Georgios Kalaitzidis

This paper compares the ethics of social consequences’ (ESC) and Amartya Sen’s accounts of justice, to explore their similarities and differences and how they can productively inform practice. Methodologically, I use Sen’s framework as a heuristic lens to evaluate and refine ESC. The focus is asymmetric; I evaluate ESC’s account of justice while drawing on Sen when it helps identify limits or suggest improvements. I then illustrate the practical stakes with a brief application to pharmacy ethics. The analysis shows that ESC’s strengths are its clear, outcome-oriented guidance and its contextual flexibility. It offers practical criteria for decisions that seek the prevalence of positive social consequences and supports equitable resource use. However, ESC pays less explicit attention to individual capabilities, democratic engagement, and public reasoning. Sen’s approach complements these gaps by emphasising real opportunities for individuals to live lives they value and by highlighting transparency and inclusive deliberation. I argue for a capability-informed refinement of ESC that keeps ESC’s practical focus on consequences while adding capability-based safeguards (a minimum capability floor, non-discrimination, and a requirement of public justification). In pharmacy ethics this yields transparent, defensible rationing principles that balance overall benefit with respect for individuals.

Amartya Sen’s “The Idea of Justice” is structured around the idea of a practical and realisation-focused approach to justice, contrasting it with Rawls’ transcendental institutionalism. Sen introduces a pluralistic and comparative framework that emphasises the importance of public reasoning in achieving justice and its application to real-world injustices. He draws on Indian philosophy distinguishing between “niti” (organisational propriety) and “nyaya” (realised justice) to argue that justice should impact people’s lives directly. Sen criticises the parochialism of traditional moral frameworks while advocating for open impartiality influenced by Adam Smith’s “impartial spectator” to include diverse perspectives in the discourse on justice. Additionally, he challenges Rawls’ abstract concepts like the “original position” and “veil of ignorance” as overly conceptual and disconnected from real-world conditions. Sen proposes a practical approach focusing on individuals’ capabilities, meaningful freedoms and expansion of individuals’ opportunities. Further, Sen highlights democracy and public participation, arguing for decision-making processes that include diverse perspectives and are influenced by the public voice. He explores the notions of impartiality and objectivity, differentiating between “closed” and “open” forms of impartiality. Sen argues that open impartiality is crucial for achieving justice in a globalised world emphasising the importance of global dialogue and the inclusion of marginalised voices. He contrasts this with closed impartiality which limits deliberation to specific groups, thereby neglecting broader concerns of global justice. Lastly, Sen critiques traditional justice theories particularly the Rawlsian model for their insularity and failure to incorporate cross-cultural understanding. Through his advocacy for public reasoning, open impartiality and the enhancement of individual capabilities, Sen offers a practical and inclusive framework for addressing real-world injustices.

Accelerated COVID-19 vaccine development represents an important accomplishment and a milestone in the history of vaccine evolution. However, the vaccine’s scarcity made its equitable global allocation and distribution ambiguous. Despite the initial pledges from wealthy countries for fairness and inclusivity towards the poorer ones, the policies followed diverged significantly. Wealthy countries have vastly superior access to vaccines in a reality likened to an ethical disaster. This paper calls for the need for fair global vaccine allocation and distribution and examines the barriers that were met along the way, originating from different points, such as the nationalistic approach on the matter that most wealthy countries have adopted or the inability of poor countries to purchase or manufacture vaccines. Further, a suggestion regarding the ethical principles and values that ought to guide global vaccine allocation and distribution is provided with a higher priority given to helping the worst-off, saving the most lives, protecting people in high risk, such as frontline healthcare professionals, and minimising social gaps, along with an ethical theoretical background for each prioritisation. It is not too late for wealthy countries to realise that vaccine inequity prolongs pandemics, so that they change their policies in favour of the global common good that will not only provide immediate universal benefits but will also serve as a guide for future pandemic crises.