Gina Lebkuecher

Classical Confucians, contemporary feminists, and comparative philosophers have argued that roles and relationships constitute our agency and autonomy. These philosophers argue that who we are, including our desires, intentions, and values, can be explained by our relationships—e.g. to family, peers, or friends—and roles—e.g. as teacher or daughter. However, some argue relational views fail to robustly explain autonomy in a way that captures the harms of oppression. I argue that Classical Confucian understandings of relational agency, which endorse a weak source normativity and emphasize the importance of normative ‘checks’ on relationships and roles, can help answer this worry. Rituals, relationships, and roles help to shape, direct, and express natural attitudes and affects in accordance with normatively primary understandings of relational human nature and harmony. Classical Confucianism can thus shed light on the construction of relational agency and offer insight into how oppressed subjects may undermine oppression.

The Ouroboros Effect refers to the fact that generative artificial intelligences (AIs) are increasingly being trained on AI-generated data. The effect results in the production of “boilerplate” or “biased” output, which does not pose any significant problem for what we call bias- and boilerplate-friendly domains. However, it does limit the applicability of generative AI to what we call heterodox domains: domains that build on yet depart from traditions, value novel and original contributions, and are context-dependent. Heterodox domains may therefore be resistant to AI-integration. And, significant problems are created when AI is applied to them. This has important implications for how we understand the application of AI to domains such as art, ethics, and education, as well as other domains that count as heterodox.

Classical Confucians, contemporary feminists, and comparative philosophers have argued that roles and relationships constitute our agency and autonomy. These philosophers argue that who we are, including our desires, intentions, and values, can be explained by our relationships—e.g. to family, peers, or friends—and roles—e.g. as teacher or daughter. However, some argue relational views fail to robustly explain autonomy in a way that captures the harms of oppression. I argue that Classical Confucian understandings of relational agency, which endorse a weak source normativity and emphasize the importance of normative ‘checks’ on relationships and roles, can help answer this worry. Rituals, relationships, and roles help to shape, direct, and express natural attitudes and affects in accordance with normatively primary understandings of relational human nature and harmony. Classical Confucianism can thus shed light on the construction of relational agency and offer insight into how oppressed subjects may undermine oppression.

Moral bioenhancement presents the possibility of enhancing morally desirable emotions and dispositions. While some scholars have proposed that moral bioenhancement can produce virtue, we argue that within a virtue ethics framework moral bioenhancement cannot reliably produce virtue. Moreover, on a virtue ethics framework, the pursuit of moral bioenhancement carries moral risks. To make this argument, we consider three aspects of virtue—its motivational, rational, and behavioral components. In order to be virtuous, we argue, a person must (i) take pleasure in doing the right thing and have the correct motivational attitudes; (ii) reason correctly about what is called for in a particular ethical dilemma; and (iii) intentionally and continuously practice and cultivate virtues. These dimensions of morality—in short: precisely those emphasized in a virtue ethics framework—cannot be consistently or reliably met using existing moral bioenhancement technology.

The primary question my dissertation aims to answer is: how might eudaimonic virtue ethics be reimagined to respond to contemporary criticisms from disability scholars, feminists, and empirical psychology? To answer this, I introduce the Eudaimonic View of Virtue, or EV, and propose a Mengzian adaptation of the EV (EV-M) in response to these criticisms. The EV captures the four core claims to which eudaimonic virtue ethical theories are committed: (i) virtues, in the sense of excellent character traits or dispositions, are the foundation of ethics or ethical action (i.e., aretaicism); (ii) virtue is at least partially constitutive of human well-being/flourishing (i.e., eudaimonism); (iii) virtue or virtuous activity consists in the good performance of human function or fulfilling human nature (i.e., naturalism); and (iv) practical wisdom, in the sense of understanding how to live well, is required for achieving full virtue. For the EV, reason and emotions are both pivotal parts of virtue. However, there is disagreement among contemporary and historic eudaimonic virtue ethicists about what specific roles reason and emotion play—whether for Aristotle (the founder of the Western eudaimonic virtue ethics tradition) or in virtue ethical theory more broadly. The EV can be divided into (broadly) rational and emotional versions. I critically evaluate contemporary EV-based accounts in light of critiques from disability scholars, feminists, and psychologists, revealing rational versions’ vulnerability to the first two avenues of critique and emotional versions’ susceptibility to the third. In contrast to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which defines human nature through rational activity, Mengzi defines human nature through its potential for moral goodness; moreover, his moral psychology does not contain a rigid rational-emotional divide. This helps the Mengzian version of the EV evade criticisms from feminist and disability perspectives. Additionally, the EV-M’s emphasis on the interdependence of society and individuals—through its focus on rituals and social roles—provides an avenue of response to the psychology critique. The EV-M thus serves as a resilient foundation for an improved EV.

Classical Confucian philosopher Mengzi 孟子 offers resources that can help shed light on the metaphysical status of moral qualities and answer the question of how we come to perceive them. I argue that Mengzi puts forward an account of virtue as sensitivity similar to that offered by John McDowell. Both thinkers endorse a particular kind of motivationally internalist naturalistic moral realism, and both explain virtue as analogous to perception of secondary qualities. I offer an original contribution to existing literature by further arguing that Mengzi’s view includes an understanding of moral perception as including perception of uniquely human roles and the moral obligations they generate. This essay thus offers a novel textual interpretation of the _Mengzi_. Based on this interpretation, it then puts forth the argument that Mengzi’s version of virtue as sensitivity allows the Confucian thinker to avoid criticisms of McDowell’s “Sensitivity Account” of virtue. In particular, I argue that Mengzi’s account of sensitivity—as one that includes sensitivity to human roles and relationships—is better able to explain variation in perceived moral qualities both over time and across cultures. This is because Mengzi’s view recognizes that what is called for morally shifts with the agent’s social roles. Thus, a Mengzian-influenced Sensitivity Account of virtue can better account for differences in moral judgment by emphasizing that moral facts are a feature of human relationships, which likewise vary between cultures and individuals and change over time.

Fabiano argues that virtue theory offers the best “safety framework” for mitigating the risks of moral enhancement (1). He advances five desiderata for an ideal safety framework and then explains how virtue theory satisfies each. Among these desiderata is the “preservation of identity” (1). Fabiano argues that moral enhancement can safely preserve personal identity when carried out within the framework of virtue theory. We suggest Fabiano's argument for this conclusion falls short, since contra Fabiano’s claim, enhancing virtues may not preserve—and could even damage—personal identity. We draw on three sources of evidence: 1) virtue theory scholarship that argues for the importance of habituation for virtue formation, 2) Focquaert and Schermer’s (2015) distinction between active and passive enhancement and attendant endorsement of more active paths to virtue enhancement, and 3) empirical research suggesting that technologies which support moral enhancements may have damaging effects on personal identity.