Giles Pearson

Chapter 9 offers a detailed analysis of _Philebus_ 42c–47d. Here, after first discussing a neutral state between pleasure and pain, Socrates introduces some ‘stroppy’ characters (_duschereis_) who are said to bear witness to the fact that there are some states that only seem to be pleasures, but aren’t so in reality, and others that have the appearance of enormous size, but which in truth are commingled with pain. This chapter (inter alia) sketches Socrates’ argument concerning the neutral state, explores the view that he wishes to attribute to the ‘Stroppies,’ explains how he employs their arguments and methodology, provides a reconstruction of an important missing part of their argument concerning the view that pleasure doesn’t really exist, explains how Socrates’ own account contrasts with that of the Stroppies, and explores the notions of false pleasure/pain in play in this part of the _Philebus_.

This chapter provides arguments regarding Aristotle’s insights into the cognitive component of emotions. More specifically, it argues that Aristotle believed that a variety of psychological states can grasp the cognitive content involved in emotions. In order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of this view, the chapter presents a debate concerning whether Aristotle advocates a _phantasia_-based account of emotions, according to which emotions are some kind of perceptual construal or imagining, or whether he is instead best thought of as holding some kind of belief-based view. In fact, the chapter contends that both interpretations are in the wrong. Hence, the chapter advances its own view by first providing a sketch of some of the key points in the debate before reconsidering Aristotle’s view.

Aristotle's account of the role of desires in the motivation of action may usefully be examined by comparing it with recent accounts, in particular Thomas Scanlon's. Aristotle and Scanlon both hold that the source of motivation is what agents see as good about their acting in the way in question. But Scanlon identifies this with perceived reasons, whereas Aristotle identifies it as the object of desire, which can be grasped not just through belief, but additionally through _phantasia_ (‘construal’, ‘imagination’). The difference is not slight, as it enables Aristotle to account for animal desire and also, more significantly, to acknowledge a range of non-rational desiderative responses in human beings that Scanlon's account must miss.

This book provides the first systematic interpretation of what Aristotle thinks occurrent emotions are and points to some philosophical merits of his account. It is argued that he holds that emotions are representational pleasures or distresses that are formed in response to other intentional states that apprehend their objects. Even this bare formulation of his view is notable in several respects. First, the idea that the pleasures or distresses of emotions are representational--directed at objects in the world (or ourselves)--contrasts sharply with accounts that identify emotions with non-representational sensations or feelings. Second, the notion that emotions are pleasurable or distressful responses to other intentional states that apprehend their objects provides a fundamental contrast with many current accounts which instead view emotions as (in part) modes of apprehension or kinds of epistemic state themselves. Third, Aristotle's view stands in opposition to motivational accounts of emotions, insofar as while he thinks that emotions interact with desires or motivational states in important ways, he does not think they are themselves (even in part) motivational states. They are representational pleasures or distresses alone. Together, these three points give Aristotle a novel understanding of the representational role emotions play; namely, neither descriptive, nor prescriptive, but reactive. Besides developing these ideas, both textually and philosophically, the book also explores how Aristotle individuates emotion types; his understanding of the material dimension of emotions; and how his view can provide a novel explanation of recalcitrant emotions, a notoriously problematic phenomenon for many recent accounts of emotions.

Desire is a central concept in Aristotle's ethical and psychological works, but he does not provide us with a systematic treatment of the notion itself. This book reconstructs the account of desire latent in his various scattered remarks on the subject and analyses its role in his moral psychology. Topics include: the range of states that Aristotle counts as desires ; objects of desire and the relation between desires and envisaging prospects; desire and the good; Aristotle's three species of desire: epithumia, thumos and boulêsis ; Aristotle's division of desires into rational and non-rational; Aristotle and some current views on desire; and the role of desire in Aristotle's moral psychology. The book will be of relevance to anyone interested in Aristotle's ethics or psychology.