Genoveva Martí

There is a real question as regards what conceptual engineering consists in, what it means to engineer concepts, and what the aims, motivation and targets of conceptual engineering are. In this sense, conceptual engineering is remindful of cases in which there are some clear examples of a phenomenon (and some clear non-examples), but the final definite characterization of the phenomenon is still under dispute. In this paper we hope to provide more tools for reflection by examining some cases and raising questions as to whether they can be coherently understood as cases of conceptual engineering and if so why. We discuss two semantic phenomena that are particularly important when they affect the interpretation of the law. We examine their relation to conceptual engineering, and we discuss some social and moral aspects that alert to some of the perils of prolific engineering.

Although possible worlds semantics is a powerful tool to represent the semantic properties of natural language sentences, it has been often argued that it is too coarse: with the tools that possible worlds semantics puts at our disposal, any relevant semantic difference has to be a truth conditional difference representable as a difference in intension. A case that raises questions about the ability of possible worlds semantics to make the appropriate discriminations is the distinction between rigidity and direct reference, an issue deeply connected to the representation of the behavior of two operators: ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’. Differences between the mode of operation of ‘dthat’ and ‘actually’ have been observed, but they have not been examined in depth. Our purpose is to explore systematically to what extent the observed differences between the two operators have truth conditional consequences that are formally representable in possible worlds semantics.

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder, or so we are told. Filippo Contesi, Enrico Terrone, Marta Campdelacreu and Genoveva Martí argue that the traditional view in philosophy of art is that, whilst most of us claim to believe that beauty is subjective, we actually act as though it is objective. The true problem of aesthetics then, is not whether or not we believe that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, but why our behaviour around beauty doesn’t match up with our stated beliefs. Beauty, it seems, is more than skin-deep.

Three-valued logics are standardly used to formalize gappy languages, i.e., interpreted languages in which sentences can be true, false or neither. A three-valued logic that assigns the same truth value to all gappy sentences is, in our view, insufficient to capture important semantic differences between them. In this paper we will argue that there are two different kinds of pathologies that should be treated separately and we defend the usefulness of a four-valued logic to represent adequately these two types of gappy sentences. Our purpose is to begin the formal exploration of the four-valued logics that could be used to represent the phenomena in question and to show that these phenomena are present in natural language, at least according to some semantic theories of natural language.

A series of recent experimental studies have cast doubt on the existence of a traditional tension that aestheticians have noted in our aesthetic judgments and practices, viz. the problem of taste. The existence of the problem has been acknowledged since Hume and Kant, though not enough has been done to analyse it in depth. In this paper, we remedy this by proposing six possible conceptualizations of it. Drawing on our analysis of the problem of taste, we argue that the experimental results in question are not a real challenge to its existence. By contrast, they provide empirical evidence in its support.

This paper continues the defense of a version of scientific realism, Tautological Scientific Realism, that rests on the claim that, excluding some areas of fundamental physics about which doubts are entirely justified, many areas of contemporary science cannot be coherently imagined to be false other than via postulation of radically skeptical scenarios, which are not relevant to the realism debate in philosophy of science. In this paper we discuss, specifically, the threats of meaning change and reference failure associated with the Kuhnian tradition, which depend on a descriptivist approach to meaning, and we argue that descriptivism is not the right account of the meaning and reference of theoretical terms. We suggest that an account along the lines of the causal-historical theory of reference provides a more faithful picture of how terms for unobservable theoretical entities and properties come to refer; we argue that this picture works particularly well for TSR. In the last section we discuss how our account raises concerns specifically for perspectival forms of scientific realism.

The story of the Ship of Theseus is one of the most venerable conundrums in philosophy. Some philosophers consider it a genuine puzzle. Others deny that it is so. It is, therefore, an open question whether there is or there is not a puzzle in the Ship of Theseus story. So, arguably, it makes sense to test empirically whether people perceive the case as a puzzle. Recently, David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich and forty-two other researchers from different countries have undertaken that task. We argue that their tests do not provide any evidence that bears on the question as to whether the Ship of Theseus case is a genuine puzzle. In our discussion we address also what should be taken into account if one wishes to test the puzzling, or not puzzling, status of the Ship of Theseus story.

In recent years attacks on the Kripke-Putnam approach to natural kinds and natural kind terms have proliferated. In a recent paper, Häggqvist and Wikforss (The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 1–23, 2017) attack the once-dominant essentialist account of natural kinds. Häggqvist & Wikforss also suggest that it is time to return to some sort of cluster-based descriptivist semantics for natural kind terms, thus targeting both the metaphysical and semantic tenets that underpin the Kripke-Putnam approach. In our paper we want to challenge both parts of Häggqvist and Wikforss’ project. We will argue that the anti-essentialist considerations and arguments they raise against the Kripke-Putnam view are far from compelling in some cases, and certainly not decisive against a reasonable form of the view. On the semantic side, although Häggqvist and Wikforss give few details about what a viable cluster-based descriptivist theory should look like, we will argue that one can already see the approach to be a non-starter. Ignorance and error arguments of the kinds provided by Kripke and Putnam continue to be decisive objections. The only way we can see to save the cluster descriptivist approach is to make the essential properties postulated by Kripke and Putnam become essential features of the descriptive cluster. But this makes the success of the approach parasitic on the correctness of the Kripke-Putnam view.

Some of the fundamental lessons of the so-called revolution against descriptivism that occurred in the 70s are negative and it is not immediately apparent what kind of semantic theory should emerge as regards proper names, the alleged paradigms of genuinely referential terms. Some of the claims about names, most notably Ruth Barcan Marcus’ characterization of names as tags, appear to be too picturesque to provide the basis for a positive theory and, without a theory, it would seem that the referential link between name and bearer is established by pure magic. Some authors have appealed to the causal-historical picture to construct a positive theory, and have endorsed causal descriptivism, a variety of descriptivism that incorporates causal factors. I argue against causal descriptivism and I assess the demand for a positive semantic theory of names.

--This essay explores some aspects of the transition between the Tractatus and the Investigations. The argument in the book relies on a general methodological thesis: that the nonfinal versions of Wittgenstein's thoughts should not be conceived as imperfect expositions of views that were polished in the final versions and, hence, they are not just of anecdotal interest to Wittgenstein's scholars. Rather, they contain missing pieces of the philosophical puzzle, and they are essential to interpret the final remarks. This is so because, Stern argues, Wittgenstein's goal in writing was not the goal of traditional philosophers, that is, to expound their official views on some issue, providing tight arguments and deflecting objections. Wittgenstein's aim, rather, was to distill the essence of the insights and epiphanies, the milestones in the process of thinking about a problem, so as to stimulate the reader who struggles with and thinks through the same fundamental problems. The final remarks, thus, are just the cryptic tips of an iceberg and, from the point of view of the interpreter, cannot be understood properly if it is not against the backdrop of notes and drafts that contain Wittgenstein's presentations to himself of the questions he was trying to address and are a more faithful record of the dialectic of alternative approaches and solutions he was considering. Hence, Stern relies on all the sources in which Wittgenstein's ideas have arrived to us, and there is an abundance of quotes from these sources in the body of the essay.

We explore two ways of distinguishing the semantic operation of kind terms. First, we focus on a distinction between terms with a flexible versus terms with an inflexible semantics. Flexibility depends on whether some changes in the domain of application are taken to be possible while being consistent with past usage and what is intuitively the same meaning. On the other hand we discuss terms whose mode of operation is tolerant, in that the cohabitation in the speakers’ community of more than one use or practice of use of the term in question is accepted. Those terms contrast with terms that operate in a strict way restricting severely the legitimacy of different uses that cut the domain of application in different ways. Among the latter we include terms with an ethical component and terms whose correct application involves high stakes. These distinctions are not new, since the phenomena that we identify as flexibility and tolerance have been observed, although in our view they have not been properly systematized and assessed. We argue that the two distinctions throw light on the bases of some disputes and on some legal disagreements.

According to Donnellan the characteristic mark of a referential use of a definite description is the fact that it can be used to pick out an individual that does not satisfy the attributes in the description. Friends and foes of the referential/attributive distinction have equally dismissed that point as obviously wrong or as a sign that Donnellan's distinction lacks semantic import. I will argue that, on a strict semantic conception of what it is for an expression to be a genuine referential device, Donnellan is right: if a use of a definite description is referential, it must be possible for it to refer to an object independently of any attributes associated with the description, including those that constitute its conventional meaning.

Stavroula Glezakos (2009) argues that Frege himself could not pose Frege’s puzzle without relying on the distinction between sense and reference, a distinction that the puzzle was supposed to motivate, not presuppose. In this paper I argue that there are still some puzzling questions about the informativeness of identity sentences, and I discuss a problem generated by the Fregean contention that one and the same proper name can have different senses for different speakers an issue that, in my view, Frege should have puzzled more about.

I examine two sets of experimental results about the semantics of general terms, by Genone and Lombrozo (2012) and by Nichols, Pinillos and Mallon (forthcoming) that allegedly reveal significant variations in semantic intuitions as regards the correct application of general terms. The two sets of authors propose two entirely different semantic treatments: Genone and Lombrozo espouse a hybrid semantics whereas Nichols, Pinillos and Mallon are inclined towards an appeal to ambiguity. I cast some doubts on the coherence of a hybrid theory and argue in favor of the ambiguity approach. But I also argue that the sort of ambiguitiy Nichols, Pinillos and Mallon postulate is easy to incorporate to non-descriptivist approaches.

Experimental semanticists have concluded that there is wide variation in referential intuitions among speakers, for it appears that some speakers display referential intuitions that are in line with descriptivism, whereas other speakers’ intuitions are in line with the predictions of the causal-historical picture. In this chapter, I first situate the debate by comparing descriptivist and non-descriptivist approaches to reference. After examining some of the experimental results, I argue that the tests conducted do not elicit data that are relevant for semantic theorizing and, hence, that the results should not have an impact in the theory of reference.

One of the many important tasks of semantics is to provide an account of the substitution patterns of a language—that is, to furnish an explanation of the conditions under which semantic values of complexes are preserved when components are replaced. The importance of this issue is plain: we only have to recall the debates regarding substitutivity between proponents of direct reference theories and advocates of some version of Fregeanism, as well as the disagreements among different proponents of direct reference theories as regards substitutivity in belief reports. This is why it is important to articulate an acceptable principle of substitution. A traditional statement of the principle of substitution holds that codesignative singular terms should be intersubtitutable salva veritate. In the past I have argued that such a principle is not connected properly to some pretheoretical data about the function of referring terms. In this chapter I argue that such a principle does not gain support either from other, more fundamental, laws. I end by defending the adequacy of a different principle of substitution.

In the semantic revolution that has led many philosophers of language away from Fregeanism and towards the acceptance of direct reference, the notion of rigidity introduced by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity has played a crucial role. The notions of rigidity and direct reference are indeed different, but proponents of new theories of reference agree that there is a one way connection between them: although not all rigid terms are directly referential (witness rigid definite descriptions), all directly referential terms are rigid. My purpose in this paper is to contest this widely held view. I will argue that, on a certain conception of what direct reference is (a conception present in the works of the main proponents of the theory), the fact that a term is directly referential does not entail that it is rigid. From this conclusion, I will argue, we can learn some substantial lessons about the assumptions and commitments of new theories of reference.