Giacomo Croci

This paper reconsiders Hegel’s account of madness in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences and the Lectures on the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. Hegel characterizes mental disorder as a disruption rooted in the natural determinacy of the mind, while simultaneously insisting on its necessary relation to rationality and maintaining their conceptual separation. Against this background, his emphasis on humane treatment, grounded in the presupposed rationality of patients, raises tensions that invite further scrutiny. By examining the systematic position of madness within the Anthropology, the paper explores whether it may be interpreted as a point of inflection in processes of social reproduction, drawing on the conceptual resources of Marxist-feminist theory. Madness emerges not merely as dysfunction but as a phenomenon embedded within the reproduction of forms of life. In dialogue with Freud’s theory of the symptom, the paper concludes by proposing that psychic disturbance may be understood as a mode of participation in sociality, rather than its breakdown. This interpretive shift re-evaluates Hegel’s account and outlines a framework for conceiving mental disorder as a moment within, rather than outside, minded and rational life.

This article re-examines Friedrich W. J. Schelling’s philosophical divergence from dialectical philosophy, with a focus on his Freedom Essay. While traditionally viewed as rejecting dialectics—particularly following the publication of Georg W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit—this study challenges that perception by arguing that Schelling employs a dialectical understanding of identity centred on disjunction (§ 1). It demonstrates how Schelling’s metaphysics, developed to accommodate freedom, incorporates the notion of identity of contradictory elements (§ 2). By exploring the central role of disjunction in Schelling’s “dialectical argument” (§ 3) and critically engaging with recent interpretations by Manfred Frank and Mark J. Thomas (§ 4), the article reassesses the Freedom Essay as a pivotal contribution to dialectical philosophy, broadly construed. Ultimately, it aims to facilitate a more nuanced comparison between Schelling’s and dialectical philosophies, challenging the entrenched narrative of their fundamental opposition (§ 5).

This paper develops a critical phenomenology of need through a dialogue with Edmund Husserl, Emmanuel Levinas, and Ernst Bloch. It examines need as a complex phenomenon encompassing affective, practical, and normative dimensions, rooted in both embodied and socially conditioned experiences. By focusing on the teleological models underlying need, the paper distinguishes instrumental, internal, and transformative teleology. Husserl’s reflections on instincts illuminate need as a tensed structure shaped by evaluations and striving. Levinas’ critique of instrumental teleology introduces the ethical challenge of reconciling individual needs with responsibility toward others, while Bloch highlights the transformative potential of need to address scarcity and drive socio-material reorganisation. By connecting individual and collective experiences of need with ethical responsibility and political action, this analysis contributes to contemporary debates in political phenomenology and critical theory, demonstrating the potential of need to uncover paths toward transforming unjust social conditions.

Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie Subjektivität als wesentlich geschichtlich gefasst werden kann. Ein aktuelles Problem besteht darin, den Begriff der Subjektivität mit der Idee der Geschichtlichkeit in Einklang zu bringen. Um dieses Problem zu lösen, schlägt die Arbeit vor, auf Schellings Frühwerk, insbesondere das System des transzendentalen Idealismus, und auf Heideggers Daseinsphilosophie zurückzugreifen. Im ersten Teil wird eine Perspektive auf Subjektivität entwickelt, die auf einer Praxisauffassung basiert. Dabei werden Schelling und Heidegger kritisch interpretiert und in den aktuellen Debatten zum Naturalismus und zur Perspektive der ersten Person angewendet. Im zweiten Teil wird der Fokus themenspezifisch auf die Geschichtlichkeit gerichtet. Hierbei werden insbesondere Schellings früher Zeitbegriff und Heideggers Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins diskutiert und mit Blick auf die Frage der personalen Identität in der Zeit aktualisiert. Die Monografie richtet sich an Forscherinnen und Forscher der klassischen deutschen Philosophie, der Hermeneutik, der Philosophie der Praxis sowie der breit gefassten Philosophie des Geistes.

This article reassesses the notion of personal identity over time from a Heideggerian perspective, aiming to bridge the conceptual gap between concerns for personhood and continuity. Traditional approaches, including the psychological and moral approaches to the self, often inadequately address the relationship between personhood and temporal continuity. This article establishes an understanding of personhood as social agency, contending that this perspective encompasses both conceptual dimensions central to the question of personal identity over time. Following an initial exploration of the problem (§ 2), a concept of social agency rooted in Heidegger’s notion of Dasein is developed in comparison with alternative conceptions of personhood (§ 3). Subsequently, drawing on Arthur Danto’s philosophy of history, Heidegger’s perspective on personal identity over time is examined with a focus on historicity (§ 4). Lastly, this account is compared with contemporary views on personhood and identity over time (§ 5).

The article reassesses Schelling’s philosophy of art in the System of Transcendental Idealism, focusing on its practical philosophy and the concept of the artefact. Often unexplored, this perspective offers a new account of Schelling’s early aesthetics, linking aesthetic experience to historical becoming. The discussion begins with an analysis of Schelling’s theory of intentional action, followed by a reconstruction of his understanding of artefact. It argues that Schelling integrates both social and material dimensions into his concept of artefacts. The paper then examines Schelling’s comparison between artefacts in general and works of art, asserting that aesthetic experience in the context of the System exemplifies ‘hermeneutic obstinacy’. This characteristic, typical of works of art, correlates with the open nature of historical reality.