Gbenga Fasiku

One of the vibrant topics of debate among African and non-African scholars in the 20th and 21st centuries centered on the existence of African philosophy. This debate has been described as unnecessary. What is necessary is, if African philosophy exists, we should show it, do it and write it rather than talking about it, or engaging in endless talks about it. A popular position on the debate is that what is expected to be shown, done and written is philosophy tailored along the stereotyped and paradigmatic sense peculiar to Western philosophy. Interestingly, a non-African scholar, Barry Hallen argues that using the method of ordinary language philosophy, African philosophy is philosophy per se, and should be recognised as such. The focus of this paper is to analyse what Hallen refers to as ordinary language philosophy and explain how it authenticates African philosophy as unique ‘species’ of philosophy, thus, putting an end to the controversy on the ontology of African philosophy.

There is a prevalent assumption that the phenomenal character of a mental experience is an ontological property existing as part of the fabric of the world. This implies that the problem of explaining the phenomenal property of a mental experience is a metaphysical one. Contrary to this assumption, the present paper argues that phenomenal properties of mental experiences are the results of our epistemological perspectives of the world. Consequently, the paper contends that in developing issues for African Philosophy of Mind, care must, ab initio, be taken to avoid the metaphysical pitfalls of considering phenomenal characters or properties of mental states to be part of the fabric of the world

A thought is a mental state with a phenomenal aspect; it is essentially subjective. However, in Yorùbá thought system, a thought involves third persons or objective perspectival aspects. This is contrary to the nature of thoughts, hence the need to explain how the distinct properties of subjectivity and objectivity are found in Yorùbá thoughts system. The paper is divided into three parts. The first explores the nature of phenomenality in human mental states. The second explains that the Yorùbá thoughts system is linked with the embodied cognitive system. It is argued that when an average Yorùbá thinks, such a thought is a dialogue between the first person and third persons or objects. The third part draws examples from Yorùbá thought system to illustrate the complementariness between the first-person character and the objective or external elements of mental state.

Arguments against the plausibility of a scientific theory of consciousness are hinged on the ground that attached to mental consciousness are phenomenal properties, also known as qualia, which are not amenable to any scientific theory. This paper develops and defends a neuroidentity hypothesis that purports to show that qualia, which are identified as neuroqualia, are the same as some neurochemical interactions in the central nervous system. The neuroidentity hypothesis is offered as a possible way of moving closer to a probable scientific theory of consciousness.

This paper challenges the viability of argument from supervenience in defense of a physicalist position on the place of qualia, the subjective properties of consciousness, in a physical or material world. Physicalism, being an ontological thesis that asserts that the only things that really exist are either physical entities or properties, affirms that every mental attribute must be a physical attribute. However, the existence of a quale as an attribute of a mental state falsifies this affirmation. The physicalist argues that qualia supervene on the physical properties in the human body, and that any problem about qualia is, just like any other scientific problem, resolvable scientifically, either in principle or in practice. This paper argues that supervenience is merely a report of the nature of reality, and not a justificatory ontological affirmation that qualia supervene on physical properties. The paper begins with a short description of physicalism and an account of qualia as distinctive character of consciousness. It further articulates and examines the physicalists’ use of the argument from supervenience to establish that qualia supervene on the physical elements in the world. The concluding part shows the errors in the argument from supervenience, and its implication for the truth of physicalism.

Transparency International has consistently maintained two prominent assertions: that corruption remains a global threat because no human society in the world has a clean record, and that Africa is the most corrupt region in the world. These assertions raise some fundamental philosophical concerns. The former assertion re-opens the need to ascertain whether corruption is an essence of humans, or an acquired disposition. Howsoever this is resolved forms the fulcrum of concerns on the second assertion. This paper engages these philosophical concerns. The paper takes two paths to achieve this goal. The first draws from Aristotle’s essentialism and Thomas Hobbes’ accounts on human nature to engage the debate on the relationship between human nature and corruption. The second derives and discusses the plausibility and fundamental implications of the claim that Africa is the most corrupt region in the world. It was found that neither on the basis of Aristotle’s nor Thomas Hobbes’, nor even a possible African cosmology as discussed, can it be said that official corruption is essential to humans. The paper concludes that what is at issue concerning corruption as measured by Transparency International pertains to different African expectations of recompense in a protective communalism from which relatives in public offices must have drawn care, now termed “corruption” by Transparency International, which is not so regarded in the African social order.