Gianfranco Pellegrino

The main claim of this paper is that, contrary to the received view, Ross’ doctrine of resultance does not provide a premise in favour of non-naturalism, but rather makes possible a viable form of non-reductionist naturalism. This is argued mainly by viewing resultance as constitution, where resultant properties are constituted by those natural properties from which they result. Accordingly, resultant properties and their constitutive properties can be viewed as placed in the same ontological realm. However, to rule out reductionism, constitution is to be considered as not implying identity. Some arguments in favour of this view of constitution, above all in the moral realm, are presented in the last sections

In this paper, two different axiologies of pleasure are attributed to Hutcheson and Mill. Hutcheson endorsed a hedonist axiology, where quality of pleasure works as a still quantitative factor, able to counterbalance other quantitative features of pleasurable mental states - such as intensity and duration. By contrast, in Mill's view of value, the quality of pleasures is the only value-making feature, silencing any contribution from other quantitative elements. Therefore, the presence of certain qualitative characteristics - namely, the connection of certain pleasures with human active faculties - becomes a necessary and sufficient condition of value. Due to this unique role of quality, Mill's axiology opens the way to non-pleasurable experiences being valuable - for non-pleasurable exercises of the human active faculties meet the condition to be valuable states. Thus, Mill's theory of value is declared non-hedonistic - against the recent claims to the contrary put forth by W. Donner.

Population ethics is defined and presented, and some of the paradoxes it encapsulates are spelled out. It is argued that the concept of the quality of a life or of a life worth living can- not be avoided if inquiry on many relevant ethical and political topics is to be pursued in a theoretically fitting mode. In particular, the article deals with the asymmetry between rea- sons for not creating unhappy lives and reasons for creating happy lives, the well-known repugnant conclusion and the paradox of mere addition

Il saggio introduce le tematiche di questo numero, soffermandosi in parti- colare sulla rilevanza etica e politica del cambiamento climatico. Dopo una rapida spiegazione dell'effetto serra naturale e artificiale, si ripercorrono le teorie che concepiscono il cambiamento climatico come un problema di giustizia distributiva. Secondo alcuni autori queste teorie non sono suffi- cienti per dare strumenti adeguati, perché il cambiamento climatico rappre- senta un problema etico nuovo, che richiede una strumentazione etica ine- dita. Il saggio approfondisce alcune delle caratteristiche nuove dell'etica del cambiamento climatico, soprattutto in relazione all'impatto che le scelte presenti avranno sulla qualità della vita delle generazioni future.It is an introduction to the topic of the present issue of "La società degli in- dividui", dealing with the ethical and political relevance of climate change. After a brief account of the greenhouse effect, various approaches to clima- te change as a matter of distributive justice are considered. According to many authors, these approaches are inadequate, because climate change is a new issue, requiring new tools. The paper focusses on some of the new fea- tures of climate ethics, mainly in connection with the effects that our pre- sent choices may have on the quality of life of future generations

Particularism denies that invariant valence is always possible and that it is needed in sound moral theorising. It relies on variabilism, namely the idea that the relevant features of a given situation can alter their moral valence even across seemingly similar cases. An alternative model is defended (the “disappearing model”), in which changes in the overall relevance of complex cases are explained by re-individuation of the constituent features: certain features do not alter their relevance in consequence of contextual changes, but rather they disappear, either because they are embedded within larger complexes or are substituted by different features. This view is shown to be compatible with the main premises of variabilism and explanatorily superior to it. Nevertheless, it does not involve particularism, but rather a peculiar form of generalism.