Giuliano Rosella

This paper explores the mathematical connections between the algebraic and relational semantics of Lewis’s logics for counterfactual conditionals. Specifically, we introduce topological variants of Lewis’s well-known possible-worlds semantics—based on spheres, selection functions, and orders—and establish duality results with respect to varieties of Boolean algebras equipped with a counterfactual operator, which serve as the equivalent algebraic semantics of Lewis’s main systems. These results aim to provide a solid mathematical foundation for the study of Lewis’s logics, and offer a new perspective on the most well-known possible worlds-based models. In particular, we write explicit proofs for several results that are often assumed without proof in the literature. Leveraging these duality results, we also derive alternative proofs of strong completeness for Lewis’s variably strict conditional logics with respect to their intended models, and clarify the role of the limit assumption in sphere semantics.

Methods for probability updating, of which Bayesian conditionalization is the most well-known and widely used, are modeling tools that aim to represent the process of modifying an initial epistemic state, typically represented by a prior probability function P, which is adjusted in light of new information. Notably, updating methods and conditional sentences seem to intuitively share a deep connection, as is evident in the case of conditionalization. The present work contributes to this line of research and aims at shedding new light on the relationship between updating methods and conditional connectives. Departing from previous literature that often focused on a specific type of conditional or a particular updating method, our goal is to prove general results concerning the connection between conditionals and their probabilities. This will allow us to characterize the probabilities of certain conditional connectives and to understand what class of updating procedures can be represented using specific conditional connectives. Broadly, we adopt a general perspective that encompasses a large class of conditionals and a wide range of updating methods, enabling us to prove some general results concerning their interrelation.

This paper investigates updating methods for possibility measures and their logical representation through conditional operators. We introduce a general possible worlds semantics equipped with selection functions (or equivalently, Boolean algebras with binary conditional operators). This provides a unified framework for various conditionals, including those studied by Stalnaker and Lewis. Building on our recent triviality result—which shows standard conditionalization for possibility measures cannot be represented as the possibility of a given conditional—we explore how alternative updating methods for possibility measures can be represented as the possibility of conditionals within our framework. Specifically, we define novel updating methods for possibility measures based on these selection functions. These methods, unlike standard conditionalization, exhibit a direct correspondence with the possibility of conditionals. In particular, we prove the possibility of selection function-based conditionals directly aligns with updated qualitative capacities, as defined by Dubois et al. Furthermore, we delineate the specific conditions under which the possibility of such conditionals precisely coincides with a general update of the original possibility measure.

This paper presents a novel internal modal weak Kleene semantics and its derived logics. Our approach offers an intuitive understanding of modal operators as first-order weak Kleene quantifiers, drawing inspiration from the standard translation of classical modal logic. We explore the properties of this semantics and its associated logics. Our primary contribution lies in characterization theorems for some of these modal weak Kleene logics, leveraging classical modal logic, augmented with a refined variables inclusion requirement. These results not only extend the established characterization of non-modal weak Kleene logics but also provide fresh insights into the interpretations of our modal weak Kleene logics. Specifically, building on these technical findings, we propose philosophical interpretations for our logics and their semantics that coherently extend those of non-modal weak Kleene logics.

The logico-algebraic study of Lewis’s hierarchy of variably strict conditional logics has been essentially unexplored, hindering our understanding of their mathematical foundations, and the connections with other logical systems. This work starts filling this gap by providing a logico-algebraic analysis of Lewis’s logics. We begin by introducing novel finite axiomatizations for Lewis’s logics on the syntactic side, distinguishing between global and local consequence relations on Lewisian sphere models on the semantical side, in parallel to the case of modal logic. As first main results, we prove the strong completeness of the calculi with respect to the corresponding semantical consequence on spheres, and a deduction theorem. We then demonstrate that the global calculi are strongly algebraizable in terms of a variety of Boolean algebras with a binary operator representing the counterfactual implication; in contrast, we show that the local ones are generally not algebraizable, although they can be characterized as the degree-preserving logic over the same algebraic models. This yields the strong completeness of all the logics with respect to the algebraic models.

Lewis-Gärdenfors imaging is an updating procedure for probability functions that generalizes Bayesian conditionalization, allowing to approach the probability of conditionals and counterfactual formulas without incurring in Lewis well-known triviality result. Precisely, while the probability of a so called Stalnaker conditional (as formalizable in Lewis logic C2) was proved to be an imaged probability by Lewis in his celebrated paper from 1976, a variant of Gärdenfors generalized imaging (proposed by Dubois and Prade in 1994) has been recently proved to characterize the probability of Lewis counterfactuals, the latter refer to those conditionals of Lewis’s logic C1. The present contribution extends the analysis on Lewis’s triviality result, imaging and generalized imaging to cope with possibility and necessity measures. In particular, after showing that the triviality result also holds in the possibilistic framework, we introduce a way to define the possibility measure of conditional and counterfactual formula. Then we prove that the possibilistic version of Lewis-Gärdenfors imaging (that is inspired by a definition given again by Dubois and Prade in 1994) actually characterizes, as in the aforementioned cases, the possibility of Stalnaker conditionals and Lewis counterfactuals. Furthermore, we show that possibilistic imaging can also be described within the setting of Boolean algebras of conditionals and Lewis algebras. These are algebraic models for conditional and counterfactual formulas recently introduced by two of the present authors. On these structures one can (canonically) define a notion of possibility measure that turns out to be the conditional possibility and imaged possibility mentioned above, respectively, and hence it represents the possibility of conditional and counterfactual formulas.

The aim of this work is to find an answer to the following questions: is it possible to develop a truthmaker semantics for modal statements? And how? The answer to the first question is assumed to be positive and we will focus on seeking the answer to the second one. We believe that the truth-maker semantic account originally developed by Johannes Korbmacher in some unpublished work constitutes a satisfactory answer to the second question. So, we will prove some results on the connections between Korbmacher’s account and already existing logics and we will also extend the framework and the related results to the first-order case. Moreover, we will engage in a philosophical discussion about the nature of truthmakers of modal statements and the way we should conceive of it in the light of this novel modal truthmaker approach. In the end, we will discuss the details of a possible application of the new semantic framework analysed in the thesis.

The present thesis focuses on counterfactuals. Specifically, we will address new questions and open problems that arise for the standard semantic accounts of counterfactual conditionals. The first four chapters deal with the Lewisian semantic account of counterfactuals. On a technical level, we contribute by providing an equivalent algebraic semantics for Lewis' variably strict conditional logics, which is notably absent in the literature. We introduce a new kind of algebra and differentiate between local and global versions of each of Lewis' variably strict conditional logics. We study the algebraic properties of Lewis' logics and the structure theory of our newly introduced algebras. Additionally, we employ a new algebraic construction, based on the framework of Boolean algebras of conditionals, to provide an alternative semantics for Lewisian counterfactual conditionals. This semantic account allows us to establish new truth conditions for Lewisian counterfactuals, implying that Lewisian counterfactuals are definable conditionals, and each counterfactual can be characterized as a modality of a corresponding probabilistic conditional. We further extend these results by demonstrating that each Lewisian counterfactual can also be characterized as a modality of the corresponding Stalnaker conditional. The resulting formal semantic framework is much more expressive than the standard one and, in addition to providing new truth conditions for counterfactuals, it also allows us to define a new class of conditional logics falling into the broader framework of weak logics. On the philosophical side, we argue that our results shed new light on the understanding of Lewisian counterfactuals and prompt a conceptual shift in this field: Lewisian counterfactual dependence can be understood as a modality of probabilistic conditional dependence or Stalnakerian conditional dependence. In other words, whether a counterfactual connection occurs between A and B depends on whether it is "necessary" for a Stalnakerian/probabilistic dependence to occur between A and B. We also propose some ways to interpret the kind of necessity involved in this interpretation. The remaining two chapters deal with the probability of counterfactuals. We provide an answer to the question of how we can characterize the probability that a Lewisian counterfactual is true, which is an open problem in the literature. We show that the probability of a Lewisian counterfactual can be characterized in terms of belief functions from Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, which are a super-additive generalization of standard probability. We define an updating procedure for belief functions based on the imaging procedure and show that the probability of a counterfactual A > B amounts to the belief function of B imaged on A. This characterization strongly relies on the logical results we proved in the previous chapters. Moreover, we also solve an open problem concerning the procedure to assign a probability to complex counterfactuals in the framework of causal modelling semantics. A limitation of causal modelling semantics is that it cannot account for the probability of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents. Drawing on the same previous works, we define a new procedure to assign a probability to counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents in the framework of causal modelling semantics. We also argue that our procedure is satisfactory in that it yields meaningful results and adheres to some conceptually intuitive constraints one may want to impose when computing the probability of counterfactuals.

The logico-algebraic study of Lewis's hierarchy of variably strict conditional logics has been essentially unexplored, hindering our understanding of their mathematical foundations, and the connections with other logical systems. This work aims to fill this gap by providing a comprehensive logico-algebraic analysis of Lewis's logics. We begin by introducing novel finite axiomatizations for varying strengths of Lewis's logics, distinguishing between global and local consequence relations on Lewisian sphere models. We then demonstrate that the global consequence relation is strongly algebraizable in terms of a specific class of Boolean algebras with a binary operator representing the counterfactual implication; in contrast, we show that the local consequence relation is generally not algebraizable, although it can be characterized as the degree-preserving logic over the same algebraic models. Further, we delve into the algebraic semantics of Lewis's logics, developing two dual equivalences with respect to particular topological spaces. In more details, we show a duality with respect to the topological version of Lewis's sphere models, and also with respect to Stone spaces with a selection function; using the latter, we demonstrate the strong completeness of Lewis's logics with respect to sphere models. Finally, we draw some considerations concerning the limit assumption over sphere models.

Causal Modeling Semantics (CMS, e.g., Galles and Pearl 1998; Pearl 2000; Halpern 2000) is a powerful framework for evaluating counterfactuals whose antecedent is a conjunction of atomic formulas. We extend CMS to an evaluation of the probability of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents, and more generally, to counterfactuals whose antecedent is an arbitrary Boolean combination of atomic formulas. Our main idea is to assign a probability to a counterfactual (A ∨ B) € C at a causal model M as a weighted average of the probability of C in those submodels that truthmake A ∨ B (Briggs 2012; Fine 2016, 2017). The weights of the submodels are given by the inverse distance to the original model M, based on a distance metric proposed by Eva, Stern, and Hartmann (2019). Apart from solving a major problem in the epistemology of counterfactuals, our paper shows how work in semantics, causal inference and formal epistemology can be fruitfully combined.

In this paper we propose a semantic analysis of Lewis' counterfactuals. By exploiting the structural properties of the recently introduced boolean algebras of conditionals, we show that counterfactuals can be expressed as formal combinations of a conditional object and a normal necessity modal operator. Specifically, we introduce a class of algebras that serve as modal expansions of boolean algebras of conditionals, together with their dual relational structures. Moreover, we show that Lewis' semantics based on sphere models can be reconstructed in this framework. As a consequence, we establish the soundness and completeness of a slightly stronger variant of Lewis' logic for counterfactuals with respect to our algebraic models. In the second part of the paper, we present a novel approach to the probability of counterfactuals showing that it aligns with the uncertainty degree assigned by a belief function, as per Dempster-Shafer theory, to its associated conditional formula. Furthermore, we characterize the probability of a counterfactual in terms of Gärdenfors' imaging rule for the probabilistic update.

This paper introduces a new framework, based on the notion of compatibility space, obtained by adding a primitive incompatibility relation to a state space in the sense of Fine. The key idea inspiring the framework is to modify Fine's truthmaker semantics by taking the notion of incompatibility as primitive, and use it to define other notions. We discuss some interesting features of the framework and explore its advantages over the standard framework of state spaces. We review some applications of the framework, including proofs of soundness and completeness theorems for a number of logics, one way to use compatibility states to mirror Kripke frames, and an exploration of a way to use the new framework to provide truthmaking clauses for modal formulas.

Causal Modeling Semantics (CMS, e.g., Galles and Pearl 1998; Pearl 2000; Halpern 2000) is a powerful framework for evaluating counterfactuals whose antecedent is a conjunction of atomic formulas. We extend CMS to an evaluation of the probability of counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents, and more generally, to counterfactuals whose antecedent is an arbitrary Boolean combination of atomic formulas. Our main idea is to assign a probability to a counterfactual (A ∨ B) > C at a causal model M as a weighted average of the probability of C in those submodels that truthmake A∨ B (Briggs 2012; Fine 2016, 2017). The weights of the submodels are given by the inverse distance to the original model M, based on a distance metric proposed by Eva, Stern, and Hartmann (2019). Apart from solving a major problem in the epistemology of counterfactuals, our paper shows how work in semantics, causal inference and formal epistemology can be fruitfully combined.