Gillian Brock

This chapter discusses Rawls’s reasoning concerning how to navigate issues of international economic justice. Rawls offers a sophisticated account that offers many significant insights. This chapter aims to highlight some of these. After outlining Rawls’s argument for his model aimed at offering substantial guidance in international affairs, the chapter covers frequently voiced key criticisms of Rawls’s views in this domain. It shows some of the ways in which Rawls, or rather those who would defend him, might address these challenges. In the process we come to appreciate the important insights that Rawls is able to offer. So this chapter argues that Rawls’s position on duties to address global poverty and his views concerning how to assist burdened societies to make the improvements they seek contain considerable wisdom that is not adequately acknowledged.

Chapter 12 considers why reforms to several taxation arrangements are needed, especially in the quest to reduce global injustices. The role of tax havens and transfer pricing schemes in facilitating massive tax evasion and abusive tax avoidance are discussed, along with some of the initiatives aimed at improvements. The case for carefully crafted new global taxes, including air ticket taxes and currency transaction taxes, is also considered. The chapter argues that all the reforms proposed here are normatively desirable and feasible. The chapter also engages with the work of prominent proposals concerning global taxation, considering their strengths and weaknesses.

What responsibilities do those in developed countries have to promote arrangements in developing countries that allow all to live decent lives, respectful of human rights? As a particular focus, we consider the responsibilities with respect to three rights related to decent lives and work—the rights to just and favorable conditions of work, a decent standard of living, and a social and international order that can support such rights. Once we come to appreciate the perhaps unexpected ways in which assisting with creating the right kind of institutional environment and civic participation matters, we can then approach the question of what we ought to do and who ought to do it. The responsibilities we have with respect to these three rights are not straightforward. For instance, developed country agents have responsibilities not to undermine institutions, practices, or other measures necessary for states to be effective or citizens to be empowered.

Migration dominates contemporary politics across the world, and there has been a corresponding surge in political theorizing about the complex issues that it raises. In a world in which borders seem to be solidifying while the number of displaced people soars, how should we think about the political and ethical implications of human movement across the globe? In this book, Gillian Brock, one of the leading figures in the field, lucidly introduces and explains the important historical, empirical, and normative context necessary to get to grips with the major contemporary debates. She examines issues ranging from the permissibility of controlling borders and the criteria that states can justifiably use to underpin their migration management policies through to questions of integration, inclusion, and resistance to unjust immigration laws. _Migration and Political Theory_ is essential reading for any student, scholar, or general reader who seeks to understand the political theory and ethics of migration and movement in the twenty-first century.

This contribution discusses three important issues that should be addressed by those concerned with global justice. Theorizing should be better informed by a range of important bodies of knowledge, such as scholarly, activist, policy, legal, and practitioner-based. There is also a need for more inclusive normative frameworks for allocating specific responsibilities to particular agents. I explain the need for both by discussing an especially important neglected topic, namely that of corruption, which so badly undermines prospects for global justice.

Corruption is a pervasive problem across the world and is regularly ranked as among the greatest global challenges. Furthermore, considering the role that corruption plays in exacerbating deprivation and fueling social tension, peaceful and just societies are unlikely to come about without tackling corruption. Addressing corruption should be a high priority for those concerned with poverty eradication, peace, security, and justice. Yet, curiously, corruption has not yet been the focus of any books by philosophers working on global justice topics. This book does so. The book offers a normatively justified account of how to allocate responsibilities for addressing corruption across the many agents who can and should play a role. In order to know who should take responsibility and how they should do so, we need to understand multiple forms of corruption, the corruption risks associated with various activities, the interventions that tackle corruption effectively, and current policy and legal frameworks in place for addressing corruption, all topics covered in the book. In addition, the book offers a new framework for navigating responsibility to address injustice, one that is action-oriented and forward-looking. Adopting an agent-empowering approach, this book addresses a significant global problem in a comprehensive way, providing the tools we need for progress as we collaborate to tackle this global scourge.

John Rawls's most influential work on human rights appears in his book The Law of Peoples. There is a lively debate between critics and advocates of Rawls's approach about a number of issues, including whether Rawls endorses a particularly concise list of human rights as establishing important ground rules in international affairs, and whether he should endorse further or different candidates as belonging to the list of human rights deserving respect. In this chapter these debates are covered. The chapter offers some relevant background important to orient the focused discussion on human rights. It covers a general overview of common critical responses to Rawls's position on human rights and influential responses to the criticisms. The chapter provides a detailed treatment of the function of human rights and the list question. It also identifies some areas for further reflection related to these important debates.

Matthew Lindauer, Peter Higgins, Jiewuh Song, and Ana Tanasoca have engaged thoughtfully with the work I present in _Justice for People on the Move_. I am very grateful for their insightful comments, critical remarks, observations about areas of agreement, useful suggestions for progressing important conversations, and invitations to elaborate on core issues. I cannot possibly discuss all the important issues they cover here, but in this response essay I address some of their most prominent concerns in the next four sections. The first section engages with Matthew Lindauer’s critique. It covers the normative grounding for my account and its relationship with the human rights practice that I support. In the second section I discuss why legitimacy has such a prominent role in my argument, thus addressing Peter Higgins’s commentary. The third section reviews some points about the human rights practice. These clarifications help address Jiewuh Song’s and Ana Tanasoca’s queries about practical implications and strengthening implementation avenues. In the final section I cover how my contribution requirements function in judging state legitimacy. Drawing on this discussion I address points from Song’s and Tanasoca’s papers, such as epistemic challenges in assessing contributions to the legitimacy of the state system.

Hidalgo1 argues that, contrary to widespread belief, active recruitment of health workers ‘generally refrains from enabling harm or facilitating wrongdoing’. In this commentary, I argue that the case is not yet convincing. There are a number of problems with the argument, only some of which I can sketch here. These include: Hidalgo gives an insufficient account of the relevant harms that are inflicted when healthcare workers emigrate. Relatedly, he does not take account of the underlying causes of migration and what might assist in remedying the situation. He thus fails to catalogue a wide range of losses that are born when health workers emigrate from developing countries and fails to appreciate how his recommendations undermine some of the constructive initiatives that might assist poor, developing countries. Hidalgo misrepresents the situation in developing countries, incorrectly describing government funding of tertiary education as some kind of gift, rather than an investment in creating important human capital to provide for citizens’ needs, which can mean that fair returns on investment are quite justified. With the correct descriptions in place, the grounding for various duties to reciprocate is rendered secure. There are some important problems with the empirical studies cited such that they do not provide support for Hidalgo's argument.I begin with the case for. There are large disparities in life prospects between developing and developed countries. Indeed, this wide disparity is one of the main reasons healthcare workers want to leave in the first place. If that is the main reason healthcare workers seek to exit, it is not insignificant what would address the causal, underlying problems. How do we promote prosperity in developing countries? A lively debate on this topic flourishes. However, one factor that has widespread support from all sides of the debate is that the quality of …