Giuliana Di Biase

Locke’s theory of personal identity in Essay 2.27 notably resonates with the account of personal “Ipseity” developed by Henry More in The Immortality of the Soul as a critique of Averroism. Like Locke, More established a connection between personal identity, consciousness, and memory, emphasising the crucial role of consciousness in unifying an individual’s mental life. However, More equated consciousness with an attribute of the soul, thereby making the continuity of personal identity over time dependent on the persistence of the soul’s immaterial substance. He further characterised the sameness of this substance as sufficient to ensure human identity, thus conflating personal identity, human identity, and substance identity. Although Locke did not reference More directly, his arguments in the Essay indicate his intention to challenge More’s substance-based account of personal identity. Additionally, Locke sought to expose the inconsistencies in More’s defence of the pre-existence of the soul, one of the pillars of his rational theology. Locke contended that this doctrine could not adequately vindicate divine justice and benevolence, as it failed to guarantee the continuity of personal identity in this life. Consequently, it could not provide an effective alternative to the traditional doctrine of original sin, contrary to More’s beliefs.

This book offers an exciting array of contributions to the study of Locke’s own study of travel literature. The importance of its vast topic was acknowledged from the beginning of serious secondary writing about him. Lord Peter King, in his Life of John Locke (1829), remarked that Locke “employed his leisure in reading books of travels, of the best of which he was a great admirer.” This book, drawing upon and considerably expanding the contents of a 2022 special issue of Studi Lockiani, provides recent findings and discoveries, pressing into uncharted areas. The authors and editors use a wide array of sources, treating “travel literature” broadly and capaciously to include the grand works of travel represented by Hakluyt, Purchas, Bernier, Thévenot, Ramusio, Ogilby, and Sagard, as well as specific “relations” of travels to the far reaches of the world, information-conveying correspondence, notebook entries, and maps (especially when annotated). The topic is of great interest not only to Locke scholars, but also to all those investigating cultural anthropology, political philosophy, the expansion of colonialism, the history of ideas, and their circulation in the early modern period.

This chapter investigates the genesis and evolution of Locke’s idea of human life as a “state of mediocrity”. While this idea had ancient roots going back to the early Church fathers, it remained current in the seventeenth century where mediocrity was generally equated with a condition of partial ignorance and imperfection. Locke’s account of it is original; while life is a time of mediocrity, death opens the way to the extremes of eternal misery or eternal happiness. Initially, inspired by the Church fathers, Locke conceived of human life as a condition of _intellectual_ mediocrity. Subsequently, and arguably prompted by his reading of the pessimistic outlooks of Nicole and Pascal, he redefined the state of mediocrity in more optimistic terms: humans are naturally suited to their mediocre state. A further development of his conception of mediocrity, again involving a partial rethinking of the human condition, can be found in the _Essay_, where Locke represents mediocrity as an imperfect state of insatiable desire. It is redeemed, however, by the ability of living human beings to attain perfect knowledge of morality.

The paper examines the copious correspondence between the English philosopher John Locke and the French intellectual Nicolas Toinard ; Locke made the acquaintance of Toinard in Paris in 1677 or early in 1678, and the latter remained his lifelong friend and most assiduous correspondent. An Orléanais and a devout Catholic, Toinard combined an intense interest in the Scriptures with an enthusiasm for experimental science and inventions of every kind; he introduced Locke to all the French official institutions and to a number of private laboratories. Toinard’s principal work, Evangeliorum Harmonia Graeco-Latina, was greatly appreciated by Locke for its new method. The paper attempts to explore the bulk of this correspondence in detail, giving an account of the wide range of topics dealt with in the two hundred letters; it is divided into four paragraphs referring, respectively, to the years 1678-1679, 1679-1681, 1681-1686, 1686-1704. The perspective is diachronic; on some occasions, the focus is on a particular topic which is the object of prolonged discussion between the two correspondents. In the conclusion, attention is drawn to the relevance of this correspondence in the context of the 17th century and of Locke’s philosophical thought.

The Cambridge Platonist Henry More was fiercely averse to the Lurianic Kabbalah, with which he became acquainted through the two tomes of the Kabbala denudata. More contributed to the first tome substantially and was highly influential in shaping the reception of this work, edited by Christian Knorr von Rosenroth. He denounced the incompatibility of the Christian religion with Luria's system and in his last contribution, the Fundamenta, he put forward an apagogical argument meant to show the inconsistency of Luria's teaching. The article aims at exploring the nature of More's argument so as to highlight the philosophical essence of his criticism, the intention of which was to emphasize the incompatibility of the Kabbalah with any form of rational speculation. Luria's doctrine appeared to More to be a compromise between materialism and spiritualism, a sort of hybrid theory that was even worse than materialism, given its misleading theistic appearance as well as the lack of internal coherence. This compromise was also morally unacceptable, being symptomatic of weakness of the will.