Gerry Dunne

This short review examines Chapter 5 of Sarah M. Stitzlein’s Teaching Honesty in a Populist Era: Emphasizing Truth in the Education of Citizens, concentrating on “The Role of Honesty in Teaching About Controversial Issues.” Emphasizing what I call “zetetic avoidance creep” (ZAC), the review explores how teachers may either consciously or unconsciously drift from open inquiry toward more superficial, more palatable educational discourse to maintain harmony. Stitzlein’s chapter offers a compelling case for preserving honest engagement — even with divisive topics — to bolster democratic and intellectual endeavors. By analyzing three key passages, I underscore Stitzlein’s emphasis on transparency and robust debate, concluding with reflections on ZAC’s broader implications for educational practice.

Smartphones hijack dopaminergic reward circuits through unpredictable bursts of novelty, undermining sustained attention. Many educators, in response, “Hollywoodise” their teaching—mistaking superficial engagement for genuine understanding. Such tactics, I contend, fundamentally misdiagnose the precise nature of the crisis. Drawing on Reward Deficiency Syndrome (RDS), this paper shows how variable-ratio reinforcement in digital platforms weakens attentional control, intrinsic motivation, and critical cognition—ultimately steering pedagogy toward entertainment-centric models that exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problem. Critiquing three flawed responses—(i) Technocentrism, (ii) Reductive gamification, and (iii) Experience-first edutainment—I propose tantric learning as an alternative pedagogy that steadily rebuilds attentional capacity through disciplined, intellectually demanding practices.

Philosophy lags behind the social sciences and life sciences in terms of interdisciplinary co-authorship, with 2024 data showing that about one paper in six by philosophers can be classified as interdisciplinary, compared with one in three (or more) in the life and social sciences (OpenAlex, 2025).Footnote1 This paper examines how four key epistemic vices: (i) closed-mindedness, (ii) insouciance, (iii) arrogance, and (iv) complacent incuriosity might play a contributory role in systematically blunting philosophers’ appetite for collaboration. We also discuss how these vices can interact with systemic forces – prestige hierarchies, perverse professional incentives, and ‘publish-or-perish’ norms – in ways that could further undermine cross-disciplinary collaboration. The paper predominantly focuses on vices, but it explores how these vices can plausibly interact with systemic factors. We co-opt the concepts of epistemic trespassing, silos, and my-side bias as three additional phenomena possibly contributing to a lack of interdisciplinarity. Ultimately, we contend that systemic pressures set the stage, but epistemic vices compound these obstacles – limiting rigorous, responsible interdisciplinary inquiry. Our actionable proposals are based on our analysis of the vices and the relationships those vices plausibly have with systemic factors. Explicating these interconnected factors, we aim to forge deeper engagement with other fields, cultivating a richer and more holistic philosophical practice.

In education, the concept of _‘thinking skills’_ has long been contentious. This article revisits the 2010 debate between Stephen Johnson and Harvey Siegel on whether thinking can be taught as a general skill. To weigh in on this ongoing dispute, it contributes a novel perspective by augmenting key insights from 4E cognition to avoid treating cognition as a purely brain-based computational perspective which treats the brain as separate from the rest of the body and its environment. I argue that given the elusiveness of the concept of ‘thinking skills’, scholars must first reach a sufficiently precise and pluralistic understanding of so-called ‘thinking skills’ to avoid talking past another. Such precision, I contend, is a necessary condition, an antecedent epistemic obligation, so to speak, prior to the design of curricula which prioritize the acquisition of the much-heralded, yet heavily disputed, ‘21st-century thinking skills’ ((Varas et. al., 2023 ) assortment of the following: Critical thinking, Creativity, Collaboration, Communication, information, and media literacy, Computing and ICT literacy, Cross-cultural understanding and Career, and learning self-reliance (Trilling and Fadel, 2009 ). See (Dishon and Gilead, British J Educ Stud 69:393–413, 2021 )) for a critical analysis of the unquestioned exaltation of said twenty-first century skills). To ground the discussion in policy, I revisit the influential UK _McGuinness Report_, examining how it influenced higher education institutions’ approaches to thinking skills and how it shaped their understanding of those skills, including critical thinking. One key finding of my analysis is that both domain-specific knowledge and contextually sensitive, generalizable thinking skills are vital for fostering a robust understanding of how to nurture and enhance thinking skills in educational settings. More importantly, such thinking skills are best viewed through the lens of 4E cognition rather than as decontextualized, disembodied cognitive outcomes. In short, this paper demonstrates that in an era focused on developing 21st-century skills, clarifying exactly what we mean by ‘thinking skills’—particularly through the lens of novel 4E cognition frameworks—must inform the future design of effective thinking-skills curricula.

This short review examines Chapter 5 of Sarah M. Stitzlein's _Teaching Honesty in a Populist Era: Emphasizing Truth in the Education of Citizens_, concentrating on "The Role of Honesty in Teaching About Controversial Issues." Emphasizing what I call "zetetic avoidance creep" (ZAC), the review explores how teachers may either consciously or unconsciously drift from open inquiry toward more superficial, more palatable educational discourse to maintain harmony. Stitzlein's chapter offers a compelling case for preserving honest engagement — even with divisive topics — to bolster democratic and intellectual endeavors. By analyzing three key passages, I underscore Stitzlein's emphasis on transparency and robust debate, concluding with reflections on ZAC's broader implications for educational practice.

This paper takes aim at strawman characterisations of non-ideal epistemology. To be precise – I pre-empt one objection to the central argument advanced by Robin McKenna in his book, ‘Non-Ideal Epistemology’. The objection I have in mind is this: all forms of choice in non-ideal epistemological settings constitute, to a greater or less extent, cases of ‘epistemic satisficing’. Epistemic satisficing,Footnote1 on my account, approximates to situations in which agents knowingly reject the better for the good enough. She chooses the good enough because it realises this aim. Satisficers thus aim for good enough. Optimisers, in this case, ideal epistemologists, aim for normatively robust purist forms of epistemic rationality, free from contextually contingent constraints on epistemic options, neatly abstracted away from human cognitive limitations. The charge I try to defend non-ideal approaches from is that it permits agents to knowingly reject the better for the good enough. A large part of the problem, as I see it, rests on disambiguating epistemic satisficing, bounded rationality, and idealization projects in epistemology.Footnote2 Might non-ideal epistemologists be accused of validating those who waste their time on ‘good enough’ when they could do better?Footnote3 Contra such mischaracterisations, I defend non-ideal epistemology from the charge of inappropriate epistemic satisficing, a position in which agents knowingly reject the ‘better’ for the ‘good enough’, not because of some countervailing consideration, but because it realises agents’ aim of good enough – good enough fitting some mix of subjective/objective context-specific criterion.

Harvey Siegel has argued that successful critical thinking requires both a critical mindset and expertise in evaluating reasons. In this article, I focus on the latter, the business of accurately appraising competing reasons in the practical domain. More specifically, I critically examine the limitations inherent in two commonly used epistemic frameworks: the balance account and reasons-for-and-against. I argue neither is suitable for scenarios requiring especially nuanced appraisals or complex metrics. This is because they primarily deal with somewhat crude approximations and/or binary choices. I will propose a new framework to address this concern. I dub this the Stress-Testing-Critique-Support-Explanationist Account (STCSEA). STCSEA is engineered to handle complex practical epistemic situations, ones where determining what to do is not straightforward or immediately calculable. To fully understand the accurate and reliable determination of competing reasons’ strengths and weaknesses, educators require sophisticated tools. Such tools can help us fully to grasp the concept and mechanics of rational defeat—that being figuring out the strength of competing reasons. To do so, we must also formulate and continuously refine an operationalized defeasibility taxonomy.I proceed as follows. I begin by providing a brief overview of the critical thinking debate. I then survey John Pollock’s work on defeaters. This work is germane to the conversation yet remains something of a lacuna in the contemporary philosophy of education literature. After this, I discuss the balance account and reasons-for-and-against, specifically their evident limitations. I then make a case for the superiority of STCSEA when it comes to handling ‘hard cases’. These are cases where what we should, must, or may do necessitates a complex computation. Such computations often exceed the mathematical or epistemic resources associated with ‘balancing metaphors’ and ‘for and against’ determinations.

This paper considers in conceptual terms the extent to which pre-service teachers’ disengagement with philosophy of education might usefully be explained in terms of the mistaken charge of (1) ‘epistemic trespassing’ frequently levelled against philosophers of education. This cohort charge philosophers of education with being ultracrepidarians—those who proffer opinions on subjects that they know nothing about. Contra this view, I argue that casting philosophers as epistemic trespassers—lofty theorists with nothing meaningful to contribute to professional practice—is a wrongful charge, or ‘epistemic vice’, based on a series of epistemic mistakes. These, individually and collectively, lead to a series of troubling costs in terms of impoverished professional formation and practice. To diagnose a plausible explanatory account of this phenomenon, I briefly turn to what I consider the main causes of this misattribution—more precisely—the four secondary category mistakes pre-service teachers make. Naturally a qualification is required. I contend these epistemic mistakes can rightfully be attributed to *some pre-service teachers in such determinations, which include: (2) misunderstanding standpoint epistemology (SE) in terms of automatic privilege being coextensive with first-personal authority (FPA); (3) overestimating the added value of deliberate/rational ignorance; (4) misguided intellectualist views of skills and expertise; and, (5) uncritical technicist attempts to emulate TikTok Exemplars with the allure of ‘Insta results’.

This paper proposes a novel educational approach to epistemic vice rehabilitation. Its authors Gerry Dunne and Alkis Kotsonis note that, like Quassim Cassam, they remain optimistic about the possibility of improvement with regard to epistemic vice. However, unlike Cassam, who places the burden of minimizing or overcoming epistemic vices and their consequences on the individual, Dunne and Kotsonis argue that vice rehabilitation is best tackled via the exemplarist animated community of inquiry zetetic principles and defeasible-reasons-regulated deliberative processes. The vice-reduction method they propose is made up of four distinct yet complementary components: (1) positive exemplarism of epistemic virtue (saints), (2) negative exemplarism of epistemic vice (sinners), (3) direct teaching/instruction, and (4) cognitive apprenticeship. Dunne and Kotsonis argue that this pedagogical intervention appropriately considers learnings deriving from forensic scrutiny of both ideal and non-ideal interpersonally calibrated zetetic features integral to knowledge acquisition as well as wider societal influences impacting the development of agents' epistemic character. It bridges research on vice epistemology (Cassam's obstructivist theory), social epistemology (corrupted social processes mitigating against vice rehabilitation), virtue epistemology, and moral exemplarism.

ABSTRACT This paper scrutinizes the nature and scope of deleterious consequences arising from the pursuit of unattainable pedagogical exemplars on social media. We cash out this phenomenon using exemplarist theory to emphasize the fact that social media (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, TikTok) are platforms in which the vast majority of users present idealized and curated versions of themselves. We focus specifically on educational practitioners and show that attempting to emulate unattainable pedagogical exemplars has negative impacts on agents’ emotional well-being: It can cause burnout and self-conflict, decrease motivation, and also inflict detrimental outcomes on agents’ self-esteem. We conclude that attainable, relevant, relatable, and authentic exemplars are key to a successful exemplarist approach and that safeguarding against unattainable pedagogical exemplars is of paramount importance for the wellbeing of pedagogues, and by extension, the success of educational systems.

This paper examines the relatively underexplored relationship between epistemic wrongs and epistemic harms in the context of epistemic injustice. Does the presence of one always imply the presence of the other? Or, is it possible to have one without the other? Here we aim to establish a prima facie case that epistemic wrongs do not always produce epistemic harms. We argue that the epistemic wrongness of an action should never be evaluated solely based on the action's consequences, viz. the epistemic and practical harms suffered by the wronged party. Instead – as we shall show – epistemic harms necessarily follow from epistemic wrongs. To conclude, we suggest ways in which extant accounts of epistemic wrongs and epistemic harms as they cash out in epistemic injustice contexts might be refined in light of our argument.

This paper proposes a novel educational approach to epistemic vice rehabilitation. Its authors Gerry Dunne and Alkis Kotsonis note that, like Quassim Cassam, they remain optimistic about the possibility of improvement with regard to epistemic vice. However, unlike Cassam, who places the burden of minimizing or overcoming epistemic vices and their consequences on the individual, Dunne and Kotsonis argue that vice rehabilitation is best tackled via the exemplarist animated community of inquiry zetetic principles and defeasible-reasons-regulated deliberative processes. The vice-reduction method they propose is made up of four distinct yet complementary components: (1) positive exemplarism of epistemic virtue (saints), (2) negative exemplarism of epistemic vice (sinners), (3) direct teaching/instruction, and (4) cognitive apprenticeship. Dunne and Kotsonis argue that this pedagogical intervention appropriately considers learnings deriving from forensic scrutiny of both ideal and non-ideal interpersonally calibrated zetetic features integral to knowledge acquisition as well as wider societal influences impacting the development of agents' epistemic character. It bridges research on vice epistemology (Cassam's obstructivist theory), social epistemology (corrupted social processes mitigating against vice rehabilitation), virtue epistemology, and moral exemplarism.

‘Epistemic exploitation occurs when privileged persons compel marginalised knowers to educate them [and others] about the nature of their oppression’ (Berenstain, 2016, p. 569). This paper scrutinizes some of the purported wrongs underpinning this practice, so that educators might be better equipped to understand and avoid or mitigate harms which may result from such interventions. First, building on the work of Berenstain and Davis (2016), we argue that when privileged persons (in this context, educators) repeatedly compel marginalised or oppressed knowers, to not only to educate them, but indeed others, about the nature of their oppression, they risk subjecting them to further epistemic-moral harms. This is due to the likelihood that at least some of their audience will assign them less/more credibility than they deserve based on pre-existing identity-based prejudices. Second, though some of these requests to ‘educate’ or ‘learn more’ masquerade as seemingly virtuous or innocuous epistemic inquiries, privileged persons underestimate or remain ignorant of secondary harms which stem from internalized epistemic obligations, oppressive double-binds (Hirji, 2021), and attendant emotional burdens oppressed knowers carry in relation to the ever-present possibility of ameliorating oppressor mindsets. After surveying each context-specific harm briefly, we then turn to an applied reading of how these exploitative practices sometimes culminate in something we refer to as ‘ontic burnout’, a form of interminable explanatory fatigue brought on by repeated requests to educate the privileged about what it means to be oppressed.

This paper sets out to accomplish two goals. First, drawing on the Irish perspective, it reconceptualises one of the enduring legacy-based harms of epistemic colonisation, in this case, ‘linguicism’, in terms of ‘hermeneutical injustice’. Second, it argues that otherwise well-meaning attempts to combat epistemic colonisation through the inclusion of marginalised testimony can, in certain circumstances, lead to cases of ‘epistemic exploitation’, which, in turn, can result in ‘ontic burnout’. Both linguicism and epistemic exploitation, this paper theorizes, have the potential to bring about ontic burnout. Here is the plan: to set the scene, section I briefly surveys some key arguments supporting the call for higher education institutions (HEIs) to engage in epistemic decolonising, focusing on the importance of striking a balance between two extremes: (i) abandoning all forms of Eurocentric/colonial knowledge through the elimination of inherited thinking and conceptual schemes which result from colonization, in particular, those which remain in our thinking “owing to inertia rather than to our own reflective choices” (Wiredu 2002, p.56); (ii) the other—pursuing a more positive project where we seek to, “exploit as much as is judicious the resources of indigenous conceptual schemes” (Wiredu 1996: p.136). From here, it moves to consider harms associated with a subset of ‘epistemicide’, that is, ‘linguicism’—a phenomenon where the language and culture of the colonizer become part of the ‘civilising project’ and, in more extreme cases of linguicide, forcibly replaces indigenous languages. Section II then explores the subtleties of harmful by-products deriving from ‘inclusion’, namely that which scholars refer to as ‘epistemic exploitation’. Situations where marginalised scholars are finally ‘at the table but still on the menu’ arise when privileged persons, compel marginalised knowers to educate them [and others] about the nature of their oppression (Berenstain, 2016). Habitual requests to turn themselves inside out for emancipatory principles give rise to a phenomenon known as ontic burnout (Dunne and Kotsonis, 2022, p.9)—“a form of dissociative explanatory fatigue culminating in oppressed persons engaging in a conscious or unconscious decoupling from their socially constructed identity, from the burdens and injustices associated with being a member of a certain social kind”. This harm is, I argue, rarely discussed in the literature and worthy of further analysis.

Our aim in this paper is to argue that empathy is an intellectual virtue. Empathy enables agents to gain insight into other people’s emotions and beliefs. The agent who possesses this trait is: (i) driven to engage in acts of empathy by her epistemic desires; (ii) takes pleasure in doing so; (iii) is competent at the activity characteristic of empathy; and, (iv) has good judgment as to when it is epistemically appropriate to engage in empathy. After establishing that empathy meets all the necessary conditions to be classified as an intellectual virtue, we proceed to discuss Battaly’s argument according to which empathy is a skill rather than a virtue. We contend, contra Battaly, that the agent who possesses the virtue of empathy: (a) sometimes foregoes opportunities to engage in the activity characteristic of empathy because it is the virtuous thing to do, (b) does not make deliberate errors, and (c) her actions are always ultimately aiming at epistemic goods.