Giuliano Infantino

In diesem Aufsatz zeige ich, dass es keine hinreichende Rechtfertigung dafür gibt, Kinder kategorisch vom Wahlrecht auszuschließen. Ausgehend von der Prämisse, dass das Wahlrecht ein fundamentales Recht darstellt, das Staatsbürgern nur aus zwingenden Gründen vorenthalten werden darf, setze ich mich mit zwei Rechtfertigungsstrategien auseinander: dem Argument aus der personalen Kompetenz und dem Argument aus dem Kinderschutz. Ich zeige, dass beide Strategien scheitern. Das Kompetenzargument kann keine kategorische Diskriminierung auf Grundlage statistischer Zusammenhänge rechtfertigen, das Kinderschutzargument verwechselt Täter und Opfer. Ferner argumentiere ich, dass der Ausschluss bei generationenübergreifenden Entscheidungen wie der Klimapolitik besonders fragwürdig ist, weil es zu asymmetrischer Betroffenheit führt. Ich ende mit dem Ergebnis, dass Kindern das Wahlrecht zusteht.

The article examines what Hegel’s higher-order concretization of the nature–spirit relation implies for the contemporary mind–body problem. After reconstructing the standard materialist and dualist options and their respective commitments to a nomologically closed universe, it argues that both frameworks fail to account for the fact that any determination of the relation between body and mind is itself a theoretical – and thus spiritual – act. Drawing on Hegel’s mereological conception of spirit as the concrete whole of which nature is a constitutive part and condition, the article develops a higher-order criterion for theorizing the mind–body relation: the distinction between nature and spirit must be understood as the result of spirit’s self-relation and self-understanding. This yields a form of ontological pluralism that secures the autonomy of spirit without reverting to a simple dualism of mind and matter.

This paper reconstructs Hegel’s objection to Kant’s critique of the ontological argument (OA) without defending the traditional OA. First, in agreement with Kant, I argue that the traditional OA illicitly presupposes <Being> as a real predicate. Second, following Hegel, I contend that Kant does not establish the stronger thesis that <Being> cannot in principle function as a real predicate. I develop a charitable reading of the “hundred-dollar” passage, locating its force in the realm of finite, empirical concepts whose intensions cannot entail existence, and sketch Hegel’s claim that certain logical concepts are necessarily self-instantiating, thereby including <Being> among their marks. I then examine Kant’s “triangle argument", which appears to support a form of existential nihilism by permitting cancellation of both subject and predicate. The upshot is that while Kant’s critique defeats traditional OAs, it does not foreclose non-traditional, Hegelian routes from concept to existence.

In this article, I examine Hegel's concept of translating nature into conceptual form through an analysis of the introductions to his lectures on the philosophy of nature. I argue that Hegel develops an epistemic transformation theory according to which our understanding of nature is fundamentally the result of transformative cognitive processes. Rather than simply mirroring nature as it exists in itself, these processes first dissect nature through empirical cognition into various concepts that enable knowledge of specific natural phenomena. Building upon this, philosophical cognition then identifies these concepts as essential determinations of a general concept of nature. Through a close reading of the lecture introductions, I demonstrate that empirical cognition transforms nature from an inhomogeneous space-time continuum into a conceptual multiplicity of genera and laws. However, this conceptual multiplicity poses a problem: it cannot explain how the unity of nature consists in an internally coherent whole. I show that this unity can only be grasped through genuinely philosophical cognition that takes up the various concepts derived from empirical analysis and transforms them into aspects of a unified whole. Central to my interpretation is Hegel's notion of self-determining universality, which I argue provides the conceptual framework for understanding how philosophical cognition can realize this unifying transformation.

In this review, I evaluate Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer's 1070-page dialogical commentary on Hegel's Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences. The book demonstrates both strengths and limitations in attempting to balance faithful interpretation with critical engagement. While Stekeler offers valuable insights, particularly in his analysis of contingency and the philosophy of subjective spirit, his deflationary approach sometimes understates the metaphysical aspects of Hegel's thought. This is especially evident in his interpretation of spirit as the 'truth of nature' and his reading of absolute spirit. Despite these criticisms, the commentary serves as a rich resource of intertextual references and philosophical analysis that advances our understanding of Hegel's mature system.

In this review, I critically examine Stephen Houlgate's two-volume work "Hegel on Being" (Bloomsbury, 2022). While I acknowledge the book's considerable strengths, particularly its detailed textual analysis, didactic value, and illuminating comparative discussions, I identify two fundamental problems. First, I argue that Houlgate's close adherence to Hegel's text comes at the expense of hermeneutic distance, resulting in a lack of argumentative originality and systematic transparency. Second, I challenge his interpretation of Hegel's Logic as ontology, which I contend prematurely identifies thought-determinations with the objective world without adequately considering how this relationship might only be clarified through the systematic development of Hegel's philosophy. Despite these criticisms, I conclude that Houlgate's philologically precise work makes a valuable contribution to contemporary Hegel scholarship by bringing historical and contemporary perspectives into productive dialogue.