Gérald Hess

L’éthique des vertus met l’accent sur les représentations et les affects qui poussent les personnes à agir, au lieu de se focaliser sur les normes et de se borner à énoncer des interdictions et des obligations. Elle aide ainsi à combler l’écart entre la théorie et la pratique qui est particulièrement dramatique à un moment où les individus comme les États reconnaissent la réalité du changement climatique mais ne parviennent pas à réorienter les modes de production ni à reconvertir l’économie. Quel processus de transformation de soi permet d’avoir du plaisir à consommer autrement et d’acquérir les traits moraux indispensables à la transition écologique ? Celle-ci reposant autant sur le volontarisme politique que sur la capacité des citoyens à modifier leurs styles de vie, il importe aussi de se demander comment articuler le plan individuel et le plan collectif. Enfin, faut-il penser que l’éthique a une dimension universaliste ou souscrire à une approche plus particulariste et contextualisée de la morale ? Telles sont les questions qui réunissent dans ce volume des chercheurs issus de disciplines différentes.

This paper explores the phenomenon of near-death experiences (NDEs) from a phenomenological viewpoint, contesting the objectification of an NDE's intentional content while acknowledging two of its characteristics: the exclusivity of the experience and the subject's self-transformation. Through these two features, a discussion follows on the epistemological and ontological arguments advanced by those endorsing an objectivist interpretation of the phenomenon, whether materialist or spiritualist. The last part of the essay lays the groundwork for developing an ontology designed to provide an appropriate philosophical signification for NDEs.

Starting from the observation that there is a gap between knowledge of the environmental sciences and practical engagement, for example, in climate change or biodiversity loss, this article explores one possible explanation for this situation—namely, the process of objectification inherent in science. It then proposes to remedy the situation by defending the idea of a ‘first-person ecology’. This term refers to a field of research and practice that looks at the relationship between humans and nature from the point of view of the embodied and situated nature of lived experience. The lived experience of nature at the heart of a first-person ecology is first studied from an epistemic perspective using the concept of recognition, inspired by the Frankfurt School philosopher and sociologist Axel Honneth. It is then approached from a phenomenological perspective, using the emerging field of ecospirituality to describe the characteristics of this experience.

This article examines how a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics can truly avoid an anthropocentric bias in the ethical evaluation of a situation where the environment is at stake. It argues that a non-anthropocentric virtue ethics capable of avoiding the pitfall of an anthropocentric bias can only conceive of the ultimate good—from which virtues are defined—in reference to an ecological self. Such a self implies that the natural environment is not simply a condition for human flourishing, or something that complements it by adding the proper good of animals, organisms or ecosystems. Fulfilment is not that of a human self, but that of an ecological self: the natural environment or nature is not an external but an internal good. Therefore, the virtues or character traits that such an ecological self must nurture and develop leads us ultimately to distinguish—without opposing them—three different forms of virtue ethics applied to the environment, depending on whether it is anthropocentric or non-anthropocentric and whether nature is considered extrinsically or intrinsically. Such distinctions are also crucial to determine how we conceive of the political community and the collective goals that virtuous citizens assign to it (for instance, to preserve biodiversity, to tackle climate change, and so on).