•  523
    Oedipus the King: Temperament, Character, and Virtue
    with Robin Hankey
    Philosophy and Literature 29 (2): 269-285. 2005.
  •  446
    Free will and events in the brain
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 22 (3): 287-310. 2001.
    Free will seems to be part of the romantic echo of a world view which predates scientific psychology and, in particular, cognitive neuroscience. Findings in cognitive neuroscience seem to indicate that some form of physicalist determinism about human behavior is correct. However, when we look more closely we find that physical determinism based on the view that brain events cause mental events is problematic and that the data which are taken to support that view, do nothing of the kind. In fact …Read more
  •  276
    Perception and neuroscience
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (March) 83 (March): 83-103. 1989.
    Perception is often analysed as a process in which causal events from the environment act on a subject to produce states in the mind or brain. The role of the subject is an increasing feature of neuroscientific and cognitive literature. This feature is linked to the need for an account of the normative aspects of perceptual competence. A holographic model is offered in which objects are presented to the subject classified according to rules governing concepts and encoded in brain function in tha…Read more
  •  166
    The Neurodynamics of Free Will
    Mind and Matter 18 (2): 159-173. 2020.
  •  165
  •  151
    Brain bisection and personal identity
    Mind 95 (April): 224-9. 1986.
    It has been argued that 'brain bisection' data leads us to abandon our traditional conception of personal identity. Nagel has remarked: The ultimate account of the unity of what we call a single mind consists of an enumeration of the types of functional integration that typify it. We know that these can be eroded in different ways and to different degrees. The belief that even in their complete version they can be explained by the presence of a numerically single subject is an i1lusion.l Parfit …Read more
  •  143
    Consciousness and Intentionality
    with John McMillan
    John Benjamins. 2001.
    This book considers questions such as these and argues for a conception of consciousness, mental content and intentionality that is anti-Cartesian in its major...
  •  112
    Moral responsibility, consciousness and psychiatry
    with John McMillan
    Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 39 (11): 1018-1021. 2005.
  •  108
  •  99
    A discursive account of multiple personality disorder
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 4 (3): 213-22. 1997.
  •  97
    Disembodied persons
    Philosophy 61 (July): 377-386. 1986.
    In discussing Disembodied Persons we need to confront two problems: A. Under what conditions would we consider that a person was present in the absence of the normal bodily cues? B. Could such circumstances arise? The first question may be regarded as epistemic and the second as metaphysical
  •  97
    Minimally Conscious States, Deep Brain Stimulation, and What is Worse than Futility
    Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 8 (2): 145-149. 2011.
    The concept of futility is sometimes regarded as a cloak for medical paternalism in that it rolls together medical and value judgments. Often, despite attempts to disambiguate the concept, that is true and it can be applied in such a way as to marginalize the real interests of a patient. I suggest we replace it with a conceptual toolkit that includes physiological futility, substantial benefit (SB), and the risk of unacceptable badness (RUB) in that these concepts allow us to articulate what is …Read more
  •  86
    Are mental events preceded by their physical causes?
    with Christopher D. Green
    Philosophical Psychology 8 (4): 333-340. 1995.
    Libet's experiments, supported by a strict one-to-one identity thesis between brain events and mental events, have prompted the conclusion that physical events precede the mental events to which they correspond. We examine this claim and conclude that it is suspect for several reasons. First, there is a dual assumption that an intention is the kind of thing that causes an action and that can be accurately introspected. Second, there is a real problem with the method of timing the mental events c…Read more
  •  85
    Doctors' stories, patients' stories: a narrative approach to teaching medical ethics
    with B. Nicholas
    Journal of Medical Ethics 23 (5): 295-299. 1997.
    Many senior doctors have had little in the way of formal ethics training, but express considerable interest in extending their education in this area. This paper is the report of an initiative in continuing medical education in which doctors were introduced to narrative ethics. We review the theoretical basis of narrative ethics, and the structure of and response to the two-day workshop
  •  80
    Therapeutic Action
    Mind 113 (452): 769-771. 2004.
  •  74
    The neurophilosophy of pain
    Philosophy 66 (April): 191-206. 1991.
    The ability to feel pain is a property of human beings that seems to be based entirely in our biological natures and to place us squarely within the animal kingdom. Yet the experience of pain is often used as an example of a mental attribute with qualitative properties that defeat attempts to identify mental events with physiological mechanisms. I will argue that neurophysiology and psychology help to explain the interwoven biological and subjective features of pain and recommend a view of pain …Read more
  •  72
    Husserl, Wittgenstein and the snark: Intentionality and social naturalism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2): 331-349. 1997.
    The Snark is an intentional object. I examine the general philosophical characteristics of thoughts of objects from the perspective of Husserl's, hyle, noesis, and noema and show how this meets constraints of opacity, normativity, and possible existence as generated by a sensitive theory of intentionality. Husserl introduces terms which indicate the normative features of intentional content and attempts to forge a direct relationship between the norms he generates and the actual world object whi…Read more
  •  70
    The debates about human free will are traditionally the concern of metaphysics but neuroscientists have recently entered the field arguing that acts of the will are determined by brain events themselves causal products of other events. We examine that claim through the example of free or voluntary switch of perception in relation to the Necker cube. When I am asked to see the cube in one way, I decide whether I will follow the command (or do as I am asked) using skills that reason and language g…Read more
  •  62
    Representation, Meaning, and Thought
    Oxford University Press. 1992.
    This study examines the relationship between thought and language by considering the views of Kant and the later Wittgenstein along with many strands of contemporary debate in the area of mental content. Building on an analysis of the nature of concepts and conceptions of objects, Gillett provides an account of psychological explanation and the subject of experience, offers a novel perspective on mental representation and linguistic meaning, looks at the difficult topics of cognitive roles and s…Read more
  •  53
    The use of human tissue
    Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 4 (2): 119-127. 2007.
    The use of human tissue raises ethical issues of great concern to health care professionals, biomedical researchers, ethics committees, tissue banks and policy makers because of the heightened importance given to informed consent and patient autonomy. The debate has been intensified by high profile scandals such as the “baby hearts” debacle and revelations about the retention of human brains in neuropathology laboratories worldwide. Respect for patient’s rights seems, however, to impede research…Read more
  •  53
    Moral insanity and practical reason
    Philosophical Psychology 5 (1). 1992.
    The psychopathic personality disorder historically has been thought to include an insensitivity to morality. Some have thought that the psychopath's insensitivity indicates that he does not understand morality, but the relationship between the psychopath's defects and moral understanding has been unclear. We attempt to clarify this relationship, first by arguing that moral understanding is incomplete without concern for morality, and second, by showing that the psychopath demonstrates defects in…Read more
  •  51
    Moral theory and medical practice (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 41 (164): 379. 1991.
    In this unique study Fulford combines the disciplines of rigorous philosophy with an intimate knowledge of psychopathology to overturn traditional hegemonies. The patient replaces the doctor at the heart of medicine. Moral theory and the logic of evaluation replace epistemology as the focus of philosophical enquiry. Ever controversial, mental illness is at the interface of philosophy and medicine. Mad or bad? Dissident or diseased? Dr Fulford shows that it is possible to achieve new insights int…Read more
  •  49
    Bao-yu: A Mental Disorder or a Cultural Icon?
    with Flora Huang
    Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 11 (2): 183-189. 2014.
    The embodied human subject is dynamically connected to his or her historico-sociocultural context, the soil from which a person’s psyche is nourished as multiplex meanings are absorbed and enable personal development. In each culture certain towering artistic works embody this perspective. The Dream of the Red Chamber introduces Jia Bao-yu—a scion of the prestigious Jia family—and his relationships with a large cast of characters. Bao-yu is controversial but, at the time of the family’s tragic c…Read more
  •  47
    Delusions: A Different Kind of Belief?
    with Richard Mullen
    Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 21 (1): 27-37. 2014.
    Delusions, a key feature of psychosis, are usually thought of as a type of belief, as in the definition of the American Psychiatric Association: A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and despite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the person’s culture or subculture (e.g. it is not an article of …Read more
  •  44
    The first edition of The Mind and its Discontents was a powerful analysis of how, as a society, we view mental illness. In the ten years since the first edition, there has been growing interest in the philosophy of psychiatry, and a new edition of this text is more timely and important than ever. In The Mind and its Discontents, Grant Gillett argues that an understanding of mental illness requires more than just a study of biological models of mental processes and pathologies. As intensely soci…Read more