Non-cognitivism is an approach to metaphor that denies the existence of any metaphorical meanings. A metaphor’s only meaning is its literal meaning. The interpretation of metaphor, on this approach, does not consist in metaphorical contents being communicated by being either semantically encoded or pragmatically communicated. Rather, metaphor operates in an entirely non-linguistic way that does not require the postulation of such meanings. Metaphors cause people to see connections, even to grasp…
Read moreNon-cognitivism is an approach to metaphor that denies the existence of any metaphorical meanings. A metaphor’s only meaning is its literal meaning. The interpretation of metaphor, on this approach, does not consist in metaphorical contents being communicated by being either semantically encoded or pragmatically communicated. Rather, metaphor operates in an entirely non-linguistic way that does not require the postulation of such meanings. Metaphors cause people to see connections, even to grasp new thoughts, but they do not do so by meaning those thoughts or connections. Non-cognitivism faces a stern challenge from the problem of embedding: metaphors embedded in propositional attitude reports seem to require metaphorical meanings in their truth conditions. In this paper, we argue that existing attempts to solve this problem for non-cognitivism have been unsuccessful. We then offer a new solution that differentiates two scope readings of embedded metaphors and explains each in turn. The paper thus suggests that non-cognitivism has enough rescores to account for embedded metaphors.
