Gloria Zúñiga y Postigo

Carl Menger’s theory of subjective economic value is not only one of the greatest contributions of Austrian economics, subjective value is also the received view in mainstream economics today. However, modern-day economic theory does not explicitly address the theory advanced by Menger but merely assumes that value is subjective on the basis that the experience of valuing something is no more than an expression of preference. Accordingly, contemporary economists do not appear to recognize the distinction between this understanding of value and any other possible understanding of value, such as objective theories of moral value advanced in older strands of inquiry. Lacking the theoretical basis laid by Menger, subjectivity indeed appears deceptively simple: choices are made on the basis of preferences, and preferences are subjective. It would thus follow that further examination of the phenomenon of choice appears unnecessary. The aim of this paper is to present the Austrian philosophical foundations of the theory of subjective economic value and examine how this received theory has been quite significantly transformed in its transition to a neoclassical economics framework that has disposed of its theoretical basis.

This dissertation is an ontological investigation of value. The thesis is this: Value is a moment founded on a real entity and, in this sense, value is real. I argue that this thesis is true for all objects in the domain of value by looking at three distinct categories of value: economic value, aesthetic value, and moral value. And I demonstrate by means of advancing definitions, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for each of these three categories of value, that this thesis is the essential glue that holds all values in the realm of social reality as part of the genus value. There are two restrictions to this thesis. One restriction is that the real existence of value is possible only if there is a relation of correspondence between a value judgment and its referent. A false value judgment, then, fails to correspond to its intentional target so there is no possible value. The other restriction is that the value entities are either concrete objects that have at least temporally come into being, or actual states of affairs with a spatial and temporal location. Both of these restrictions combined imply that no future states of affairs, or objects which either have not or cannot come into being, can be objects of value. This dissertation draws from sources in the Central European philosophical tradition

This chapter will present the argument that the tools of ontology offer a means for teaching the philosophical foundations of economic value and for engaging interdisciplinarily the examinations of economics. Ontology is the branch of philosophy that is concerned with the description of existing domains in the world, the objects in such domains, and their relations. It does not attempt to explain or interpret, only to describe, and it is in this sense that ontology is reconcilable with the scientific methods of economics. Additionally, it is capable of describing the complex structures, relations, and emergence of economic objects in human economic activity. This chapter will address three insights from ontology that shed light on the implications of the notion of subjectivity in the theory of subjective economic value, the differences between economic value and other kinds of value, and the role that subjectivity and economic value have in the emergence of the social object we know as money.

Carl Menger’s theory of subjective economic value is not only one of the greatest contributions of Austrian economics, subjective value is also the received view in mainstream economics today. However, modern-day economic theory does not explicitly address the theory advanced by Menger but merely assumes that value is subjective on the basis that the experience of valuing something is no more than an expression of preference. Accordingly, contemporary economists do not appear to recognize the distinction between this understanding of value and any other possible understanding of value, such as objective theories of moral value advanced in older strands of inquiry. Lacking the theoretical basis laid by Menger, subjectivity indeed appears deceptively simple: choices are made on the basis of preferences, and preferences are subjective. It would thus follow that further examination of the phenomenon of choice appears unnecessary. The aim of this paper is to present the Austrian philosophical foundations of the theory of subjective economic value and examine how this received theory has been quite significantly transformed in its transition to a neoclassical economics framework that has disposed of its theoretical basis.

Foundations of Economic Personalism is a series of three book-length monographs, each closely examining a significant dimension of the Center for Economic Personalism's unique synthesis of Christian personalism and free-economic market theory. In the aftermath of the momentous geo-political and economic changes of the late 1980s, a small group of Christian social ethicists began to converse with free-market economists over the morality of market activity. This interdisciplinary exchange eventually led to the founding of a new academic subdiscipline under the rubric of economic personalism. These scholars attempt to integrate economic theory, history, and methodology with Christian personalism's stress upon human dignity, humane social structures, and social justice. This final volume in the series systematically applies the praxeological and theoretical foundations of the personalist tradition to free-market economic theory. Unlike the previous two, this work defends economic liberty in theologically sensitive terms that reference the personalist tradition, without compromising the disciplinary integrity of either economics or social ethics

Foundations of Economic Personalism is a series of three book-length monographs, each closely examining a significant dimension of the Center for Economic Personalism's unique synthesis of Christian personalism and free-economic market theory. In the aftermath of the momentous geo-political and economic changes of the late 1980s, a small group of Christian social ethicists began to converse with free-market economists over the morality of market activity. This interdisciplinary exchange eventually led to the founding of a new academic subdiscipline under the rubric of economic personalism. These scholars attempt to integrate economic theory, history, and methodology with Christian personalism's stress upon human dignity, humane social structures, and social justice. This second volume in the series surveys the anthropological foundations to the disciplines of economics and moral theology. The first part of the book presents an overview of the German, French, and Polish branches of personalist thought. Particular attention is given to theological anthropology, especially as it is developed by such thinkers as Emmanuel Mounier, Max Scheler, Gabriel Marcel, Karol Wojtyla, and Emil Brunner. Part two surveys models of human nature that have been espoused by various schools of free-market thought—including mainstream neoclassical economics. In conclusion, the authors demonstrate how an expanded understanding of human nature can augment the ability of economic science to model and predict human behavior.