-
171Law-Determination as Grounding: A Common Grounding Framework for JurisprudenceLegal Theory 25 (1): 53-76. 2019.Law being a derivative feature of reality, it exists in virtue of more fundamental things, upon which it depends. This raises the question of what is the relation of dependence that holds between law and its more basic determinants. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that grounding is that relation. We first make a positive case for this claim, and then we defend it from the potential objection that the relevant relation is rather rational determination (Greenberg 2004, 2006). Against thi…Read more
-
137Three Comments on Joseph Raz's Conception of NormativityJurisprudence 2 (2): 329-378. 2011.This section is a discussion of Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity introduced by Georgios Pavlakos
-
133The Explanatory Demands of Grounding in LawPacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4): 900-933. 2022.A new strategy in philosophy of law appeals to explanatory gap arguments to attack legal positivism. We argue that the strategy faces a dilemma, which derives from there being two available readings of the constraint it places on legal grounding. To this end, we elaborate the most promising ways of spelling out the epistemic constraints governing law-determination, and show that each of the arguments based on them has problems. Throughout the paper, we evaluate a number of explanatory requiremen…Read more
-
93Practice, reasons, and the agent's point of viewRatio Juris 22 (1): 74-94. 2009.Positivism, in its standard outlook, is normative contextualism: If legal reasons are content-independent, then their content may vary with the context or point of view. Despite several advantages vis-à-vis strong metaphysical conceptions of reasons, contextualism implies relativism, which may lead further to the fragmentation of the point of view of agency. In his Oxford Hart Lecture, Coleman put forward a fresh account of the moral semantics of legal content, one that lays claim to preserving …Read more
-
71Coercion and the Grounds of Legal Obligation: Arthur Ripstein's Force and FreedomJurisprudence 1 (2): 305-316. 2010.
-
55Law, normativity and the model of normsIn S. Bertea & G. Pavlakos (eds.), New Essays on the Normativity of Law, . pp. 246-280. 2011.There exists a widespread consensus amongst contemporary jurisprudents, positivists and non-positivists alike, that the meaning of ‘obligation’ should not radically shift from law to morality, or any of the other domains of practical reason. Yet there is limited effort in contemporary discussions of legal obligation to engage with the metaphysics of normativity with an eye to a well-founded account of those elements that deliver its non-conditional character. On a recent occasion I discussed the…Read more
-
41Correctness and Cognitivism. Remarks on Robert Alexy's Argument from the Claim to CorrectnessRatio Juris 25 (1): 15-30. 2012.The argument from the claim to correctness has been put forward by Robert Alexy to defend the view that normative utterances admit of objective answers. My purpose in this paper is to preserve this initial aspiration even at the cost of diverting from some of the original ideas in support of the argument. I begin by spelling out a full-blooded version of normative cognitivism, against which I propose to reconstruct the argument from the claim to correctness. I argue that the context of uttering …Read more
-
34Autonomy and Normativity (review)Review of Metaphysics 56 (4): 908-910. 2003.Truth, right, and beauty are normative. In other words, our theoretical, practical, and aesthetic judgements are founded only if they correspond to standards for truth, rightness, or beauty respectively. The book at hand is not primarily interested in the differences between kinds of normativity—in fact, it treats normativity in a more or less unified way—nor does it spend much time on listing criteria for truth, right, or beauty. Rather, its primary aim is to discover what metaphysical status a…Read more
-
33The Special Case Thesis. An Assessment of R. Alexy's Discursive Theory of LawRatio Juris 11 (2): 126-154. 1998.
-
33Jurisprudence or legal science?: a debate about the nature of legal theory (edited book)Hart Publishing. 2005.In a series of new essays the authors attempt to answer important questions about the nature of jurisprudential thinking.
-
30Non-individualism, rights, and practical reasonRatio Juris 21 (1): 66-93. 2008.The paper looks at an impasse with respect to the role of rights as reasons for action which afflicts contemporary legal and political debates. Adopting a meta‐ethical approach, it moves on to argue that the impasse arises from a philosophical confusion surrounding the role of rights as normative reasons. In dispelling the confusion, an account of reasons is put forward that attempts to capture their normativity by relating them to a reflexive public practice. Two key outcomes are identified as …Read more
-
26Constitutional Rights, Balancing and the Structure of AutonomyCanadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 24 (1): 129-153. 2011.The question of the character of constitutional rights norms is complex and admits of no easy answer. Without reducing the complexity of the issue, I attempt in this paper to formulate some clear views on the matter. I shall argue that constitutional rights reasoning is a species of rational practical reasoning that combines both balancing and the grounds as to why balancing is appropriate . Absent the latter type of reason, the application of constitutional principles remains a pure instance of…Read more
-
24Law, rights and discourse: the legal philosophy of Robert Alexy (edited book)Hart. 2007.This volume reflects the breadth of Alexy's philosophy, identifies new areas of inquiry and offers a new impetus to the discourse theory of law.
-
24On the Necessity of the Interconnection between Law and MoralityRatio Juris 18 (1): 64-83. 2005.
-
17Book review of Winfield, RD (2001) Autonomy and Normativity. Investigations of Truth, Right and Beauty (review)Review of Metaphysics. forthcoming.
-
17Agency, Negligence and Responsibility (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2021.This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume intr…Read more
-
16Normativity versus Ontologiy: Law, Facts and Practical ReasonRechtstheorie 34 (4): 393-419. 2003.
-
16Agency, Negligence and Responsibility (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2021.This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume intr…Read more
-
16From a Pluralism of Grounds to Proto‐Legal Relations: Accounting for the Grounds of Obligations of JusticeRatio Juris 30 (1): 59-74. 2017.In this paper I discuss critically Mathias Risse's paper “Responsibility and Global Justice.” First, I argue that for Risse's pluralist account of the grounds of justice to hold together, there is need to presuppose a monist standpoint which ultimately contributes to grounding principles of justice. Second, I point out that Risse's understanding of obligations of accountability and justification is rather narrow in that it functions as an addendum to obligations of justice. Conversely, I will su…Read more
-
11New essays on the normativity of law (edited book)Hart. 2011.An important part of the legal domain has to do with rule-governed conduct, and is expressed by the use of notions such as norm, obligation, duty, and right. These require us to acknowledge the normative dimension of law. Normativity is, accordingly, to be regarded as a central feature of law lying at the heart of any comprehensive legal-theoretical project. The essays collected in this book are meant to further our understanding of the normativity of law. More specifically, the book stages a th…Read more
-
11Comparative Constitutional Studies. Between Magic and Deceit. Günter Frankenberg, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018Constellations 26 (1): 170-173. 2019.
-
5In this book the author argues that knowledge is the outcome of an activity of judging, which is constrained by reasons (reflexive).
-
5Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Agency (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2015.This collection of new essays explores in depth how and why we act when we follow practical standards, particularly in connection with the authority of legal texts and lawmakers. The essays focus on the interplay of intentions and practical reasons, engaging incisive arguments to demonstrate both the close connection between them, and the inadequacy of accounts that downplay this important link. Their wide-ranging discussion includes topics such as legal interpretation, the paradox of intention,…Read more
-
Revamping associative obligationsIn Salman Khurshid, Lokendra Malik & Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco (eds.), Dignity in the legal and political philosophy of Ronald Dworkin, Oxford University Press. 2018.
-
The Metaphysics of Law: From Supervenience to Rational JustificationIn Bartosz Brożek, Antonino Rotolo & Jerzy Stelmach (eds.), Supervenience and Normativity, Springer. 2017.
-
Preliminary remarks on a theory of legal normativityIn Jerzy Stelmach & Bartosz Brożek (eds.), The normativity of law, Copernicus Center Press. 2011.
-
Between reason and strategy : some reflections on the normativity of proportionalityIn Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller & Grégoire C. N. Webber (eds.), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning, Cambridge University Press. 2014.