed by experience.

The scholarly consensus is that Thomas Aquinas’s views about individuation changed over time. The consensus states that he wavered in his opinion about whether determinate dimensions or indeterminate dimensions serve in the individuation of corporeal substances. I argue that this consensus is mistaken. I focus on early texts of Thomas to argue that he relies on different types of dimensions to answer different problems of individuation. Determinate dimensions resolve a problem in the order of perfection, and indeterminate dimensions resolve a problem in the order of generation. I explain texts that answer the problem of individuation in the order of perfection according to questions about universals, cognition, and science. I then explain texts that answer the problem of individuation in the order of generation. My conclusion argues that, despite abandoning the language, Thomas continues later in his career to rely on indeterminate dimensions to resolve the problem of individuation in the order of generation.