Giuseppe Ferraro

A interpretação da filosofia de Nāgārjuna como um niilismo metafísico radical é comum tanto entre os autores antigos quanto nos estudos budológicos contemporâneos. Uma primeira leitura da doutrina da vacuidade proposta por esse autor, com efeito, parece levar à conclusão de que nada existe em última análise e, portanto, a realidade em si seria equivalente a um puro não-ser. Uma tal metafísica do nada, entretanto, seria duplamente problemática: primeiramente, ela parece sofrer de graves incovenientes lógico-conceituais; em segundo lugar, ela colocaria Nāgārjuna fora da ortodoxia budista, por ser o niilismo uma doutrina explicitamente reprovada pelo Buda histórico. Uma leitura mais atenta e completa dos textos a nossa disposição, entretanto, nos leva a concluir que a filosofia do fundador da escola Madhyamaka não pode ser considerado como um niilismo metafísico, mas sim, ao invés disso, como uma tentativa de evitar e de eliminar qualquer metafísica, tanto afirmativa quanto negativa, em total acordo com o programa filosófico – já presente no ensinamento do Buda – do “caminho do meio”, equidistante das categorias do ser e do não-ser.

Nas primeiras duas seções deste artigo, apresento alguns dos argumentos que os filósofos budistas indianos Nāgārjuna (ca. séculos II-III) e Vasubandhu (ca. séculos IV-V) usam para mostrar a insustentabilidade lógica dos fenômenos, respectivamente, do movimento e da existência de objetos externos/extramentais. A lógica desses argumentos é comparável à lógica que Zenão de Eleia utiliza nos seus paradoxos contra o movimento e a multiplicidade – e, de fato, no interior dos estudos budológicos contemporâneos, essa comparação já foi sugerida. Na terceira seção, entretanto, pretendo mostrar que os objetivos filosóficos mais imediatos desses três pensadores divergem e são inconciliáveis: enquanto Zenão critica o movimento e a multiplicidade para demonstrar a plausibilidade dos atributos da imobilidade e da univocidade do Ser parmenídico, os paradoxos de Nāgārjuna e Vasubandhu devem ser entendidos no âmbito de projetos filosóficos que, em continuidade com o ensinamento budiano do caminho do meio, pretendem ficar equidistantes das categorias do “ser” e do “não-ser”, evitando ambas. Finalmente, na quarta e última seção, defendo a tese de que os objetivos últimos dos Eleatas e aqueles dos dois filósofos budistas voltam a ser parecidos: Parmênides e o Buda, como também seus respectivos epígonos, buscam promover nos seus seguidores uma “revolução epistêmica” que consiste na passagem de uma visão ordinária da realidade a uma compreensão extraordinária ou suprema, coincidente com a realidade em si e, portanto, verdadeira em última análise.

With regards the crucial issue of the existence of the self, within canonical texts of the Buddhist Abhidharma schools we find passages that are frequently at odds with one another. Sometimes the Buddha defends or respects the belief in the self and in personal continuity; at other times he seems to deny that beyond the psycho-physical factors to which our existential experience can be reduced there is an ātman that contains, owns or controls these same factors; in further cases still, he states that the use of the metaphysical categories of “being” and “non-being” must be avoided – thus, about the self (or everything else), it is inappropriate to say that it exists or that it does not exist. Faced with these divergences (or contradictions) within contemporary Buddhist studies, we can detect two main tendencies. Some scholars start from the assumption that the Buddha’s teaching is or should be coherent and univocal, and, therefore, propose readings of his original message that are supposed to iron out or conciliate any inconsistencies. Others believe that the inconsistencies are actually irreconcilable and, therefore, maintain that the Abhidharma canons are a composite and stratified redaction in which the opposite views of different writers overlap and intersect. Against these historiographical approaches, the purpose of the present paper is to show that the three aforementioned modes of the Buddha’s teaching are, in fact, both alternative and irreconcilable. This, however, far from presenting a puzzle to be solved or explained (by resorting to suppositions of which, in the canons, we have no explicit confirmation), is nothing more than a feature of the Buddha’s Dharma, which appears to be a teaching that develops different pedagogical/soteriological modes for different purposes, and which is conceived for the spiritual growth of followers with different intellectual and psychological profiles.

In the first part of this paper I critically examine some of the main interpretations of “classical” Yogācāra philosophy of Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Among these interpretations, based on extant textual and contextual data, I consider philologically unlikely both metaphysical-idealistic readings, which ascribe to these authors the view that ultimate reality is a mental or subjective stuff, and epistemological-idealistic readings which advocate that either Yogācāra suspends judgment on the existence of the extramental or that it maintains that the extramental exists in itself and ultimately. Instead, I consider more likely the thesis that classical Yogācāra upholds an epistemological idealism that, while admitting epistemological priority of the mental over the extramental, rules out the ultimate existence of both the former and the latter. This exclusion, however, does not amount to the exclusion of every metaphysics, but rather to the adoption of a metaphysics of emptiness conceived, in fact, as absence of the mental/extramental dichotomy. In the second part of the paper this reading of classical Yogācāra is compared with the interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy that I elsewhere called “realistic antimetaphysical”, and I reach the conclusion that, while with respect to epistemology between early Madhyamaka and classical Yogācāra there is continuity, regarding metaphysics these two schools are deeply distinct and discontinuous: while Nāgārjuna conceives of emptiness as an extinction of any metaphysical view, Yogācāra emptiness actually presents itself as a metaphysical point of view.

A great deal of "epistemological" thought is dedicated to the question of the origin of the ideas that form our ordinary conception of reality.1 How do we obtain our view of the world as a whole composed of discrete substances, endowed with space-time extension, which are the substrata of specific qualities, linked to each other by different kinds of relation?This is a question that is certainly less problematic in contexts of thought that defend "pluralist" ontologies—where being is thought to amount to a plurality of discrete and self-subsistent entities. There...

Some time ago I advanced on the pages of this journal a critique of the interpretation given by Jay L. Garfield and Mark Siderits (hereafter GS) of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(2):195–219, 2013.1); to my article the two authors responded with a ‘defense of the semantic interpretation’ of the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (GS, J Indian Philos 41(6):655–664, 2013). Their reply, however, could not consider my personal understanding of Nāgārjuna’s notions of śūnyatā and dve satye. My interpretation of these notions was in fact absent in the paper GS responded, and was only related in a second paper of mine (Ferraro, J Indian Philos 41(5):563–590, 2013.2), still unpublished at the time of GS’s drafting of their ‘defense’. Therefore, in the present rejoinder, I found it appropriate, rather than responding point by point to the passages of GS’s reply, to advance a comparison between the semantic interpretation and my ‘realist antimetaphysical’ understanding of Nāgārjuna’s thought

The difference between the concepts of saṃsāra e nirvāṇaset forth by the historical Buddha in his first sermon seem to be disputed by the equalization of the two terms effected by Nāgārjuna in a topical passage of his MK. This article, firstly, supports the thesis that the contradiction is just a seeming one and that the relation of difference or identity between the two dimensions depends on the philosophical register, respectively epistemological and ontological, being used - in both cases for soteriological purposes - by the Buddha and Nāgārjuna. Secondly, we wish to prove that, in any case, Nāgārjuna's ontology, far from being a philosophical novelty or an evolution of the thought of the founder of Buddhism, is, on the contrary, one of the possible applications of the "non-self" doctrine - probably the most important and original contribution of Buddhist thought to the history of world philosophy - expounded by the Buddha in his second sermon.La differenza tra i concetti di saṃsāra e nirvāṇastabilita dal Buddha nel suo primo sermone sembra essere messa in discussione dall'equiparazione dei due termini effettuata da Nāgārjuna in un passaggio-chiave delle sue MK. Questo articolo, in primo luogo, difende la tesi che la contraddizione sia soltanto apparente e che la relazione, di differenza o di identità, tra le due dimensioni dipende dal registro filosofico, rispettivamente epistemologico e ontologico, usato - in entrambi i casi per finalità soteriologiche - dal Buddha e da Nāgārjuna. In secondo luogo, cercheremo di provare che, in ogni caso, l'ontologia di Nāgārjuna, lungi dall'essere una novità filosofica o un'evoluzione rispetto al pensiero del fondatore del buddhismo è, al contrario, una delle possibili applicazioni della dottrina del non-sé - probabilmente il contributo più importante e originale del pensiero buddhista alla storia della filosofia universale - esposta dal Buddha nel suo secondo sermone

This paper proposes an interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of the two truths that considers saṃvṛti and paramārtha-satya two visions of reality on which the Buddhas, for soteriological and pedagogical reasons, build teachings of two types: respectively in agreement with (for example, the teaching of the Four Noble Truths) or in contrast to (for example, the teaching of emptiness) the category of svabhāva. The early sections of the article show to what extent the various current interpretations of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of the dve satye—despite their sometimes even macroscopic differences—have a common tendency to consider the notion of śūnyatā as a teaching not based on, but equivalent to supreme truth. This equivalence—philologically questionable—leads to interpretative paths that prove inevitably aporetic: indeed, according to whether the interpretation of śūnyatā is ‘metaphysical’ or ‘anti-metaphysical’, it gives rise to readings of Nāgārjuna’s thought incompatible, respectively, with anti-metaphysical and realistic types of verses traceable in the works of the author of the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK). On the contrary, by giving more emphasis to the expression samupāśritya (“based on”), which recurs in MMK.24.8, and therefore, by epistemologically separating the notion of śūnyatā from the notion of paramārtha-satya (and of some of its conceptual equivalents such as nirvāṇa, tattva and dharmatā), we may obtain an interpretation—at once realistic and anti-metaphysical—of the theory of the two truths compatible with the vast majority (or even totality) of Nāgārjuna’s verses

This paper supports the thesis that nihilistic interpretations of Madhyamaka philosophy derive from generally antirealistic and/or metaphysical approaches to Nāgārjuna’s thought. However, the arguments and many images by way of which the author of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and his Indian commentators defend themselves from the charge of nihilism show limits in these approaches, and rather confirm that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy should be read as a theoretical proposal that is at once realistic and antimetaphysical. The epistemology inherent to the soteriological dimension of the Buddha’s teaching, of which Nāgārjuna presents himself as a faithful continuer, assesses on the one hand the accomplishment of a ‘cognitive revolution’ consisting in the achievement of a new vision of reality and on the other the avoidance of any metaphysical description of the same vision. Comprehension of the Madhyamaka philosophical enterprise through a realistic-antimetaphysical lens seems to hinder and prevent the possibility of any nihilistic interpretation of Nāgārjuna.

This paper proposes a critical analysis of that interpretation of the Nāgārjunian doctrine of the two truths as summarized—by both Mark Siderits and Jay L. Garfield—in the formula: “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth”. This ‘semantic reading’ of Nāgārjuna’s theory, despite its importance as a criticism of the ‘metaphysical interpretations’, would in itself be defective and improbable. Indeed, firstly, semantic interpretation presents a formal defect: it fails to clearly and explicitly express that which it contains logically; the previously mentioned formula must necessarily be completed by: “the conventional truth is that nothing is conventional truth”. Secondly, after having recognized what Siderits’ and Garfield’s analyses contain implicitly, other logical and philological defects in their position emerge: the existence of the ‘conventional’ would appear—despite the efforts of semantic interpreters to demonstrate quite the contrary—definitively inconceivable without the presupposition of something ‘real’; moreover, the number of verses in Nāgārjuna that are in opposition to the semantic interpretation (even if we grant semantic interpreters that these verses do not justify a metaphysical reconstruction of Nagarjuna’s doctrine) would seem too great and significant to be ignored

La differenza tra i concetti di sa?s?ra e nirv??a stabilita dal Buddha (VI-V sec. a.C.) nel suo primo sermone sembra essere messa in discussione dall’equiparazione dei due termini effettuata da N?g?rjuna (II sec. d.C.) in un passaggio-chiave delle sue MK2. Questo articolo, in primo luogo, difende la tesi che la contraddizione sia soltanto apparente e che la relazione, di differenza o di identità, tra le due dimensioni dipende dal registro filosofico, rispettivamente epistemologico e ontologico, usato – in entrambi i casi per finalità soteriologiche – dal Buddha e da N?g?rjuna. In secondo luogo, cercheremo di provare che, in ogni caso, l’ontologia di N?g?rjuna, lungi dall’essere una novità filosofica o un’evoluzione rispetto al pensiero del fondatore del buddhismo è, al contrario, una delle possibili applicazioni della dottrina del non-sé (an?tma-v?da) – probabilmente il contributo più importante e originale del pensiero buddhista alla storia della filosofia universale – esposta dal Buddha nel suo secondo sermone

This paper supports the thesis that nihilistic interpretations of Madhyamaka philosophy derive from generally antirealistic and/or metaphysical approaches to Nāgārjuna’s thought. However, the arguments and many images by way of which the author of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and his Indian commentators defend themselves from the charge of nihilism show limits in these approaches, and rather confirm that Nāgārjuna’s philosophy should be read as a theoretical proposal that is at once realistic and antimetaphysical. The epistemology inherent to the soteriological dimension of the Buddha’s teaching, of which Nāgārjuna presents himself as a faithful continuer, assesses on the one hand the accomplishment of a ‘cognitive revolution’ consisting in the achievement of a new vision of reality and on the other the avoidance of any metaphysical description of the same vision. Comprehension of the Madhyamaka philosophical enterprise through a realistic-antimetaphysical lens seems to hinder and prevent the possibility of any nihilistic interpretation of Nāgārjuna.

RESUMO Entre os vários pontos da obra de Nāgārjuna que deram origem a análises e discussões, o tema das 'duas verdades' é um dos mais controversos. Com efeito, dentro da ampla bibliografia dedicada a essa temática, são muitas, e amiúde divergentes, as tentativas de explicar o que Nāgārjuna entendesse - no verso 24.8 das suas Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā - com as expressões 'verdade convencional' e 'verdade suprema'. Esses pontos de vista interpretativos, entretanto, frequentemente, parecem prescindir daquele que talvez seja o critério mais confiável para dirimir as controvérsias relativas às MMK: i. e., a leitura dos comentários indianos às mesmas MMK. Em contraste com essa tendência, este escrito objetiva investigar as passagens do Prajñāpradīpa e das Prasannapadā onde encontramos explicações, respectivamente de Bhāviveka e de Candrakīrti, que dizem respeito às duas verdades. O resultado dessa pesquisa se apresentará como nitidamente favorável à interpretação da doutrina das duas verdades que, em outros escritos, chamei de 'pedagógica'.ABSTRACT Among the many passages of Nāgārjuna's work that have generated analysis investigation and discussion, the issue of the 'two truths' is one of the most controversial ones. In fact, within the vast bibliography dedicated to this topic, attempts to explain what Nāgārjuna meant - in verse 24.8 of his Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā - by 'conventional' and 'supreme truth' are many and frequently divergent. However, it often seems that these interpretative views neglect what probably is the most reliable criterion for solving controversies in the MMK: i. e., the reading of Indian commentaries to the MMK. Going against this trend, this paper aims to investigate passages of Bhāviveka's Prajñāpradīpa and of Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā where we find explanations that concern the two truths. The result of this research will look quite favorably on the interpretation of the two truths doctrine that I called, in other works of mine, "pedagogical".