Giulia Codognato

L’objectif de cet article est d’examiner Les dilemmes de la métaphysique pure (1901) du philosophe Charles Renouvier, le fondateur du néo-criticisme français et l’un des pionniers du personnalisme. Le choix d’analyser cette œuvre, écrite à la fin de sa vie, est dû au fait qu’elle a été peu considérée par l’historiographie, alors qu’elle pourrait contribuer à illustrer le tournant personnaliste de l’auteur. Dans la première partie, nous présenterons brièvement la pensée de Renouvier. Ensuite, nous examinerons l’œuvre de 1901, dans laquelle Renouvier analyse les cinq dilemmes métaphysiques qui, selon lui, ont caractérisé l’histoire de la philosophie: le conditionné et l’inconditionné, la loi des phénomènes et la substance, le fini et l’infini, la liberté et le déterminisme, la personne et la chose. Renouvier identifie le quatrième dilemme comme la clé pour résoudre les dilemmes métaphysiques, en considérant la croyance et la liberté comme les aspects distinctifs de l’être humain.

In this special issue, we present contributions that explore the significant influence of G.E.M. Anscombe’s philosophical insights on both philosophy and social science. Anscombe, a leading 20th-century philosopher, extensively addressed topics from metaphysics to morality, playing a key role in reviving Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. Deeply influenced by Wittgenstein, she emphasized language analysis and argued that morality should be grounded in human life and practices, rather than abstract principles. This issue highlights how her work, particularly her account of intentional action and her focus on the “grammar” of practical reasoning, offers valuable conceptual resources for analyzing social phenomena. The papers within this issue aim to bridge conceptual analysis with empirical inquiry, stimulating reflection among both philosophers and social scientists on how Anscombe’s thought can inform concrete research.

In this special issue, we present contributions that explore the significant influence of G.E.M. Anscombe’s philosophical insights on both philosophy and social science. Anscombe, a leading 20th-century philosopher, extensively addressed topics from metaphysics to morality, playing a key role in reviving Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. Deeply influenced by Wittgenstein, she emphasized language analysis and argued that morality should be grounded in human life and practices, rather than abstract principles. This issue highlights how her work, particularly her account of intentional action and her focus on the “grammar” of practical reasoning, offers valuable conceptual resources for analyzing social phenomena. The papers within this issue aim to bridge conceptual analysis with empirical inquiry, stimulating reflection among both philosophers and social scientists on how Anscombe’s thought can inform concrete research.

The aim of this paper is to show that if and only if agents are motivated to act by good reasons for acting, they flourish, since, in so doing, they consciously act in accordance with their nature through virtuous actions. I offer an account of what good reasons for acting consist of reconsidering Aquinas’ natural inclinations. Based on a critical analysis of Anjum and Mumford’s work on dispositions in analytic metaphysics, I argue, contra Hume’s law, that Aquinas’ natural inclinations show that metaphysics is foundational for ethics. I claim that agents flourish as human beings if and only if they consciously act in accordance with natural inclinations. Natural inclinations naturally tend towards goods that depend on the metaphysical structure of human nature, by virtue of which agents have some powers that they should actualise in order to flourish. Intellect and will are the rational powers that distinguish human beings from other living beings. The will naturally desires what is good. If the will, through the input of the intellect, desires what is genuinely good for human beings according to their nature, it also directs the other powers to their own actualisation. Natural inclinations do not strictly necessitate agents to act in accordance with them, because, by virtue of their rational powers, agents should also recognise that they have a reason for acting in accordance with them. Thus, I will suggest that we can best appreciate the importance of natural inclinations from the first-person perspective.

The aim of this thesis is to show the relevance that Aquinas's theory of natural inclinations can play in the contemporary debate for the inquiry on human flourishing, which consists in the realisation of the proper end that human beings have as human beings. We will engage in dialogue with several authors, belonging to the analytic tradition (Elizabeth Anscombe, John Finnis, Ralph McInerny, Anthony Lisska) or, nevertheless, culturally close to it (Alasdair MacIntyre), who have reconsidered the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas in the contemporary debate in order to inquire what enables human flourishing. We will argue that the proper consideration of natural inclinations leads, on the one hand, to overcome the problems posed by Hume's law by identifying human nature as a normative criterion common to all human beings, and, on the other hand, to recognise the role of the first-person perspective in identifying what enables the human flourishing of each agent. Natural inclinations do not express agents' psychological preferences, but consist in the fact that human beings naturally tend towards the realisation of their nature as a good to be realised. In order to flourish, human beings are required to act in accordance with their natural inclinations, since natural inclinations are tendencies that human beings have towards a set of goods that are grounded in human nature. Revisiting a recent proposal put forward by Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum in the field of analytic metaphysics, we will argue that agents develop a virtuous conduct if and only if they act in accordance with their natural inclinations; in doing so, they flourish as human beings, that is, they actualise the powers they have by virtue of their nature. However, human beings are not strictly necessitated to act in accordance with their natural inclinations. Indeed, in order to flourish, agents should also recognise, by virtue of their rational capacities, that acting in accordance with their natural inclinations is a reason for acting for them and they should act in accordance with these reasons. Furthermore, we will argue that there is no single way to flourish for all human beings, because, although flourishing requires that human beings act in accordance with their nature, nevertheless, the way in which agents can flourish varies according to their individual characteristics and according to the circumstances and contexts in which they act, that is, according to the practices in which they participate in their lived experience. In the last part of this thesis, we will test the theoretical proposal developed in the previous parts through a critical analysis of Alasdair MacIntyre's thought.

My aim in this paper is to investigate what enables human flourishing from a Thomistic perspective by considering Aquinas’ natural inclinations. I will argue that human beings flourish in different ways, depending on their practices. However, not every practice contributes to human flourishing, but only those that are consistent with human nature, which agents grasp through their natural inclinations. To support this argument, I will critically analyze MacIntyre’s account, referring mainly to his latest work (2016). MacIntyre has the merit of highlighting the role of practices in human flourishing by considering the narrative dimension in the agents’ lives, but he fails to recognize the properly metaphysical framework of human nature, that would be provided by the proper consideration of natural inclinations.

This paper aims to consider the boundary role of metaphysics in the realm of ethics within the contemporary debate of analytic Thomism in regard to the naturalistic fallacy. Two interpretations of Aquinas's natural law and natural inclinations will be critically analysed. On the one hand, John Finnis's interpretation – New Natural Law Theory –, which excludes the metaphysical realm in the consideration of Aquinas's natural law; on the other hand, Ralph McInerny and Anthony Lisska's approach, which acknowledges the unavoidability of metaphysics in Aquinas’s ethics. Finally, through the analysis of Thomistic natural law made by Dario Composta (1971), the relevance of the first-person experience in identifying what normatively pertain to human nature will be shown.

This paper aims to consider the relevance of Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of natural inclinations within the contemporary debate on practical reason. Through a critical analysis of Candace Vogler's Reasonably Vicious (2002) and on the basis of Dario Composta’s analysis of Thomas Aquinas' theory of action (1971), it is intended to show that natural inclinations are metaphysical realities, which define the motivational framework of individual agents, offering them normative constraints regarding what is to be considered good and desirable as an end. The reasons for action that arise from inclinations cannot disregard the point of view of the individual agent, who grasps what pertains to human nature through her own experience.