Giulio Basilio

In his new edition of the Greek text of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics, Rowe has excised the third column of the table of EE II 3. In this essay, I argue that a careful understanding of the argumentative approach Aristotle adopts in these sections provides strong grounds for rejecting Rowe’s editorial bracketing of the third column. My argument is divided into four parts. First, I contend that in EE II 3 Aristotle intends to expound the domains of the several character virtues by articulating their underlying πάθη. Next, I show that Aristotle employs the notion of paronymy to conduct the enquiry into character virtue at the level of the abstract quality and of the concrete individual who exhibits the relevant πάθος. I then turn to considering the specific difficulties involved in making sense of two lines of the table, namely the δίκαιον and the φρόνησις trio. On the whole, I hope to show not only that the transmitted text should be retained as is, but also that understanding why this is so will enhance significantly our understanding of Aristotle’s project in these sections of the EE.

abstract: Aristotle concludes Nicomachean Ethics book VI (= Eudemian Ethics book V) with several puzzles, one of which has to do with the utility of practical wisdom (1143b21–28). I argue that scholars have neglected the importance of this puzzle, together with Aristotle’s reply to it, which, crucially, brings in his notion of natural virtue. Reflecting on this puzzle shows, first, that Aristotle has a robust understanding of natural virtue; and second, the role of practical wisdom as a correction of, and supplement to, the shortcomings of natural virtue. My argument has important consequences for Aristotle’s acceptance of the unity of the virtues.