Giuseppe Flavio Artese

How do the temporal horizons of human experience shape what our social, cultural, and material environments afford? This question has become crucial as affordance research increasingly explores the social, cultural, and historical dimensions of perception and action. Recent approaches in radical embodied cognitive science have built on Costall’s notion of canonical affordances to clarify how possibilities for action are disclosed in socially normative ways and in relation to shared practices. However, despite these advancements, the temporal organization of canonical affordances remains underdeveloped. Existing accounts generally emphasize the phenomenological time of everyday experience, the situated time of practices, or the developmental trajectories of learning, leaving unexplored the longer horizons through which sociality and materiality are formed, sustained, and adapted. Consequently, the multitemporal and diachronic depth under which canonical affordances persist or change risks being flattened. Supported by anthropology and archaeology, this article addresses this limitation by introducing two largely neglected temporal scales: intergenerational and transgenerational time. Intergenerational time captures the lived temporal rhythms emerging from habitual sociomaterial practices across a few generations. Transgenerational time concerns the persistence and transformation of canonical affordances linked to the natural and anthropic processes by which material culture endures, accumulates, and changes across deep time. We formalize these horizons within a broader multitemporal and diachronic framework, situating them alongside existing phenomenological, situated, developmental, and phylogenetic timescales to specify the causal relations that hold between them.

Our paper is concerned with theories of direct perception in ecological psychology that first emerged in the second half of the twentieth century. Ecological psychology continues to be influential among philosophers and cognitive scientists today who defend a 4E (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) approach to the scientific study of cognition. Ecological psychologists have experimentally investigated how animals are able to directly perceive their surrounding environment and what it affords to them. We pursue questions about direct perception through a discussion of the ecological psychologist’s concept of affordances. In recent years, psychologists and philosophers have begun to mark out two explanatory roles for the affordance concept. In one role, affordances are cast as belonging to a shared, publicly available environment, and existing independent of the experience of any perceiving and acting animal. In a second role, affordances are described in phenomenological terms, in relation to an experiencing animal that has its own peculiar needs, interests and personal history. Our aim in this paper is to argue for a single phenomenological or experiential understanding of the affordance concept. We make our argument, first of all, based on William James’ concept of pure experience developed in his later, radical empiricist writings. James thought of pure experience as having a field structure that is organized by the selective interest and needs of the perceiver. We will argue however that James did not emphasize sufficiently the social and intersubjective character of the field of experience. Drawing on the phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch, we will argue that psychological factors like individual needs and attention must be thought of as already confronted with a social reality. On the phenomenological reading of affordances we develop, direct perception of affordances is understood as taking place within an intersubjective world structured by human social and cultural life.

In his writings, Gibson firmly claimed that cultural or social factors could never distort perception. Cultural artefacts, social norms, language and signs were instead described as influencing perception and behavior only indirectly. At the same time, in his last monumental monograph, Gibson introduced the concept of affordance as applicable to the “whole realm of social significance”. Unfortunately, Gibson did not elaborate further on the relationship between the notion of affordance and the socio-cultural organization of niches like ours. This issue divided Gibson’s followers into two sides. Some of them followed Gibson, claiming that socio-cultural factors can drive behavior but never permeate perceptual experience to its bottom layers. A second group assumes instead that the presence of a structured socio-cultural context permeates the meaning of affordances already at the perceptual level. The aim of this chapter is twofold. The first part of the chapter aims to reconstruct Gibson’s view on the role of culture and sociality and then highlight the reasoning that animates both groups of theorists. In particular, a large part of the discussion is based on motivating the problematics that led the second group of theorists to disagree with Gibson and his idea that the individual’s social background never permeates sensory perception. The second aim is to throw the seeds to develop a methodological tool available to these theorists in order to characterize the experience of affordances as shaped by the social and cultural context in which they are embedded; the notion of field. This notion has a long history in psychology but its methodological consequences are often overlooked. Notably, one of the risks of the concept of field is, as scholars of the Gestalt school like Parlett and Lee claimed, that the notion could be framed so broadly to include “anything and everything”, making it theoretically and scientifically trivial and hence unable to provide a rigorous characterization of what is encountered in individual experiences. To avoid the trivialization of this concept, I conclude by developing a recent proposal that suggests endorsing the notion of field specifically elaborated by the phenomenologist Aron GurwitschGurwitsch, A..

In the last three decades, an interdisciplinary research program - called “the 4E approaches” - highlighted the necessity of rethinking the theoretical assumptions and experimental practices of mainstream cognitive science. However, the claim of the disruptive potential of 4E research grows old without seeing the announced and wanted effects on how cognitive phenomena are studied. This introduction to the edited volume “Situated Cognition Research: Methodological Foundations” focuses on the method(olog)ical issues of the 4Es, the loosely connected but promising methodical options available in the debate, and the foundational questions that need to be answered if we aim to develop a 4E methodology.

This volume assembles supporters and critics of situated cognition research to evaluate the intricacies, prerequisites, possibilities, and scope of a 4E methodology. The contributions are divided into three categories. The first category entails papers dealing with a 4E methodology from the perspective of epistemology and philosophy of science. It discusses whether to support explanatory pluralism or explanatory unification and focuses on possible compromises between ecological psychology and enactivism. The second category addresses ontological questions regarding the synchronic and diachronic constitution of cognitive phenomena, the localization of cognitive processes, and the theoretical issue of mutual manipulability. The third category analyzes how the theoretical and practical commitments of 4E approaches lead to empirically supported investigations of different phenomena, such as research on affordances and (chronic) pain. The book renews attention to the possible adverse consequences coming along with methodical fragmentation, as found among 4E positions. It provides an overdue first step towards a systematic and positive answer to methodological concerns in situated cognition research. Without this and further steps in the future, the growth of 4E ́s significance for the scientific study of the mind might stall or even decrease. With such steps, situated cognition research could realize its frequently highlighted but so far not comprehensively accessed potential to change radically the modalities of how cognitive phenomena are studied. This volume is of interest to scholars of the philosophy of mind.

Central figures in the phenomenological tradition, such as Aron Gurwitsch, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, drew extensively on gestalt psychology in their writings. The dialogue between phenomenology and psychology they began continues today in the field of embodied cognitive science. We take up this conversation starting from Aron Gurwitsch’s rich phenomenological analysis of the perception of the cultural world. Gurwitsch’s phenomenological descriptions of the perception of the cultural world bear a striking resemblance to work in embodied cognitive science that takes its inspiration from Gibson’s ecological psychology. Gibson coined the term “affordance” to refer to the possibilities for action that can be directly perceived by persons [Gibson 1979]. However, Gibson from his earliest writings made a distinction between a universal, strictly individual and nonsocial form of perception and a perception of the world that was subject to social and cultural influences. We use Gurwitsch to argue against Gibson’s individualist understanding of direct perception. Each affordance that can be selected as an object of perception refers to a wider sociocultural context, which Gurwitsch called an “order of existence”. We end our paper by taking up the question of the relation of phenomenological description of the perceptual world and explanations of perceptual experience provided by embodied cognitive science.

Gibson defined affordances as action possibilities directly offered to an animal by the environment. Ambitiously, affordances are meant to show the inadequacy of the subjective-objective dichotomy in the study of cognition. Armed with similar concerns, some neo-Gibsonians recently thought of affordances as latent dispositions existing independently of individual organisms or whole species. It is no coincidence that critics had, on several occasions, objected that this theoretical stance dramatically neglects the role of the perceiver in the emergence of affordances. In this paper, we provide a phenomenological characterization of the perceiver’s role in affordance perception. Specifically, we borrow from Husserlian phenomenology to characterize two features of affordance perception that can enrich our understanding of the individual’s engagement with the environment, namely, its affective and temporal aspects. Taking an everyday activity such as rock climbing as a case example, we show that phenomenological investigations, if not misinterpreted as mere introspection, can represent an ally for ecological psychologists.