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18Martha Nussbaum: Anger and forgiveness: resentment, generosity, justice: Oxford University Press, New York, 2016, xii + 315 pp, $24.95International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (2): 259-263. 2019.
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1Conditions of Moral ResponsibilityDissertation, University of Notre Dame. 2000.The conditions of moral responsibility include having the right kind and amount of control over actions, events or states of affairs that are morally significant. Both metaphysical issues and normative concerns are relevant, and these are extensively intertwined. This dissertation proposes a framework for an original theory of moral responsibility. The idea that rational autonomy is required for moral responsibility is developed and defended. I clarify various aspects of rationality and the natu…Read more
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33Are We Rarely Free? A Response to RestrictivismPhilosophical Studies 107 (3): 219-237. 2002.Arguments for Restrictivism – the position that we are rarely free– have been proposed by incompatibilists Peter van Inwagen and David Vander Laan among others. This article is concerned much more with these arguments than with quantifying the frequency of free actions. There are two general ways to argue for restrictivism. First, one may take a Negative Strategy, arguing that the situations in which one is not free are common and predominant. Second, one may focus on situations in which one is …Read more
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88The problem of evil has been raised as a problem for any monotheist who has traditional beliefs about God. The belief that God exists and is omniscient) omnipotent, and omnibenevolent has been claimed to be inconsistent with the existence of evil. Though philosophical theists have provided successful defenses against the problem of evil, few if any, have given an adequate explanation of the existence of evil that is considered plausible on a specific belief system. In this thesis I explore the c…Read more
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26OverviewComparative Philosophy. forthcoming.On February 28, 2002, John Dominic Crossan gave a very well-organized and entertaining presentation for the Annual Mary Olive Woods Lecture and was well received by the large audience. His talk should spark continued interest in who is likely the most influential person ever to walk the earth. He condensed three lectures into one as he spoke of the materials, methods, and results of his historical research into the life of Jesus. The materials mentioned were the canonical Gospels of Matthew, Mar…Read more
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12Mundane or Incredible!?: Identifying When an Explanation Is RequiredAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2). 2008.The article explores the difference between something being merely extremely improbable but believable and something being literally incredible–unbelievably improbable without intervention of some sort. In the former case, a rational person would not expect a special explanation for the occurrence, but in the latter, she does. John Leslie and Peter van Inwagen have proposed principles that can be used to distinguish the two types of cases. The weaknesses of their principles are shown and a r…Read more
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737Moral Objectivity, Simplicity, and the Identity View of GodPhilosophia Christi 11 (1): 126-144. 2009.In contrast to the most common view, I argue that one can consistently affirm that fundamental moral principles are objective and invariable, and yet are dependent on God. I explore and reject appealing to divine simplicity as a basis for affirming this conjunction. Rather, I develop the thesis that God is identical to the Good (the Identity View or IV) and argue that the IV does not fall to the criticisms of simplicity. I then consider a divine will theory (DWT) that claims moral principles …Read more
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158Moral Responsibility and the Ability to Do OtherwiseJournal of Philosophical Research 30 303-319. 2005.Frankfurt-style examples (FSEs) cast doubt on the initially plausible claim that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for moral responsibility. Following the lead of Peter van Inwagen and others, I argue that if we are careful in distinguishing events by causal origins, then we see that FSEs fail to show that one may be morally responsible for x, yet have no alternatives to x. I provide reasons for a fine-grained causal origins approach to events apart from the context of moral responsibility…Read more
Macomb, Illinois, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Value Theory |