Giulio Fellin

A constructivisation of the cut-elimination proof for sequent calculi for classical, intuitionistic and minimal infinitary logics with geometric rules—given in earlier work by the second author—is presented. This is achieved through a procedure where the non-constructive transfinite induction on the commutative sum of ordinals is replaced by two instances of Brouwer’s Bar Induction. The proof of admissibility of the structural rules is made ordinal-free by introducing a new well-founded relation based on a notion of embeddability of derivations. Additionally, conservativity for classical over intuitionistic/minimal logic for the seven (finitary) Glivenko sequent classes is here shown to hold also for the corresponding infinitary classes.

Alongside the analogy between maximal ideals and complete theories, the Jacobson radical carries over from ideals of commutative rings to theories of propositional calculi. This prompts a variant of Lindenbaum’s Lemma that relates classical validity and intuitionistic provability, and the syntactical counterpart of which is Glivenko’s Theorem. The Jacobson radical in fact turns out to coincide with the classical deductive closure. As a by-product we obtain a possible interpretation in logic of the axioms-as-rules conservation criterion for a multi-conclusion Scott-style entailment relation over a single-conclusion one.

Glivenko’s theorem says that classical provability of a propositional formula entails intuitionistic provability of the double negation of that formula. This stood right at the beginning of the success story of negative translations, indeed mainly designed for converting classically derivable formulae into intuitionistically derivable ones. We now generalise this approach: simultaneously from double negation to an arbitrary nucleus; from provability in a calculus to an inductively generated abstract consequence relation; and from propositional logic to any set of objects whatsoever. In particular, we give sharp criteria for the generalisation of classical logic to be a conservative extension of the one of intuitionistic logic with double negation.

A terminating sequent calculus for intuitionistic propositional logic is obtained by modifying the R $\supset $ rule of the labelled sequent calculus $\mathbf {G3I}$. This is done by adding a variant of the principle of a fortiori in the left-hand side of the premiss of the rule. In the resulting calculus, called ${\mathbf {G3I}}_{\mathbf {t}}$, derivability of any given sequent is directly decidable by root-first proof search, without any extra device such as loop-checking. In the negative case, the failed proof search gives a finite countermodel to the sequent on a reflexive, transitive, and Noetherian Kripke frame. As a byproduct, a direct proof of faithfulness of the embedding of intuitionistic logic into Grzegorcyk logic is obtained.

The topic of this thesis lies in the intersection between proof theory and algebraic logic. The main object of discussion, constructive reasoning, was introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century by Brouwer, who followed Kant’s explanation of human intuition of spacial forms and time points: these are constructed step by step in a finite process by certain rules, mimicking constructions with straightedge and compass and the construction of natural numbers, respectively.The aim of the present thesis is to show how classical reasoning, which admits some forms of indirect reasoning, can be made more constructive. The central tool that we are using are induction principles, methods that capture infinite collections of objects by considering their process of generation instead of the whole class. We start by studying the interplay between certain structures that satisfy induction and the calculi for some non-classical logics. We then use inductive methods to prove a few conservation theorems, which contribute to answering the question of which parts of classical logic and mathematics can be made constructive.Abstract prepared by Giulio FellinE-mail: [email protected]: https://researchportal.helsinki.fi/en/publications/constructivisation-through-induction-and-conservation.

We study infinitary intuitionistic logic by employing both syntactic and semantic methods. First, we introduce a natural deduction system for infinitary predicate logic and study some of its basic properties. We then extend neighbourhood semantics to this setting, providing a soundness and completeness theorem for this system. Building on these tools, we derive three new conservation results connecting classical and constructive reasoning. We prove an infinitary version of Barr’s theorem using neighbourhood semantics; we define an infinitary Gentzen-style negative translation and show it yields a proper embedding of classical logic into minimal logic; and we establish an infinitary Glivenko theorem, identifying the Glivenko logic as the least extension of minimal logic validating Glivenko’s theorem. Finally, we show that the Glivenko logic is distinct from the other systems considered, thereby clarifying its place within the landscape of constructive infinitary logics.