Gerard Elfstrom

Charles Darwin (1809-82) changed the world forever with the 1859 publication of On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection. Charles Darwin: A Celebration of His Life and Legacy is an anthology of critical writings that grew out of a lecture series, hosted by Auburn University, held on the occasion of the two hundredth anniversary of Darwin's birth and the one hundred fiftieth anniversary of the first edition of his most famous book. Ideas in On the Origin of Species reordered the biological sciences forever, spawned new disciplines including evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, and evolutionary developmental biology, became foundational for modern biomedical research and practice, inspired new literature and literary criticism, were misused by 20th-century eugenicists and social Darwinists, traumatized persons with certain theological views, and continue to alter humankind's view of itself and its place in the world. The seventeen contributors to this anthology tell an interdisciplinary story of Charles Darwin the person, Darwin's work and world-altering ideas, and Darwin's legacy.

For much of Western history, we have been confident that human beings are persons but no other creatures have that status. These beliefs matter because personhood has often been deemed a necessary requirement for possessing moral value. Recently, an American legal activist group, the Nonhuman Rights Project, has challenged the assumption that only human beings are persons. Their approach is simple. They assume that humans possess particular features that make them persons, then ask whether there is evidence that any nonhuman animals display these same qualities. The group has offered testimony from an array of experts to support the claim that chimpanzees, elephants, and dolphins do indeed possess them. They conclude that these animals should legally be considered persons. Although the Project makes claims about legal rights only, and their court suits have so far been unsuccessful, their arguments have implications for more general issues concerning the moral standing of nonhuman animals and their relations to humans. If some animals do have a standing as persons even in the narrow sense required for legal recognition, then we may be morally obliged to treat those animals very differently, by, for example, not killing them for sport or food, or using them for medical experimentation.

Adam and Eve’s theft marks the beginning of the human career as moral agents. This article will examine the assumptions underlying the notion of moral agency from the perspective of three unremarkable human beings who found themselves in situations of moral difficulty. The article will conclude that these three people could not have acted differently than they did. It will conclude that it is unreasonable to assume that ordinary human beings will inevitably possess the resources to address difficult moral decisions.