Graziosa Luppi

This review provides a systematic critique of the debate between two paradigms in the philosophy of mind—the Naturalist–Externalist Research Program (NERP) and the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program (PIRP)—with particular focus on Uriah Kriegel’s reconciliation project. Following Kriegel’s view, attention is given to rational agents’ awareness of their mental states—a key issue since most current artificial intelligence systems aim to model rational thinking and action. Naturalist accounts derive mental content from brain activity and environmental interaction, emphasizing a constitutive dependence of the former on the latter. In contrast, phenomenological theories assert that the object of mental states is an internal semblance presented to the subject. Within this framework, I maintain that Kriegel attempts to naturalize mental content within the framework of a Same Order theory, but this limits his ability to demonstrate that intentionality is grounded in consciousness in the sense of the Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. Compounding this issue, the idea that the mind arises from manipulating representations has been challenged by dynamical approaches to cognitive science, yet advanced representational models persist, often simulating phenomenological qualities through forms of internal data organization. Methodologically, the approach is primarily comparative and reconstructive, focusing on the structural tensions and theoretical commitments that distinguish NERP and PIRP.

My topic of study concerns the Cognitive Phenomenology debate and in my work, I offer a brief collection of the main arguments presented within it, in order to analyse the different positions of philosophical lines in contrast that characterise it (Liberals and Conservatives). Regarding the fundamental stances on the phenomenal and intentional character of conscious thoughts, one of my challenges has been to know which properties of mind are related to our thoughts. Moreover, I explained the interpretation that has been given of them by some materialist theories of mind and, on the other side, by the theories which prove the non reducibility of the mental to the physical. I proceeded to realise a defence of the Liberal view, showing that pure Cognitive phenomenology offers very convincing arguments on conscious experience of a subject's inner mental states and on their intentional (potentially conscious) contents. The conservative line, such as Prinz, Carruthers and Tye, proposes solutions that are based on the fundamental assertion that one is not in contact with cognitive properties and thoughts depend on what transmits them, natural language or an internal speech. That position is highly debated and at the end, I realised that there is a moderate solution that can be chosen and it is that I propose in the final part of my work. Key-words: phenomenal properties; functional properties; phenomenal intentional states; introspection.