Giulia Russo

This paper is concerned with psychiatric self-diagnosis, a topic that has been overlooked in academic literature (except for a few studies mostly based on autistic communities and individuals), while being increasingly discussed in the context of activism. Since awareness about mental health has been increasing in the past decades, and autism is one of the most targeted conditions in the social and philosophical literature concerning psychiatry, self-diagnosis has become a topic worthy of academic discussion. I will introduce the topic and review some of the limited literature that explicitly targets it (§§ 1-2). I will then proceed to highlight the key features of self-diagnosis that emerge in the context of autism (§ 3). Then, I will explore the connections with its official counterpart – that is, professional diagnosis – and with broader discussions in the field of philosophy of psychiatry (§ 4). The goal of this kind of exploration is to gather the reasons that make self-diagnosis a relevant topic to be inquired (both theoretically and practically) and to showcase a list of issues that could direct further research on it. My final claim will be that self-diagnosis can have significant socio-political consequences, and therefore an understanding informed by social models(§ 5).

This article explores the epistemic, political, and affective dimensions of self-narration in relation to neurodivergence and self-diagnosis, focusing on how such practices can resist forms of epistemic injustice. Building on Fricker’s framework of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, we argue that self-narratives - especially when articulated through social media - can serve as tools of epistemic resistance and community building, that challenge dominant medicalized narratives. In the first part we develop a theoretical framework to understand the relation between identity claims and narrative practices, as well as their link to epistemic injustice. We will argue that lived experience of mental conditions and neurodivergence can act as a source of self-narrations that can both be influenced by, and counter, pathologizing dominant narratives. Especially through this kind of resistance, self-narrative practices can build what we call collective counter-narratives that can oppose epistemic injustice in psychiatry. Drawing on this, we explore how digital platforms provide neurodivergent individuals with alternative spaces for recognition and knowledge production. Social media affordances, such as visibility and interactivity, enable community building and identity affirmation, while also introducing vulnerabilities through over-sharing and algorithmic normativity. By analyzing self-diagnosis and online disability performance, we highlight how epistemic agency is negotiated amid technological and socio-cultural asymmetries. Ultimately, we argue that digital platforms can serve as arenas of epistemic resistance, where lived experience is claimed as collective expertise, challenging traditional medical authority, while acknowledging the associated risks and political implications.