Giulia Cantamessi

This paper is dedicated to G. E. Moore’s account of ethical intuition, with a specific focus on Principia Ethica. I begin by examining the connection between intuition, self-evidence, and proof, with the aim of emphasising how Moore’s understanding of the self-evident depends on the unprovability of certain ethical propositions. I then show how Moore’s appeal to intuition stems from his claim that the predicate «good» is indefinable and reconstruct the non-demonstrative argumentative strategies he employs when addressing questions of intrinsic value. Finally, I consider the limits Moore places on the epistemic function of intuition, while arguing that such limits do not challenge his views on the objectivity and validity of the ethical propositions grasped intuitively, and I briefly mention his later references to self-evidence in Ethics.

Cosa succede quando un’azione ci sembra giusta o sbagliata? Possiamo fidarci di questa impressione e confermarla nei giudizi e nel comportamento? Il libro cerca di rispondere a queste domande partendo da un’analisi del fenomeno in questione, che prende il nome di intuizione morale. L’autrice presenta una teoria dell’intuizione morale come una «presentazione» o «impressione» relativa a oggetti o situazioni moralmente rilevanti e ne indaga la relazione con le intuizioni non morali, le credenze e le emozioni. Vengono poi esaminate obiezioni classiche e recenti all’appello alle intuizioni in etica, che contestano in particolare la pretesa di oggettività in quest’ambito e il realismo morale. La tesi difesa è che le intuizioni morali possono giustificare giudizi e atteggiamenti e che i loro limiti, messi in luce da studi empirici riguardanti le influenze irrilevanti sulle valutazioni morali, possono essere superati con lo sviluppo e l’esercizio di virtù epistemiche.

In this paper we argue that moral intuitions, understood as non-doxastic mental states, should not be reduced to emotions. We reject the moral-intuition-as-emotion view by arguing that having an emotion is neither necessary nor sufficient to have a moral intuition. In particular, we deny the necessity claim by stressing the existence of dispassionate moral intuitions, which lack emotional phenomenology, and by claiming that some moral intuitions have no corresponding emotions, as no emotion apprehends objects in terms of the same moral features. We then argue that moral intuitions and emotions consist of different mental attitudes towards their moral contents, a difference which explains why experiencing an emotion is not sufficient to have a moral intuition. Our arguments have significant implications for current debates on the epistemic function of moral intuitions and the roles of emotions in moral lives, and we take our view to be able to explain important features of these mental states without neglecting their differences.

This paper is dedicated to the relationship between ordinary moral thought and ethical theory in Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. I suggest that different contents of ordinary moral thought play different roles and are lent different philosophical weight in Sidgwick’s arguments. I start by showing how Sidgwick appeals to certain features of ordinary moral thought, deduced from moral language and experience, both in criticising rival metaethical positions and in establishing his own claims. I then turn to the notion of common-sense morality. After clarifying what Sidgwick means by this expression, I argue that common-sense morality has neither probative value in Sidgwick’s argument for the utilitarian principle nor independent validity, and that its authority is ultimately motivated on utilitarian grounds. Pointing out how different contents of ordinary moral thought play different argumentative roles in the foundation and defence of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism enables to ac- count more comprehensively for Sidgwick’s arguments and moral methodology and provides with a more articulated account of the dialectic between his utilitarian theory and ordinary moral thought.