University of South Carolina
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2013
Fairfield, Connecticut, United States of America
  •  31
    Conventionality and Causality in Lewis-Type Evolutionary Prediction Games
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1): 199-219. 2023.
    Barrett and others have used Lewis-style evolutionary games to argue that we ought not to trust our scientific languages to inform us about ontology. More specifically, Barrett has shown that in some simple evolutionary contexts the best descriptive languages need not cut nature at its joints, that they may guide action as successfully as possible while simultaneously being deeply conventional. The present article expands upon Barrett’s argument, exploring the space for conventionalism in more m…Read more
  •  27
    Fictionalism, Semantics, and Ontology
    Perspectives on Science 26 (1): 52-75. 2018.
    In a previous article, I argued that some recent philosophical work on the use of fictions in science is, while illuminating about some aspects of current scientific practice, unduly limited to cases of well-established fictions. In other words, this earlier work contended, a philosophical account of scientific fictions can do more than merely describe scientific practices, but can aid in the resolution of disputes about the proper interpretation of scientific theories and the epistemic status o…Read more
  •  101
    I critically examine some recent work on the philosophy of scientific fictions, focusing on the work of Winsberg. By considering two case studies in fracture mechanics, the strip yield model and the imaginary crack method, I argue that his reliance upon the social norms associated with an element of a model forces him to remain silent whenever those norms fail to clearly match the characteristic of fictions or non-fictions. In its place, I propose a normative epistemology of fictions which clari…Read more
  •  20
    We consider an extension of signaling games to the case of prediction, where one agent perceives the current state of the world and sends a signal. The second agent perceives this signal, and makes a prediction about the next state of the world. We suggest that such games may be the basis of a model for the evolution of successful theorizing about the world.