The Master Argument from Hallucination is one of the most discussed challenges to Naïve Realism. Naïve Realists have thoroughly scrutinised a number of strategies for resisting it. However, they have generally dismissed out of hand what I call the Monist Strategy, according to which the hallucinations invoked by the argument also consist of a relation of perceptual awareness with the mind-independent environment. In this paper, I consider whether this often-implicit dismissal is justified. I sug…
Read moreThe Master Argument from Hallucination is one of the most discussed challenges to Naïve Realism. Naïve Realists have thoroughly scrutinised a number of strategies for resisting it. However, they have generally dismissed out of hand what I call the Monist Strategy, according to which the hallucinations invoked by the argument also consist of a relation of perceptual awareness with the mind-independent environment. In this paper, I consider whether this often-implicit dismissal is justified. I suggest that the core of resistance plausibly lies in an assumption regarding the causal requirements for the obtaining of the relation of perceptual awareness invoked by Naïve Realists. Drawing on the existing literature (Raleigh, 2014; Ali, 2018), I consider and elaborate ways in which the Monist Strategy might be developed consistently with this assumption. I suggest that there are indeed reasons to question the viability of this project. However, I argue that it is not entirely clear why Naïve Realists are forced to buy into this assumption. If they were willing to reject it, I contend, a compelling version of the Monist Strategy could be developed. According to such a view, at least some hallucinations are episodes of perceptual awareness of regions of space.
